Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1978

THE CHINESE ARMY

Ellis Joffe
Gerald Segal

Soviet Technology Imports

Philip Hanson

The Italian CP

Stephen Hellman

Book Reviews

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Young C. Kim

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

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Problems of Communism

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NOV-DEC 1978 VOL XXVII

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The Chinese Army and Professionalism

By Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal

After having been dormant for more than a decade, the multifaceted issue of military policy has again come to the fore of leadership politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Invoking what they claim is a long-term strategic threat to the PRC's security from the superpowers, particularly from the Soviet Union, important elements in the military have called for a rapid improvement of China's weapons and military equipment on the grounds that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has fallen far behind in the procurement of military technology and has to make up for lost time at the greatest possible speed.[1] They have also called for the modernization of military doctrine and for an across-the-board upgrading of the PLA's professional standards, with the strong implication that practical requirements should predominate over political considerations.

These demands have been voiced with an openness and intensity that would have been unthinkable in the twilight years of the Mao era and that represent a radical departure from the sullen silence or the stereotyped phrases that had characterized the public attitude of the military toward professional matters after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. This departure is a direct outgrowth of the changed political circumstances in the post-Mao period. For one thing, the death of Mao Tse-tung, and particularly the concomitant downfall of the Gang of Four, removed the chief barrier to the articulation of professional interests by the military. For another, the army's crucial role in the succession struggle and in the consolidation of the new leadership gave the military commanders very substantial power and put them in a position to articulate their interests with a fervor that had been impossible since the mid-1950's. The new political leadership, moreover, shares the PLA's commitment to professionalism and views its requirements with an unprecedented degree of understanding.

To be sure, differences have emerged between the political and military leaders, and some of the basic demands put forth by the armed forces have been rejected. Nevertheless, the military leaders have gained substantial and significant concessions which demonstrate that, after almost 20 years of wavering, the PLA has returned to professionalism. This article will examine the stages in that process in some detail and assess its implications.

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The Army and the Gang of Four

PLA intervention in the succession struggle on the side of the broad alliance of leaders known as the moderates and against their so-called radical rivals marked the real beginning of the process.

1. In Chinese usage, it should be noted, the term "People's Liberation Army" encompasses air and naval forces as well as ground forces. Throughout the following discussion, the shorthand designation "army" will be used in this sense.

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A PRC military delegation led by General Yang Cheng-wu, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army, examines French antitank weaponry at Camp de Mailly, France, on September 17, 1978.

—Brucelle/SYGMA.

The roots of this intervention should be sought in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's. During this turbulent period, the radical leaders gave direction and support to the activities of the Red Guards; in particular, they were responsible for goading the Red Guards into assaulting the PLA for its part in restoring order and suppressing revolutionary activity.[2] The result was a deep-seated animosity between most of the senior military figures, both central and regional, and the radical leaders. After the Cultural Revolution had run its course, this mutual hostility did not subside but rather hardened and acquired both personal and ideological dimensions. On the personal level, many military leaders—like their colleagues in the party—fell into oblivion, or suffered a worse fate, after they had been condemned by the radicals, and even those military figures who retained their positions had to contend with continuous sniping from the radical camp. Ideologically, the views of the radicals were anathema to military leaders. After its downfall, the Gang of Four was, in fact, blamed for a wide range of defects and problems that plagued the PLA and that had reportedly been caused by the Gang's antimilitary and antiprofessional attitudes.[3]

In the twilight of the Mao era—from Lin Piao's demise in 1971 to Mao's death in 1976—the bitter legacy of the previous turmoil conditioned the army's political role. After Lin's demise, the party leadership made an effort to remove the PLA from the dominating political positions it had attained during the Cultural Revolution and the period of party building

2. See Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Intervention," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Dec. 7, 1970, pp. 1-25.

3. See, for example, excerpts from an article by the Theoretical Group of the Training Department of the PLA General Staff, broadcast by New China News Agency (NCNA), Dec. 7, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Dec. 8, 1976, pp. E/4-9; see also the report by the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, NCNA, Feb. 4, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 8, 1977, pp. E/4-6.

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that followed it. On the local political level, the PLA did greatly lower its profile. But in the ruling organs, especially at the regional leadership level, it did not do so—because its implicit conditions for returning to the barracks could not be met. The main condition—and on this military commanders agreed, whatever their other differences—was that the interests of the military be protected by the civilian leaders who came in their place. At the least, then, military commanders had to be assured that order and stability would be maintained throughout the PRC, for it had been the widespread breakdown of order that had impelled them to move into the political arena in the first place. This, in turn, entailed assurance that the direction and execution of national policy would be in the hands of moderate cadres, with whom the military commanders shared a basic vision of the desired social order, regardless of the tensions between them.

But the military commanders gained no such assurances. Indeed, after coming together to oppose Lin, the coalition of moderate and radical leaders soon fell apart, and the entire period until Mao's death was marked by leadership conflict and uncertainty over national policy. As the moderate leaders, led first by Chou En-lai and then by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, attempted to consolidate their position by rehabilitating veteran cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution upheaval and by enunciating policies that played down extreme Maoist positions, their radical rivals, with Mao's backing, reacted with persistent attacks on the moderate leaders and their policies and with incessant attempts to subvert the position of the moderates. The result was a protracted conflict, the net effect of which was a standoff between the two camps, as the power pendulum swung from one to the other and back again.

This conflict at the top was repeated many times over in the localities, where allies of the rival leadership groups feuded among themselves, fomenting disorder and occasionally resorting to violence. Even if violence did not erupt, the prolonged stalemate and indecision in Peking caused uncertainty and the widespread breakdown of discipline.[4]

In this charged and unsettled situation, the military officers were clearly reluctant to relinquish their political posts. That reluctance was undoubtedly reinforced by the behavior of the radicals toward them. Inspired not only by their ideological views but also by a fear that a professionally-inclined army would be less amenable to their influence than a highly politicized one, the radicals attacked the campaign (begun after Lin's downfall) to promote professional values in the PLA and sought to upgrade political activities in the armed forces.[5] Moreover, capitalizing on the role of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, one of their top members, as director of the PLA's General Political Department, the radicals crudely attempted to meddle in the PLA's internal affairs, to discredit its veteran leaders and traditions, and to split it in order to bring at least some PLA elements into the radical camp.[6] All these moves had the cumulative impact of increasing the military commanders' suspicion and resentment and of solidifying their tacit alliance with the moderate leaders.

A PLA soldier stands guard outside the headquarters of the Heilungkiang Red Rebels' Revolutionary Committee in 1967 at the height of China's Cultural Revolution.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 4, 1967, p. 11.

4. For surveys of the period preceding Mao's death, see Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1976, pp. 1-17; and Harry Harding, Jr., "China after Mao," ibid., March-April 1977, pp. 1-12.

5. See, for example, "The Historical Experience of Three Ups and Three Downs in Military Training," *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, Jan. 24, 1978, as broadcast by NCNA, Jan. 25, 1978, in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London—hereafter *SWB*), FE/5725/BII, pp. 6-11, esp. pp. 6-7, 10.

6. See the sources cited in fn. 3 and excerpts from an article by the Theoretical Group of the Shanghai Garrison Command, Shanghai City Service, Jan. 19, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1977, pp. G/10-12.

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Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (left), former director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army and a member of the Gang of Four purged from power in September 1976; Wang Tung-hsing (center), a vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and head of Unit 8341, credited with toppling the Gang of Four; and Chen Hsi-lien (right), a vice premier of China and Commander of the Peking Military Region.

—The first photo by Sven Simon/Katherine Young; the others by Camera Press.

The working of this alliance was evident in the readiness of military commanders to give up their posts only if cadres with proven moderate credentials succeeded them. Since the comeback of such cadres was slow and since even rehabilitated cadres continued to be exposed to radical attacks, the withdrawal of the military from regional power centers was gradual. From the time of Lin's downfall until Mao's death, 8 military officers relinquished their concurrent posts as provincial party first secretaries, bringing the number from 21 down to 13. In each case, a veteran cadre took over the post. The 10th Party Congress in August 1973 formalized the rehabilitation of important party leaders and at the same time reduced the PLA's representation in the party's policymaking organs. In the Central Committee, PLA representation dropped from about 44 percent to some 30 percent, and in the Politburo it declined from about one half to one third. These trends pointed both to the process of disengagement and to its limits.

The limits were also manifest in the close watch the military officers continued to keep on political developments and in their attitudes toward these developments. Since the PLA newspaper, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao,* was in the hands of a department directed by a radical leader and since military commanders were caught in a cross fire, it is risky to try to use their public pronouncements as a means of discerning their stand. However, an examination of the major political campaigns during this period indicates that so long as the Peking leadership was split and spoke with two voices, the majority of the military tended to support campaigns, or themes within campaigns, that were associated with the moderate wing of the leadership, and remained distinctly cool to drives launched by the radicals.[7]

This is not to say that the entire PLA was united in opposition to the radical leaders. Indeed, the

7. This was evident, for example, during the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao campaign of 1974, when army-dominated provinces and major cities, with the exception of Shanghai and Canton, did not take up the radical theme of opposing "restoration." Similar restraint on the part of most army commands can be seen during the campaign against "bourgeois rights" in 1975, when they refrained from criticizing "empiricism," a code word for the expertise of the rehabilitated cadres. The army also by and large held back from attacking Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the real target of the radical-inspired "Water Margin" campaign in 1975. See Chang, loc. cit., p. 13.

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evidence suggests that the radicals had gained some support in the armed forces. The subsequent purges of, for example, Ting Shen, the commander of the Nanking Military Region, and Ma Ning, the recently appointed commander of the air force, after the fall of the Gang of Four probably stemmed from their radical connections. Moreover, the radicals had certainly courted key military commanders—of which Ch'en Hsi-lien and Li Te-sheng were the most prominent. Just how much backing this wooing gained the radicals, of course, is still moot. Some military men who were the object of the radicals' attention, such as Ch'en and Li, appeared only to be winking—if that—at the radicals.[8]

Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that whatever support the radicals managed to muster in the army, it was far outweighed by the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of officers to the PLA high command, led by the Minister of Defense, Yeh Chien-ying, and by their hostility toward the radicals. Their attitude is clear from the relatively small number of officers known to have been purged for radical ties in the immediate aftermath of the Maoist era[9] and the widespread denunciation of the Gang of Four by military commands after the Gang's demise. This attitude governed the army's behavior in the dramatic events sparked by Mao's death.

The Army in the Transition Period

In the short and still-mysterious power struggle that erupted after Mao's death, the role of the army was crucial. It seems, in retrospect, that such a struggle was bound to erupt once the Chairman was no longer present to hold the snarling rivals around him in check, no matter how senile he may have become in his last years. For one thing, the PRC has no established procedure for the transfer of power, and Hua's claim to legitimacy was pathetically flimsy, resting primarily on a vague phrase that Mao is supposed to have scribbled.[10] For another, Hua had no independent power base sufficiently strong to support him in the centrist position that he had uneasily occupied until Mao's death, and he had no choice but to place himself firmly in one of the contending camps.

Hua sided with the moderate leaders, probably for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. First, on the basis of his record both before and after Mao's death, there can be little doubt that Hua was much closer to the moderate position than to the radical position, even though he had mouthed radical slogans. Second, he presumably suspected that in the radical scheme he was marked for replacement as Mao's successor by the ambitious Chiang Ch'ing.

Whether Hua and his allies launched a preemptive attack on the radicals or whether they reacted to moves by the radical leaders is not certain. What is fairly certain is that without the backing of the PLA neither camp had sufficient strength to defeat its opponents swiftly and decisively. To be sure, the moderates plainly had stronger and more extensive power bases. Their chief strength lay in the party, the government, and the mass organizations. The radicals, on the other hand, also had power bases in these organs and had concentrated force in the form of well-armed militia units in Shanghai and probably to some extent in Peking as well. Their main power, however, lay not so much in the ruling organs as in the capacity of their followers to disrupt the orderly functioning of these organs—by

8. If Ch'en Hsi-lien had flirted with the radicals, he made a quick about-face and obviously played a crucial role in their downfall. According to a poster reportedly put up in Canton, Ch'en, together with Wu Teh and Wang Tung-hsing, presented a number of demands to Hua Kuo-feng in return for their support on the eve of the arrest of the radicals. "Three Pledges and Six Demands Sought by Ch'en Hsi-lien, Wu Teh, and Wang Tung-hsing from Hua Kuo-feng (October 5, 1976)." The poster, dated Feb. 10, 1977, was translated in *Chinese Law and Government* (White Plains, NY), Spring 1977, pp. 52-53.

9. As far as could be determined as of early 1978, there were few changes among the professional officers of the General Staff. Of the 10 deputy chiefs of staff appointed before the fall of the radicals, only 2 were replaced. The Political Department, however, was substantially revamped. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the director, and two of the four vice directors were also removed. The PLA services were relatively little affected. In the air force, a new commander of the air force was appointed, but just one of the six deputy commanders was replaced. The only other significant change in the services was the dismissal of one of the deputy commanders of the artillery. In the regions, the changes were largely in the two military regions whose commanders were purged—Ting Sheng in Nanking and Liu Hsing-yuan in Chengtu—although additional replacements did occur. For example, 4 out of 12 deputy commanders in Wuhan were removed, 2 out of 7 in Kunming, 2 out of 3 in Lanchow, 5 out of 12 in Peking, and 3 out of 9 in Shenyang. While there may have been other purges that have not been identified, the overall impression still is that the number of purged officers was not large. Moreover, some of those replaced may have lost their jobs for reasons other than connection with the Gang of Four.

10. A document published in Taiwan and attributed to the Canton military and party authorities underscored the fragility of Hua's claim to legitimacy: "We need not emphasize to excess that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng's appointment to the chairmanship of the Central Committee is based on a short phrase. 'With you in office, I can rest assured,' written by Chairman Mao. No matter how attractive the phrase is, it is at most an indication of Chairman Mao's personal intention and cannot be seen as a reflection of what the party, the army, and the people have in mind." See "Suggestion Regarding Certain Current Issues Made by the PLA Canton Military Region Party Committee and the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee of the CCP (February 1, 1977)," *Chung-yang Jih-pao*, Mar. 23, 1977, in *Chinese Law and Government*, Spring 1977, p. 78.

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Key figures in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party: from the left, Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying.

—Wide World.

means ranging from publishing articles in the mass media to instigating mass action. It was this trouble-making capacity that had enabled the radicals, with Mao's blessing, to prevent the moderate leaders from consolidating their position.[11] With Mao gone, the primary obstacle to mass action by the radicals was the army, which had convincingly demonstrated its negative attitude toward disruptive activities during the Cultural Revolution.

The radical leaders were well aware of this attitude and of the acute hostility of the senior military leaders. For this reason, they tried to neutralize these leaders by damaging military unity and discipline. Had they succeeded in seriously splitting the army, the PRC would probably have been plunged into prolonged internecine strife. Even had they only managed to keep the army out of the succession struggle, their power would have been greatly enhanced.

As it turned out, however, the radicals failed to make significant inroads into the PLA. When it came to the crunch, the army intervened forcefully against them, and the outcome of the struggle was decided with lightning speed.

This intervention had several facets. To begin with, the army carried out the coup against the Gang of Four and arrested its members. True, the credit for this operation was given to, or rather taken by, the elite guards—the now famous Unit 8341 commanded by Mao's veteran chief of security, Wang Tung-hsing. For his efforts, moreover, Wang was made one of the party's four vice chairmen by the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 and was elevated over several senior party figures to the five-member Standing Committee of the Politburo. But even though there is some uncertainty about whether Unit 8341 is ultimately subordinate to the General Office of the Central Committee—headed by Wang—or to the PLA high command, through the Peking garrison,[12] it is hardly conceivable that 8341 would, or could, have acted in the face of united opposition by army leaders. Despite its formidable power, the unit was no match for the army if the army had chosen to block its operation

11. See Harding, loc. cit., pp. 8-14.

12. On Wang Tung-hsing and Unit 8341, see Parris H. Chang, "The Rise of Wang Tung-hsing: Head of China's Security Apparatus," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1978, pp. 122-37. An article by the Theoretical Unit of the Peking Garrison Command implied that the security guards were under its command: "This unit of ours . . . always had the good fortune of guarding Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee." *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Dec. 13, 1976, in *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press* (Hong Kong—hereafter *SPRCP*), 77-03, p. 75. The poster referred to in fn. 8 says that "the Peking Military Region and Unit 8341 are to arrest the 'gang of four' jointly."

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or even to undo whatever action it had taken. Thus, regardless of how this particular line of command is sorted out, there can be little doubt that the army high command was, in the final analysis, behind the coup carried out by Unit 8341.

Once the coup was over, the army set in motion a major effort to strengthen Hua's position. In editorials and reports purportedly written by various units, it built up his image and underlined its support for him. It stressed his legitimacy as Mao's successor,[13] highlighted his virtues,[14] blasted his rivals,[15] and pledged its loyalty to him.[16] It emphasized his receptivity to its requirements and hinted that he had protected it from radical assaults during the Cultural Revolution[17]—an extremely sensitive issue for military leaders and one which had been a central factor in the chain of events that had led to Lin Piao's downfall. *Chieh-fang Chün Pao,* the army paper, also constantly linked Hua's name with that of Yeh Chien-ying, pointing to a bond between the two leaders.[18]

Although the army's symbolic support of Hua was not paralleled by a large-scale intervention of military units to prop up the new leadership, this was because no need for such intervention arose and not because of the army's reticence. The precedent for military intervention to settle political struggles had already been set, and it could safely be assumed that the army would not hesitate to quell any opposition. This, in any case, was plainly the assumption of supporters of the Gang of Four, most notably, the leaders of the Shanghai militia. They did not rise in revolt once their leaders in Peking had been eliminated. Just to make sure, however, the army reportedly moved troops into Shanghai after the coup.[19] It also seems to have intervened in Fukien and Hopeh to put down serious disorders, and to have taken over control of key railway centers, such as Chengchow in Honan, whose operations had been disrupted by infighting.[20] But on the whole the army remained on the sidelines.

Nonetheless, the threat of PLA intervention was omnipresent, and this threat, together with a declaration of support for Hua, greatly eased the consolidation of power by Hua and his colleagues. The army thus became the central pillar of the Hua leadership in the transition period. Its prestige, especially that of its veteran leaders, rose sharply. More significant, so did its power.

This power gave the PLA an exceedingly important voice in the policymaking councils of Peking—probably even more important than it enjoyed at the end of the Cultural Revolution, when it dominated the leadership organs in the provinces and wielded great influence within the central ruling group. At that time, there were significant limits on the army's influence in this group. For one thing, its influence rested to a large extent on its supremacy in the provinces, but there were serious tensions between the central military leaders and the regional military commanders as a result of cracks that had appeared and widened during the turmoil. Consequently, some of the civilian leaders, most notably Chou En-lai, probably had better lines of communication to the regional commanders than did the army high command under Lin Piao. This cleavage within the army undoubtedly reduced the power of the military representatives in the national decision-making organs. More significant, army leaders at the center and in the provinces had to contend with the towering presence of Mao, who by virtue of his personal stature and political position was able to intervene in the affairs of the military and impose restraints upon its activities.

No such inhibition exists in the post-Mao period. Neither Hua nor any other leader is capable of casting a giant shadow over the army as Mao did. Hua has had to establish his legitimacy and to consolidate his position, and to this end he has had to rely to a large extent on the army—a situation that has greatly weakened his ability to control it. Teng Hsiao-p'ing was probably originally put in the post of Chief of Staff by Chou En-lai in January 1975 partly to strengthen political control over the armed forces. However, Teng's subsequent embroilment in factional con-

13. See, for example, article by Editorial Department of the *Liberation Army Daily,* NCNA, Nov. 8, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 9, 1976, p. E/10.

14. Ibid., p. E/3. See also NCNA, Oct. 30, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 1, 1976, pp. E/11-13.

15. See, for example, NCNA, Dec. 23, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 6, 1977, pp. E/16-17.

16. E.g., *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Oct. 31, 1976, in *SPRCP,* 76-46, pp. 7-9.

17. Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* April 28, 1977, p. E/6.

18. See, for example, the article carried by NCNA, June 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 6, 1977, p. E/4.

19. According to an account emanating from a group in Hong Kong said to be close to the Peking line, the radicals had prepared the militia for action in Shanghai and had planned to move elements of the Shanghai militia to Peking. Immediately after the coup against the Gang of Four, Hsü Shih-yu, commander of the Canton Military Region sent in troops to assume temporary control of Shanghai. Chi Hsin, *The Case of the Gang of Four,* Hong Kong, Cosmos Books, 1977, pp. 38, 42. Marines from the East China Fleet were also reportedly sent in. See Parris H. Chang, "Who Gets What, When and How in Chinese Politics: A Case Study of the Strategies of Conflict of the Gang of Four," unpublished paper presented at the Contemporary China Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, p. 22.

20. *China Trade Report* (Hong Kong), September 1977. See also *The Economist* (London), July 2, 1977; and Chi Hsin, op. cit., p. 42.

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flicts and his controversial status have presumably made him dependent on the army leaders to a considerable extent—a position not conducive to rendering a chief of staff exceptionally assertive vis-à-vis his subordinates.

This does not mean, of course, that there are no important restraints on the army's power. The influence of army leaders as a bloc is diluted by military factionalism, and they have to compete for power with assertive civilian leaders, whose status has risen immensely since the downfall of the Gang of Four and whose position is not constantly undermined by the radicals. Moreover, the rules of the game in this competition have been reaffirmed, with the cardinal rule being that "the party commands the gun." The implication is that the army leadership—like other leaders—can press for the adoption of its views but must accept the decisions reached by the top decision-makers. This was the pattern in the 1950's, during the first decade of Communist rule, before Mao increasingly involved the army in politics.

The likelihood that the army will abide by this rule depends ultimately on its discipline and self-restraint, which derive from its professional ethic. That ethic has been vigorously revived and reinforced in the post-Mao period. Furthermore, the army can devote itself to the promotion of professional interests now because the Hua leadership has been receptive to its requirements and because stability across the land has been restored by Hua's policies and by the removal of radical cadres at all levels of the ruling hierarchy. The army, in short, can safely return to the barracks.

This the army has done, but with important reservations. On the one hand, it has insisted on retaining a strong voice in decision-making, and it has used this voice to make resounding calls for modernization. On the other hand, it has not extended its power from policy formulation to policy implementation by taking over leadership positions throughout the country. To the contrary, it has tended toward a further disengagement from civil affairs in the post-Mao period. In other words, the army seems to want a major influence in the making of decisions without involving itself in the actual political administration of the country. It can adopt this position because it need not assume administrative burdens to enhance its power at the center. Its role in the succession crisis has already given it great power there.

These two aspects of the army's role have been illuminated by the makeup of the central leadership organs elected by the 11th Party Congress, and by shifts in the composition of the regional leadership organs. In the highest policymaking body, the Politburo, 12 of the 23 full members can be said to represent the military—as compared with 7 out of 21 in the 10th Politburo and 10 out of 21 in the 9th Politburo. The military is thus the strongest bloc in the Politburo, and its members include all the veteran marshals and representatives of all the services. In the Central Committee, the strength of the PLA has remained at about 30 percent. Of the military members, roughly 48 percent are central military men, and 52 percent, regional. By contrast, 65 percent of the military representatives in the 9th Central Committee, which was elected in 1969 immediately after the Cultural Revolution, were from the regions. Thus, the political importance of the regional military as compared with that of the military men at the center has tended to decline. This trend presumably reflects the military's withdrawal from an involvement in political administration, which is carried on at the local level, rather than from participation in policymaking at the national level. That conclusion is reinforced by the nature of the shifts in provincial party first secretaries. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, military men held 21 of the 29 posts. In 1976, at the time of Mao's death, the number had dropped to 13. By early 1978, it stood at 9, and by late 1978, at 7.

If army commanders in the regions are withdrawing from political involvement, the top army leadership is very much an active participant in national politics—a situation reminiscent of the opening phases of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960's. After the campaign against the Gang of Four wound down, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* fired several ringing editorial salvos against unnamed but obviously senior leaders "bending with the wind, slipping away, and causing quakes."[21] While it was not clear at the time who was behind these esoteric attacks or what they were intended to achieve, they were apparently aimed at important figures who had had connections with the Gang of Four but who had not been purged. Later events suggest that one of the targets was Wu Teh, the former mayor of Peking, who had collaborated with the radicals and who fell from his post in October 1978. Thus, the army leadership is making its voice heard not only on military matters but also with respect to power and personal conflicts. That fact again highlights the emerging pattern of political participation by the

21. NCNA, Jan. 27, 1978, in *SWB*, FE/5727/BII/1-2.

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military: the army leaders obviously have no intention of withdrawing from national politics and policymaking, but neither are they moving army units into the political arena. Below the national level, the post-Mao trend is toward a further disengagement of the military from politics. The best indication of this trend is the return to military professionalism.

Prior Constraints on Professionalism

The death of Mao and the ouster of the radical leaders removed a number of constraints on the military which had severely hindered the advancement of their professional interests during the previous decade and had thereby led to a serious decline in the PLA's combat capabilities, particularly in the last five years of Mao's life. Although an attempt to reassert the professional requirements of the military had followed the downfall of Lin Piao in 1971, these constraints had thwarted it.

One of the constraints was the entanglement of the army in civil affairs and political struggles. This entanglement sapped its energy and diverted its attention from military affairs. Furthermore, such involvement created cleavages within the army and transformed it from a cohesive military machine into an arena for political conflicts.

Another constraint was the absence of a strong military voice within the ruling elite after the demise of Lin Piao and other top army leaders as a result of their alleged plot to assassinate Mao. Lin, to be sure, had severely damaged the army's professionalism by involving it deeply in political conflicts and by using it for his own purposes. At the same time, however, he had forcefully represented the military in policymaking councils and helped raise the level of military procurement. His disappearance from the scene removed that advantage. Moreover, the subsequent purge of officers with real or suspected connections with him and the pall of suspicion that the supposed plot against Mao cast over the military—whatever the truth of the charge against Lin and his associates—weakened the position of the army at other levels as well.

The most serious constraint, however, was the climate of acute antiprofessionalism that the radicals, with Mao's blessing, created and their readiness to pounce on the proponents of any view that advanced the special interests of the military. They did not argue the merits of the case but attacked their opponents on ideological grounds; consequently, officers who expressed professional concerns found themselves accused of advocating a "bourgeois military viewpoint" and in danger of being branded "revisionists." Radio Peking explained their predicament in this way:

If you talked about strengthening the weapons and equipment of the armed forces and about developing the most advanced national defense technology,

The late Lin Piao, right, pictured with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung in April 1969 at the Ninth CCP Congress, at a time when Lin was considered Mao's heir apparent.

—Camera Press.

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they [the Gang of Four] would say you advocated the theory that weapons decide everything and pursued a revisionist military line. The Gang of Four slandered efforts to develop the most advanced national defense technology, saying that when the "satellites go up into the sky," the red flag would inevitably "trail in the dust."[22]

This climate put professional officers on the defensive. If they tried to get their views across, they had to conceal their real intentions in layers of ritualistic verbiage. In any case, they were in no position to gain adequate recognition of the army's requirements.

The result of these various factors had been a drastic deterioration in the combat capabilities of the armed forces. This deterioration was most striking with regard to conventional weapons and equipment. The Chinese have made no secret of their technological backwardness in these areas. Even when the radicals were still in power, the PLA showed a surprising readiness—for reasons which were obscure but probably related to domestic and international politics—to put its backwardness on display. Thus, Drew Middleton, military correspondent of *The New York Times,* and former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and his party were shown military units armed with outdated weapons. Since Mao's death, the Chinese have been quite candid about the retarded state of their armaments, and many reports from military units, under the guise of attacking the Gang of Four, have clearly intimated that their weapons are inadequate for modern warfare. One article, for example, asserted:

The gang allowed nobody to mention improvements or work on making improvements. According to its reactionary logic, we should not have atomic bombs, make new weapons or equip our PLA units and militia forces with new weapons. The only thing that can be done is to do what our ancestors did: use sharp arrows to cope with an enemy armed to the teeth.[23]

If such statements have been couched in highly exaggerated terms as a result of the Chinese penchant for blowing up the sins of fallen opponents,

Chinese pilots and ground crews simulate a "scramble" with Chinese-made MIG aircraft.

—Eastfoto.

the retarded state of the army's equipment has also been illuminated by vignettes that found their way, probably inadvertently, into reports on army units. For example, an article by a mechanized artillery company, after emphasizing the importance of weapons and the need to modernize them, described its own efforts at weapons improvement:

We have made innovations to improve our 82-millimeter mortars and to reduce the weight of saddles for mules, horses, and camels. The speed for firing each mortar shell doubled, and the weight of such saddles was reduced by one-third.[24]

Another report from *Chieh-fang Chün Pao,* extolling the importance of training, noted that as a result of intensive training "mortar teams hit targets by manually adjusting the angle of fire and not by using range finders, and artillery observers measure distances visually."[25] This is an army that is ranged, on China's northern border, against Soviet divisions equipped with modern weapons!

Although the disclosures of China's military backwardness are no doubt intended to discredit the Gang of Four, they cannot be dismissed as mere fabrications for that purpose, for they have merely confirmed what Western military observers have

22. Peking Domestic Service, Feb. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 7, 1977, p. E/6.
23. Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 13, 1977, p. E/5.
24. Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 15, 1977, p. E/24.
25. Peking Home Service, Feb. 25, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5754/BII/2.

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been saying for several years—that the weapons systems of China's armed forces are 10-20 years out of date. While there is no question that the individual Chinese soldier is physically fit, highly disciplined, superbly motivated, and well led, there is also no question that in comparison with soldiers in other modern armies he is poorly equipped, inadequately serviced, and insufficiently trained for complex operations.

By all Western accounts, the PLA is still predominantly an infantry force. Of the 136 estimated main force divisions, 121 are infantry, and only 12 are armored. Moreover, the infantry units are deficient in all types of modern weapons other than light arms and, probably, artillery. The Chinese air force consists mainly of MIG 17's and MIG 19's, which are no match for advanced US and Soviet aircraft. Although the Chinese have also designed and produced their own, more sophisticated version of the MiG 19—the F-9—they have run into trouble with its engines and have temporarily halted mass production. The navy remains overwhelmingly a coastal defense force.[26]

In the eyes of most Western experts, the PLA is a defense force with little capacity for operating beyond China's borders but capable of frustrating an invader by relying on manpower, on a strategy of "people's war,"[27] and on China's terrain. The Chinese themselves have made no other claims for their armed forces. However, one military commentator who visited China with the Schlesinger party has questioned even the PLA's capability of defending against a large-scale thrust by fast-moving Soviet armor with air support, in light of its present level of weapons, communications equipment, and transport facilities.[28] Some Chinese officers may be raising similar questions.[29]

In any event, the technological deficiencies of the PLA are glaring—especially in precision guided and antitank missiles, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, advanced technology for tanks, interceptors with all-weather and night-flying capability as well as with sophisticated electronic warfare equipment, and an air defense system to protect Chinese ground troops from enemy aircraft. Apparently, the Chinese in 1961 launched a development program to improve their weapons and equipment—with emphasis on guided missiles with nuclear warheads, surface-to-surface missiles for long-range artillery, antiaircraft and antitank guns, medium tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored cars[30]—and they made considerable headway during the early 1960's in implementing the program and greatly increased the firepower and mobility of the PLA's combat units. But the program lost its impetus as a result of the constraints under which the military had to operate during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath and as a result of China's economic difficulties. Consequently, the PLA lagged further and further behind other major armies which were making rapid technological advances. Thus, the Chinese army is still afflicted with a wide range of serious shortcomings in weapons and equipment.

The New Situation

These shortcomings top the list of issues that have been a source of anxiety to the Chinese professional officers, and in the post-Mao period the officers have been able to address the PLA's deficiencies with unprecedented frankness and forcefulness. This situation reflects not only the removal of the constraints upon them but also the power that they gained because of the army's role in the succession struggle. Their views, moreover, have found a receptive audience among the pragmatic leaders of the present regime. Although the demands of the officers have sparked conflicts of interest with the civilian leaders about the road to modernization and the allocation of resources, there seems to be a broad consensus among the policymakers on the need to modernize the PLA and to raise its professional standards. The upshot has been an upsurge of military professionalism the likes of which have not been seen in China since the brief period of Soviet-style modernization in the mid-1950's.

This professionalism has been reflected first of all in statements emanating from the military. The main theme of these statements has been that the weapons and equipment of the Chinese armed forces must be improved because China cannot afford to lag behind the major powers. "The enemies we will

26. See International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1977-78,* London, 1977; A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia,* Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1977, pp. 273-88.

27. For a discussion of Chinese military strategy, see William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, Chap. 2. See also the present author's article, "The Chinese Army: A Balance Sheet," in *Quadrant* (Sydney, Australia), November 1977, pp. 44-48.

28. Edward N. Luttwak, "Chinese Security after Mao," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations,* Summer 1977, pp. 97-111.

29. See, for example, Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 14, 1977, p. H/1; Peking Home Service, Jan. 20, 1977, in *SWB,* FE/5721/BII/4; and NCNA, Jan. 25, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5725/BII/7.

30. Personal information from observers of military affairs.

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face are armed with sophisticated weapons and equipment," warned *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*.[31] Taking up this theme, an article by a PLA unit said:

Since war goes on continuously, weapons and equipment must be improved continuously . . . . This is because we must not remain stagnant and make no advancement militarily, especially in modern warfare. Remaining stagnant and making no advancement means lagging behind. Everyone knows that one who lags behind will take a beating.[32]

The articulated rationale for this demand is usually that the superpowers are preparing for war and China has to be ready for any eventuality.[33] Yet the apocalyptic, abstract, and stereotyped nature of such warnings suggests that the Chinese do not fear an immediate attack even from the Soviet Union—certainly not to the same extent at least that they did in the late 1960's. Even those officers who are pressing for a rapid improvement of China's defense posture apparently are not asking for "quick fixes" to counter an imminent danger; rather, they are urging a broad and basic program of military modernization that will encompass all the services and will eventually place the PLA on a par with other modern armies. As they put it: "We must have not only more aircraft and cannons but also atomic bombs; we must have not only what other countries have, but also what other countries do not have."[34]

To the extent that such statements are not just rhetoric, they are completely unrealistic for the short term. The Chinese military officers undoubtedly know quite well that in the foreseeable future they will not have what the superpowers have—let alone overtake the superpowers. What their statements point to, therefore, is a long-term and sustained modernization drive designed to narrow the gap as much as possible.

Closely linked to the theme of weapons modernization has been that of the importance of military training. The military has stressed that complex weapons require complex skills to operate them.[35] Such skills, the military has argued, can be acquired only through training. Consequently, it is on this task that the army should concentrate, for fighting, or preparing to fight, is its calling.[36]

Radical leaders had reportedly obstructed earlier efforts to launch training programs, in the same way that they had hindered the modernization of the armed forces. They branded these efforts as "advocacy of the purely military viewpoint and a resurgence of the bourgeois military line."[37] They even went to some units and "ordered the units to stop training and concentrate on studying the history of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools of military thinking."[38] And they allegedly made a farce of military training. To quote *Chieh-fang Chün Pao:*

Consider Chiang Ch'ing, for example. Bayonet training should aim at hard, accurate, and fierce blows to the enemy. She said: "No good. The movements are ungraceful." She forced all PLA units to learn the movements of theatrical sword dancers. It would be a total disaster. . .if all PLA units followed her instructions.[39]

With the revival of military training, the specialized training of officers in military academies has been emphasized. According to *Chieh-fang Chün Pao,* "officers cannot be trained with the same methods as those for soldiers," for a modern army requires officers with professional training.[40]

In addition, the leadership has affirmed, as it did in the 1950's, that officers will receive material and retirement benefits that will help ensure a constant flow of qualified personnel into the PLA's ranks. Refuting charges by the Gang of Four that the army had violated egalitarian principles, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* said:

The cadres and fighters of our army do draw salaries and allowances. It is necessary for them to do so at present. . . .we cannot go without giving a certain material guarantee to the life of the commanders and fighters. In order to maintain the army's fighting strength, it is necessary to constantly replenish its organic fiber. It is imperative to see to it that those who leave the army. . .and that those who remain in the army and join the army ranks later will feel easy and assured.[41]

31. NCNA, Sept. 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 26, 1977, p. E/12.
32. Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 15, 1977, p. E/23.
33. See, for example, Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 14, 1977, p. H/2.
34. Peking Home Service, Jan. 20, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5721/BII/1.
35. NCNA, Sept. 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 26, 1977, p. E/12.
36. See the excerpt from *Chieh-fang Chün Pao,* as reported by Peking Domestic Service, June 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 29, 1977, p. E/15.
37. Ibid., p. E/14.
38. Ibid.
39. Peking Home Service, Feb. 25, 1977, in *SWB,* FE/5754/BII/3.
40. As reported by Peking Domestic Service, June 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 29, 1977, p. E/16.
41. Peking Domestic Service, Mar. 15, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 23, 1977, p. E/18.

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

The renewed emphasis on officer training in the Chinese Army is suggested by this August 1977 photo of a unit visiting the original site of the Officers' Training Regiment on the 50th anniversary of the regiment's founding by Chu Teh in 1927.

—Camera Press.

As part of their effort to raise the quality of the army, the military leaders have also looked inward. What they saw was a decline of standards among command personnel. This decline, which had allegedly occurred under the influence of the Gang of Four, had produced serious defects: "softness, laziness, laxity, pride, slackness, arrogance, extravagance, and idleness."[42] To eradicate these defects, the high command has ordered a reshuffling of leadership organs and a weeding out of undesirable personnel in the officer corps. Although the stated criterion for the appointment of officers to important posts is professional competence, it should be noted that it has been made plain that officers suspected of having had connections, direct or indirect, with the Gang of Four are not eligible for such posts.[43]

The crackdown on the officer corps is part of a broader effort to restore strict discipline in the army. It is maintained that "a highly centralized fighting body. . .must have strict discipline and obey orders in all actions, for concerted action alone leads to victory. If each goes his own way, how can there be any fighting power?"[44] While this proposition sounds eminently sensible to a Western ear, it apparently did not to the radicals, who equated discipline with "slavishness," asserted that rules and regulations were restrictive, and encouraged opposition to superiors.[45]

A corollary of the resurgence of professionalism has been the downgrading of the militia, which has always constituted a barometer of the power relationship between "reds" and "experts" in military affairs. The officer corps has long opposed the militia on the grounds that it absorbs scarce resources but has only a limited utility in modern

42. Peking Home Service, Feb. 24, 1978, in *SWB*, FE/5754/BII/5.
43. NCNA, Feb. 23, 1978, in *SWB*, FE/5751/BII/8-9.
44. Ibid., p. 9.
45. Peking Domestic Service, June 28, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1977, pp. E/1-6.

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warfare.[46] To these drawbacks, the radicals added another element which further discredited the militia in the eyes of the professional military: the radicals tried to build it up as a counterforce to the army.[47] Since the downfall of the radicals, the importance of the militia has been subtly but significantly scaled down. Military leaders have stressed that the role of the militia is only to support the army and that under no circumstances should it have an independent command system. In line with this role, they have insisted that the militia again be placed under the joint leadership of the army and the local party committees.[48]

It is impossible to determine with certainty to what extent the demands and desires of the professional military have been translated into practice. However, given the power of the military commanders in the post-Mao period and the mood of the Hua Kuo-feng leadership, it is a safe guess that these demands have not been confined to statements made by the military but are being implemented within the limits imposed by the economy.

Some concrete indications buttress this judgment. First, the Chinese have obviously taken certain steps to modernize the armed forces. In February 1977, they convened conferences on air defense, armaments production, and research into military technology.[49] They likewise displayed a practical interest in foreign military technology by sending military delegations abroad and by playing host to military visitors from foreign countries.[50] Specific outcomes of this interest have been China's reported desire to purchase British Harrier jumpjets and its reported purchase of French antitank missiles.[51] Of at least indirect pertinence to the advancement of military technology, too, is the new status accorded scientific research and science workers by the leadership at a conference on science in March 1978.[52]

Second, there is evidence that military training has been stepped up and military discipline has been tightened,[53] and the periods of military service have been restored to their pre-Cultural Revolution levels to enable troops to master complex weapons systems. Also significant is the fact that high-ranking officers who had been purged for their professional views have reappeared since the ouster of the radicals. The most prominent of these are Huang K'o-ch'eng, former Chief of Staff, and Hung Hsüeh-chih, former Director of the General Staff's Logistics Department. Both had fallen in 1959 owing to their association with former Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, an outspoken advocate of military professionalism. Furthermore, a number of other officers with similar histories who had already reappeared before the elimination of the radicals but who had not at least publicly returned to key positions have been appointed to important posts. The most notable was the late Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had been purged at the outset of the Cultural Revolution for urging an increase in military training and importation of military technology from the Soviet Union. Lo became Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee before his death in August 1978.

Army-Party Relations

Along with the return to professionalism has gone a resubordination of the army to the party, although this trend has not been nearly as intense as the revival of professionalism. PRC leaders have strongly condemned the tendency of some commanders to disobey orders and to go their own way.[54] They have reaffirmed that command of the army ultimately rests with the party's Military Affairs Committee, whose orders must be carried out without question.[55] They have restated that leadership at all levels of the armed forces is exercised by party committees, which practice a division of labor between military commanders and political commis-

46. See Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1965, pp. 87-91.

47. See, for example, Shanghai City Service, Nov. 28, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 29, 1976, pp. E/4-10.

48. Peking Domestic Service, July 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* July 11, 1977, pp. E/1-5.

49. Peking NCNA in English, Feb. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 7, 1977, p. E/4.

50. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Oct. 22, 1977.

51. *The Observer* (London), Apr. 16, 1978; *The Age* (Melbourne), May 4, 1978; *International Herald Tribune,* Oct. 19, 1978.

52. See, for example, Hua Kuo-feng's speech to the National Science Conference, Mar. 24, 1978, in *Peking Review,* Mar. 31, 1978, pp. 6-14.

53. Peking Home Service, Feb. 25, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5754/BII/1-4; NCNA, Feb. 16, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5749/BII/9; Peking Home Service, Feb. 20, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5749/BII/10; Peking Home Service, April 8, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5786/BII/5-7.

54. See, for example, an article by Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, who was later appointed Minister of Defense and may already have been carrying out the functions of this office when he wrote the article. Peking Domestic Service, Sept. 18, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 20, 1977, pp. E/1-10, esp. p. E/9.

55. Peking Domestic Service, June 24, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 29, 1977, pp. E/2-6, esp. p. E/6.

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sars.[56] And they have underlined the importance of political work in the army, of adhering to the "mass line" in dealing with subordinates, and of perpetuating the army's revolutionary traditions.[57]

PLA officers seem to have accepted the emphasis on the subordination of the army to the party without dissent. In contrast to the late 1950's, there has been no public hint of resistance to political control or of disputes on this issue. One reason for this acceptance is the basic loyalty of the officers to the party, their discipline, and their commitment to the notion, if not always the practice, that "the party commands the gun." However, these factors were also present in other periods, when professional officers chafed under political controls and actively resisted them. The difference probably lies in the way political controls are applied today. They seem to be implemented in a moderate manner that does not infringe upon professional requirements.[58] Given the political weight of the army, as well as the affinity of basic interests between the civilian and military leaderships, it could hardly be otherwise.

In the current PLA-party relationship, then, the PLA has come under the increasing control of the party; even its "dissident" groups will apparently accept the central leadership's decisions. Conflicts that now arise are therefore likely not to be ideological, but bureaucratic, in the sense that the PLA now operates only as a pressure group vis-à-vis the top leadership. Thus, after years of concentration on political activities and the neglect of military needs, the PLA has returned to professionalism, so much so that it has been impossible to maintain a fine equilibrium—despite the leadership's declared aim to do so—between the two sides of the "red and expert" equation. In the immediate aftermath of the Mao era, the center of gravity has moved decisively to the side of the experts.

This pressure group role of the PLA has taken on special significance in recent months, for although the PRC's leaders appear generally agreed on the need to modernize the PLA, they seem to differ on how best to achieve this common objective. The critical task for them at present is to choose the correct road to modernization.

56. Ibid. See also *Peking Review,* Dec. 9, 1977, pp. 18-22.

57. Peking Domestic Service, June 24, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 29, 1977, pp. E/2-6, esp. p. E/4. See also Peking Domestic Service, July 4, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* July 7, 1977, pp. E/2-8; Peking Home Service, Feb. 17, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5745/BII/8-9.

58. The theme that political control should be strengthened but should be aimed at solving practical problems and should take concrete conditions into account was stressed at an important All-Army Political Work Conference held from late April to early June 1978. See speech by Teng Hsiao-p'ing in *FBIS-CHI,* June 6, 1978, pp. E/1-10.

Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army inspect a West German "Leopard" tank in Augustdorf (near Bielefeld) in March 1978.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

Which Road to Modernization?

Disagreements on the issue of modernization have been aired extensively and with surprising candor in the Chinese media. In evaluating these disagreements, of course, it is necessary to keep several caveats in mind. First, with regard to the issues themselves, there are doubtless nuances and differences of emphasis within schools of thought, nuances that are difficult for outside observers to detect. Moreover, not all the disputed issues necessarily carry the same weight or receive the same attention. And it is quite likely, though by no means definite, that although the groups in one school hold similar views on all the issues, not all the groups in one school are committed to all the issues in the same way. Second, with regard to personages, it is easier to discern the chief arguments than the personalities behind them. Clearly, the proponents of conflicting viewpoints do not fall into neat party and PLA categories; different groups in the PLA undoubtedly hold different views, although it is impossible to identify these groups with certainty. It may be safely assumed, however,

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that the dominant views expressed in the media reflect the position of the top PLA leaders, or at least most of them, who also function as national leaders with concerns that transcend specific military interests. And this position is clearly supported by the bulk of the civilian leadership. But it is not known who constitutes the minority group, or groups, in the PLA or to what extent these groups have support in party circles. Finally, it should be remembered that all those who take part in the debate over modernization must establish their Maoist credentials by asserting that they are not advocating the theory of "weapons over man." The standard ploy is to argue that although the "human element" is of supreme importance in warfare, weapons are also important; and that the Gang of Four had refused to concede this point and had falsely charged its proponents with promoting the notion that weapons are decisive.[59]

Broadly speaking, there have been two main schools of thought on the question of modernization. The basic difference between the two schools has concerned the *pace* of change. One school has pressed for rapid modernization of the PLA's weapons and equipment. An article in *Kuang-ming Jih-pao,* for example, argued:

The defense industry is part of the national economy and also part of defense construction. The development of the defense industry must be in keeping not only with the development of the entire national economy, but also with the progress of the modernization of national defense. Therefore, the defense industry also has considerable independence and initiative. It should be developed as fast as possible so that a good foundation may be laid. . . before the outbreak of war. At the same time, the defense industry is a sector which makes comprehensive use of the latest scientific and technical achievements. [It]. . .will inevitably continue to make new demands on other industries and on science and technology, thus motivating the development of the entire national economy and helping raise the levels of production, science, and technology.[60]

A *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* editorial likewise emphasized the importance of the time factor:

Modernization of science and technology must develop before economic construction; similarly it must develop before national defense construction. Just think about this: how can we use advanced weapons and equipment without vigorously trying to develop science and technology?. . .We cannot afford to let time slip through our fingers because time waits for no one. If we act slowly we will lag behind and will have to passively receive the blows.[61]

Reiterating that speed is of the essence, the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission warned that "it is not a good idea to wait until one is thirsty to start digging a well. . . .we must race against time, compete for speed, [and] do everything possible to overcome difficulties in modernizing the science and technology of national defense."[62] It then fired a salvo at the opponents of this view:

Anyone who still thinks that in any future war against aggression it will be possible to use broadswords against guided missiles and other nuclear weapons of imperialism and social-imperialism is evidently not prepared to possess all the weapons and means of fighting which the enemy has or may have. This is a foolish and even criminal attitude which Lenin criticized a long time ago.[63]

The second school of thought has advocated gradual modernization, insisting that economic development must take precedence over weapons improvement in the short term and that the economic sector therefore should receive top priority in the allocation of resources. Perhaps the most elaborate statement of this point of view came in a Radio Peking broadcast that discussed Mao's stand on the relationship between economic and military development.[64] It began by underlining the interdependence of the two sectors: "Stepping up economic construction means strengthening the material foundation of national defense construction. National defense construction is the reliable guarantee that economic construction can be carried out." It then laid down the order of priorities: "Our principle is that. . .we should strengthen national defense construction on the basis of the

59. See, for example, Peking Domestic Service, Feb. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 7, 1977, p. E/6.
60. *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 20, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 31, 1977, p. E/2.
61. Peking NCNA Domestic Service, Sept. 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 26, 1977, p. E/12.
62. Peking Home Service, Jan. 20, 1978, in *SWB,* FE/5721/BII/4.
63. Ibid., p. 3.
64. Peking Domestic Service, Feb. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 7, 1977, pp. E/5-9.

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development of economic construction." Then it went on to explain in detail the reasons for this order:

Why is it necessary to first of all step up economic construction in order to strengthen national defense?. . .It is well known that the people must first be fed and clothed in order to strengthen national defense and to be able to fight. Therefore, agricultural development has a great bearing on strengthening national defense. . . .Since most commanders and fighters. . .come from the countryside, this requires us to develop agriculture. . . .

The development of heavy industry in particular is of the utmost importance for national defense construction. To. . .strengthen national defense, it is necessary to produce planes, guns, tanks, warships, rifles, ammunition, and other weapons and equipment . . . . if we are not to be bullied by foreign enemies we should also have atom and hydrogen bombs, modern communications equipment, transport means, and so forth. All these cannot be obtained without the development of the metallurgical, machine-building, fuel, chemical, power, meters and instruments, electronic and other basic industries. Only by developing such industries rapidly can we lay a solid material foundation for strengthening national defense.

Finally the broadcast spelled out the concrete choices facing the nation. One alternative was to reduce expenditures on the economic sector in order to step up the development of national defense. This way was wrong. The other alternative was to reduce the proportion of military expenditures and divert the differential to economic construction. This was the correct way, and it would facilitate the strengthening of national defense. How should this alternative be implemented? Quoting Mao, the broadcast replied that military expenditures should be reduced to about 20 percent of all expenditures. However, the broadcast also indicated that while this proportion should be maintained as the standard, it might yield an increase in the absolute level of military expenditures as a result of economic development.

Besides the difference over the pace of military modernization, there has also been a divergence of views about the relevance of Maoist military doctrine. It is, of course, impossible to show definitively that the divisions on the two issues follow the same lines, but it seems reasonable to presume that at least in large part they do. Officers particularly sensitive to the retarded state of China's armaments, for instance, can be expected to have doubts about the continuing suitability of Mao's doctrine of "people's war," which relies on the superiority of the "human element" to overcome inferiority in weapons technology, to China's defense requirements. Similarly, those advocating gradual modernization of the PLA are likely to regard continued adherence to the doctrine of "people's war" as a partial counterbalance to the PLA's technological backwardness.

The debate on this issue has been more muted than that on the pace of military modernization. This fact is readily explained by the sensitivity of the issue. In the first place, officers who demand rapid military modernization can still claim to be loyal Maoists on the ground that Mao never deprecated the importance of weapons in warfare, but it is much harder for officers to call for a revision of Maoist military doctrine and still make that claim. And when professional officers have forcefully expressed their doubts about the doctrine of "people's war" in the past, they have tended to produce political confrontations that have led to their dismissals. This was the case with P'eng Teh-huai in the late 1950's and Lo Jui-ch'ing in the mid-1960's. Second—and more significant—even after Mao's death, the doctrine of "people's war" remains the cornerstone of China's defense strategy and must continue to do so as long as the Chinese have to rely on the "human element" to overcome their technological inferiority. Challenging that doctrine, therefore, has the potential of raising questions about the regime's ability to defend the country adequately.

Nonetheless, the signs of debate have been unmistakable. From certain quarters have come cautious suggestions that new conditions require new doctrinal concepts. For example, an article attributed to the Canton Garrison stated, almost apologetically, that changes in the nature of warfare inevitably bring about changes in tactics:

According to materialism, new tactics are created on the basis of new weapons. Any change in tactics is not the free creation of brilliant commanders but the result of the creation of better weapons. When technological advances can be or have been used for military purposes, they are bound to cause a change or even a reform in fighting tactics immediately, almost forcibly and in a way against the commanders' will. New tactics cannot be mastered using old weapons. Without the improvement of

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weaponry it will be impossible to raise the tactical level and win victories in a war of aggression.[65]

Another article in *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* was more forthright about the need to change the ways of warfare:

Particularly in modern warfare, we have to deal with enemies with modern weapons and equipment. It simply will not do just to raise a Mauser pistol and shout "charge." In order to defend the motherland from aggression, we must have the latest techniques and the latest concomitant tactics.[66]

Advocates of continued adherence to Maoist military doctrine have argued their case more forcefully. For example, an article by a Peking PLA unit, which may have been a reply to the article from Canton, underscored that well-armed aggressors have often been defeated by poorly armed indigenous forces. It went on:

Has the emergence of atomic bombs changed this objective law? Definitely not. . . .

. . .All new weapons are built by men. They can play their role only if they are handled by men. Therefore, men are more powerful than weapons including the atomic bomb. . . .the people's support and the people who fear neither hardship nor death themselves can create weapons, constantly improve inferior weapons and use correct strategy and tactics to overcome the weaknesses of their weapons. . . .

Of course. . .we attach great importance to the role of the weapons on the premise that the role of men is affirmed. . . .In the future we will continue to rely on the people to fight a people's war in case of invasion by imperialism or social-imperialism.[67]

Yeh Chien-ying, then Minister of Defense, reaffirmed this position on Army Day in 1977, underlining the importance of the Maoist doctrine as a means to offset China's inferiority in terms of weapons:

Another important component part of Chairman Mao's military thinking is his concept of people's war. There is nothing mysterious about our victory over Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism and other powerful and ferocious enemies at home and abroad during the decades of revolutionary war. The sole reason for our victory is that we rely on the people. It has been our practice to turn the entire nation into soldiers, use the system of combining field armies, regional troops and militia and of integrating the armed people with those who are not armed. Reliance on the people, the most important factor for our army, has helped us make up for the lack of weapons and equipment, turn our army from an inferior to a superior position and create a vast ocean for drowning the enemy. We have grown strong and won victory by means of people's war which is our magic weapon, past, present, and future.[68]

Growing out of the disputes over the proper pace of military modernization and the appropriateness of Maoist military doctrine has been a disagreement over troop training. Ever since a professional officer corps came into its own in the PRC in the mid-1950's, some of its members have contended that the more complex the weapons and tactics of the army, the more the troops have to be trained; however, this perspective has tended to conflict with the desire of the leadership to use the troops in a variety of nonmilitary activities—for political, social, and economic reasons. Despite the sharp curtailment of military involvement in political affairs and the emphasis on professionalism in the post-Mao period, the balance between military and nonmilitary activities apparently remains a matter of contention. For one group, which argues that the army not only has inferior weapons but will continue to have them for some time ahead and that Maoist military doctrine serves to offset this inferiority, the participation of troops in nonmilitary activities is essential to the realization of doctrinal concepts. A Radio Peking broadcast articulated this line of thought thus:

Our people's army is a fighting force as well as a work and productive force. On the condition that training in combat preparedness is insured, our army should engage in industrial and agricultural production. By doing so, our army can reduce the burden of the people and at the same time support socialist economic construction.[69]

65. Peking Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 14, 1977, p. H/1.
66. Broadcast by NCNA, Jan. 25, 1978, in *SWB*, FE/5725/BII/7.
67. Peking Domestic Service, June 3, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 6, 1977, p. E/10.
68. *Peking Review*, Aug. 5, 1977, p. 11.
69. Peking Domestic Service, Feb. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 7, 1977, p E/8.

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Members of a PLA unit carry out excavation work at an irrigation project in August 1976.

—Camera Press.

But some officers see things differently:

One cannot master military techniques and superior command art if not given adequate time. Political education is very important, and we also need to engage in productive labor. But, how can we. . . spend most of our time and efforts in production and other work at the expense of military training? Those tendencies toward cutting down time assigned to training. . .must be corrected. Knowledge comes from practice, and skills come from hard training. Those comrades who loudly shout slogans about military training but do not want to take pains with it should think carefully: war is merciless. We shall suffer terribly in war if we do not train hard in times of peace.[70]

* * *

After a debate which lasted roughly a year, the Chinese leadership in early 1978 reached a decision on national priorities that has at least temporarily put an end to intense public disputes over these issues, although they could conceivably resurface if the political winds change. In his report to the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978, Hua Kuo-feng indicated indirectly but unmistakably that large-scale military modernization will follow, not precede, economic development. He set out an ambitious program of industrial and agricultural development, requiring major capital investment, and mentioned military modernization only in passing. "We must," he said, "take steel as the key link, strengthen the basic industries, and exert a special effort to step up the development of the power, fuel and raw and semi-finished materials industries and transport and communications. Only thus can we give strong support to agriculture, rapidly expand light industry and substantially strengthen the national defense industries."[71] The theme that economic development must precede large-scale military modernization has been reiterated in numerous articles and radio broadcasts.

It is evident, however, that the PLA did not come out of the debate empty-handed. It appears to have received the green light to reequip selected sectors of the armed forces in the short run.[72] Its officers have also probably found some solace in the tremendous emphasis on scientific research and development, which they regard as directly relevant to national defense.[73] In addition, the views of the military on professional matters that do not require the diversion of immense resources, such as training and discipline, have been accepted without reservation. Perhaps most important, the officers have gained recognition of their professional needs, and they have persuaded the leadership to accept in principle their claim to an army equipped with up-to-date weapons.

As long as the current program of national development remains in effect, then, the Chinese army will move toward comprehensive technological modernization, but its march in that direction will apparently be long and slow. While major changes in this national program cannot be ruled out, the ramifications of such changes for the PLA are impossible to foresee at this juncture.

70. NCNA, Jan. 25, 1978, in *SWB*, FE/5725/BII/7.
71. *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978, p. 22.
72. *The Observer*, Apr. 16, 1978; *The Age*, May 4, 1978; and *Newsweek* (New York, NY), May 22, 1978.
73. Peking Domestic Service, Mar. 24, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1978, pp. E/6-7.

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Western Technology in the Soviet Economy

By Philip Hanson

Transfer of technology from the West to the Soviet Union has attracted considerable Western analytical attention in the 1970's. Yet it should be recognized that "international technology transfer" is really only a new name for an ancient phenomenon. Historians of material culture tell us that new products and the knowledge of their production and use have been crossing national boundaries for as long as there have been national boundaries to cross. The international diffusion of the fork as an eating utensil is a classic example. Less well known is the possibility that the samovar originated in Western Europe and that its use in Russia might be considered an early instance of West-East technology transfer.[1]

There is thus nothing inherently novel about Soviet acquisition of products, processes, and know-how new to the USSR.[2] The pervasiveness of international transfer as a worldwide phenomenon is indicated by figures for trade in licenses and know-how and in research-intensive products and capital goods—many, though not all, of which embody technologies not available in goods produced domestically in the importing country. If the movements across national boundaries of people (research and development personnel, technicians, and managers) with specialist production know-how could be equally well charted, the dimensions of the process of international diffusion of technology would be seen to be even more impressive than the trade figures alone suggest.

The importance of this general phenomenon of international technology transfer is stressed in the literature—especially in writings on the multinational corporation and on the product-cycle theory of international trade. Since the application of new technology is now seen to be a major source of a nation's economic growth, it is also now understood that the diffusion of new technologies from other nations can be an important part of the growth process.[3]

Despite the universal aspects of the phenomenon, however, recent Western analysis of West-East technology transfer has been conducted in terms that set it somewhat apart from most discussion of technology transfer within or between groups of trading nations. The recent salience of Soviet-US détente and the special political connotations attributed to West-East transfer are probably the main reasons why this has been so. In any case, Western analysis of the West-East transfer process has been complemented by studies of the Soviet domestic economy's performance in technological innovation and diffusion. Businessmen and officials in the West have long been aware that in many areas, especially low-priority areas, Soviet applica-

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1. A private communication from Professor R.E.F. Smith on work in progress on a history of Russian food and drink.

2. The variety and extent of Soviet absorption of Western technology since the Bolshevik Revolution are documented in A.C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development,* 3 vols., Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1968-73.

3. This notion has been developed in a challenging and far-reaching way in Stanislaw Gomulka's model of international economic growth. See S. Gomulka, *Inventive Activity, Diffusion and the Stages of Economic Growth,* Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 1971.

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tion of new technology in production has remained generally somewhat behind achievements in Western Europe, North America, and Japan. This view has now been systematically tested with respect to an array of key industrial technologies and shown to be broadly correct.[4] There are strong grounds for believing that a partial explanation for this lies in the Soviet economic system, which provides weak incentives for technological innovation and whose institutional arrangements for supply and for the management of R and D (research and development) have many features inimical to technological change.[5]

What, then, has been the outcome of recent studies of technology transfer to the Soviet Union? Scholars have yet to agree on definite answers to many of the key questions—for instance, the contribution of these transfers to Soviet output—but at least some of the ground has been charted. A good deal is now known about the characteristics of the different channels of technology transfer to the USSR, about the dimensions of many of the technology-carrying flows along these channels, about the branch-allocations of commercially-imported Western technology, and about particular successes and failures in Soviet "absorption" of many of these technologies.

We are now in a phase where the very rapid growth in Soviet commercial acquisition of Western technology that began in 1970 has come to at least a temporary halt. Imports of machinery from Western, hard-currency (i.e., excluding Finland) trade partners appear to have leveled off in 1975-77 (see Table 1). Moreover, new orders for machinery concluded in 1977 (for subsequent import) appear to have fallen sharply.[6] The present pause, after a period of hectic growth in the first half of the decade, seems an appropriate time to review the issues raised by that earlier episode of rapidly expanding West-East transfer.

The Channels of Transfer

It is useful to start by asking how technology is transferred from the West to the Soviet Union. The root idea of international technology transfer is that it is a process whereby the productivity of resources in one country can be enhanced by the acquisition from other countries of information or of products and processes embodying that information. This broad definition directs our attention to numerous channels of transfer: foreign travel by

A West German-made crankshaft swaging automatic line in operation at the Kama Truck Works of the Soviet Union in May 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

scientists and technologists; the reading of foreign technical literature; industrial espionage; the purchase of individual foreign products to be reverse-engineered (i.e., treated as the basis of designs for domestic production); purchase of foreign products for direct use (especially capital goods); purchase of licenses, know-how, and training (e.g., as part

4. See especially, R. Amann et al., Eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry,* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977. This study also shows areas where Soviet technological levels are on a par with those of leading Western countries, e.g., high-voltage electric power transmission. Indeed, the sale of a number of Soviet technologies to Western firms, especially in metallurgy, has been documented by John W. Kiser, *Report on the Potential for Technology Transfer from The Soviet Union to the United States,* prepared for the US Department of State and the US National Science Foundation, July 1977.

5. See especially, J.S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1976.

6. According to the author's tally (from Western press reports), the drop in new orders was from about US$6 billion in 1976 to about US$2.5 billion in 1977. On this, see Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of the USSR* (London), Nos. 2 and 3, 1978.

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Table 1. Soviet Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment from the West, 1955-77[a]

Year	Value in US dollars, current prices, f.o.b. (millions)	Estimated ruble value, in 1969 investment prices (millions)	Imports as share of domestic machinery investment in the following year (percent)
1955	104	148	2.0
1956	139	188	2.4
1957	128	166	1.8
1958	123	158	1.6
1959	177	227	2.2
1960	310	393	3.4
1961	390	472	3.6
1962	436	510	3.6
1963	402	467	2.8
1964	489	561	3.2
1965	366	421	2.2
1966	395	436	2.2
1967	457	499	2.4
1968	639	721	3.2
1969	889	966	3.8
1970	905	913	3.4
1971	840	796	2.8
1972	1,126	959	3.0
1973	1,574	1,091	3.2
1974	2,094	1,316	3.4
1975	4,184	2,287	5.6
1976	4,259	2,282	5.5[b]
1977	4,571	n.a.	n.a.

[a] The imports are those covered by the Standard International Trade Classification's section 7, or SITC 7. The data exclude imports from Finland, a barter-trade partner having a special political relationship with the USSR.

[b] Related to 1977 *planned* (rather than reported) investment, the latter not being available at the time of writing.

SOURCE NOTE: This table is derived from Table 2.1 in Philip Hanson, "The Import of Western Technology," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, 2nd ed., New York and London, Macmillan, 1978, p. 31. The information in column 2 is from Western trade returns. The original sources and methods used in calculating columns 3 and 4 are explained in the referenced table and accompanying text. Of the two alternative series of ruble-dollar conversion rates described there, the one that is less favorable to the ruble is used here. For reasons given in the source, this series is believed to be the more realistic. Figures for 1972-75 in columns 2 and 3 have been slightly revised to take account of recent minor revisions in OECD data. The 1975 and 1976 values in column 3 have been calculated using conversion rates of US$1.83 and US$1.87 per ruble respectively. These are extrapolations from the 1974 conversion rate on the basis of UN Economic Commission for Europe estimates of a 15 percent and a further 2 percent increase respectively in the average prices of Western machinery exports to European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. See ECE, *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (New York, NY), Vol. 29, 1977, p. 114.

of turnkey projects); direct foreign investment; and cooperation with foreign firms or government agencies in R and D and in production.

Under Yosif Stalin, Soviet efforts to acquire foreign technology relied heavily on the screening of technical literature and the reverse-engineering of foreign products imported in relatively small quantities. Such channels are inconspicuous, and they are also not really amenable to control by Western governments, short of the establishment of a total embargo on East-West contacts. At the same time, the Stalin era also witnessed several episodes where Western governments negotiated or acquiesced in large-scale Soviet acquisition of Western products embodying technologies new to the USSR.[7] These were, principally, the substantial importation of Western machinery during the First Five-Year Plan, lend-lease deliveries during World War II, and reparations acquisitions, primarily from Germany, at the end of World War II.[8]

The post-Stalin era has seen a growth in Soviet utilization of negotiated channels. While by no means smooth and continuous, the expansion of Soviet commercial acquisition of Western machinery and know-how over the past 20-25 years has no real parallel in previous Soviet history. Nonetheless, the Soviet mix of transfer channels remains quite unlike that of most other countries. Foreign direct investment is, of course, one channel that is not used at all. This, admittedly, is a channel that is also eschewed not only by most socialist countries but also by a number of nonsocialist countries. (Japan, for example, has not permitted the establishment of wholly- or majority-owned foreign subsidiaries within its boundaries for much of the postwar period.) But the Soviet Union appears at the same time to have made much less use than some countries (e.g., Japan) of licensing—or at any rate, of "pure" license purchases that are not part of a package deal including plant and machinery (see Table 2).[9] There are even differences between the Soviet mix of West-East transfer chan-

7. The author has elsewhere proposed a categorization of technology transfers as "negotiable" or "non-negotiable"—reflecting a differentiation between cases in which both partners are or are not consciously and willingly party to the transfer. See Philip Hanson, "The Import of Western Technology," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Full of Krushchev*, 2nd ed., New York and London, Macmillan, 1978.

8. For a detailed picture of these acquisitions, see Sutton, op. cit.

9. Most, if not all, Soviet-published references to numbers of license deals appear to refer to the pure license purchases handled, since 1962, by the Soviet agency Litsenzintorg, and not to those incorporated in (especially) turnkey projects in which some other Soviet foreign trade organization is the buyer.

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nels and that which has evolved in some East European countries. For instance, industrial cooperation, particularly in manufacturing, has been developed much less in the USSR than in Hungary and Poland.[10]

The increased Soviet use of at least some negotiated channels of technology transfer is hardly surprising, for it has come in a period when East-West tensions have generally been somewhat less severe than in the early 1950's and when internal changes in Soviet society have tended to reduce impediments to contacts with foreigners. Dealings with the West at slightly less than arm's length have probably also been promoted by certain new perceptions on the part of Soviet policymakers: namely, that technical change was after all proceeding rapidly in the capitalist world; that the introduction and diffusion of new products and processes in the Soviet economy had encountered obstacles and delays; and that any country that minimized its purchasing of foreign machinery and know-how was forgoing a major gain to be achieved from trade.[11]

That these perceptions gradually gained influence in Soviet policymaking may reasonably be inferred from Soviet actions. While Nikita Khrushchev was still in power, there was a surge in imports of chemical plants as part of the "chemicalization" drive; and a specialist foreign trade organization, Litsenzintorg, was created in 1962 to handle the purchase and sale of licenses. Certain other major steps, such as Soviet accession in 1965 to the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property and the 1966 signature of the unprecedentedly large deal with Fiat for the Tol'yatti auto works, with its requirements of close and prolonged cooperation, came after the fall of Khrushchev. They had evidently been under consideration earlier, but it may be that they would not have gone through without the change of leadership.[12]

Table 2. Soviet and Japanese Imports of Licenses and Know-How: a Comparison, 1949-71

A. Number of contracts

Years	The USSR	Japan
1949-59	A handful	981
1960-64	A handful	1,953
1965-71	120 (?)	6,821

B. Expenditures (US$ in millions)

Years	The USSR	Japan
1963	Negligible	136
1965	Not available, but certainly small	167
1970	Probably much less than 100	433

SOURCES: On the Soviet Union, see Philip Hanson, "The International Transfer of Technology from the West to the USSR," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 802-05.

On Japan: numbers of contracts 1949-64, see OECD, *Gaps in Technology,* Paris, 1970, p. 204; numbers of contracts 1965-71, see T. Ozawa, *Japan's Technological Challenge to the West,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1974, p. 19; value data is from Ozawa, p. 80.

In this context, the Soviet-US trade agreements of 1972 did not mark a major change in Soviet policies of technology acquisition. Rather they reflected a major addition to the group of Western trade partners with whom the USSR could pursue these policies on a substantial scale.[13]

Dimensions of Commercial Transfers

It is a great deal easier to enumerate channels of technology transfer than to measure the flows that pass along them. The special characteristics of the Soviet mix of transfer channels, however, do to some extent reduce the measurement problems. Since pure license deals do not appear to be very numerous, the patchy nature of value data on them is probably not too serious a problem. Similarly, the limited use of industrial cooperation and the complete absence of direct foreign investment

10. See Maureen R. Smith, "Industrial Cooperation Agreements: Soviet Experience and Practice," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 767-85, esp. p. 771; and Carl H. McMillan, "Forms and Dimensions of East-West Inter-firm Cooperation," in C.T. Saunders, Ed., *East-West Cooperation in Business: Inter-firm Studies,* Vienna and New York, NY, Springer Verlag, 1977, pp. 28-61.

11. The emergence of these perceptions in leadership speeches at Soviet party congresses from 1959 to 1971 is described in Hanson, loc. cit.

12. Discussions with Fiat on possible Fiat cooperation in an expansion of the Soviet car industry began before Krushchev's fall. They were conducted in part by A.N. Kosygin. See George D. Holliday, "Western Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: With a Case Study in the Transfer of Automotive Technology," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, DC, 1978, pp. 165-66.

13. The limits imposed by the US Congress in 1974 on Eximbank support for exports to the USSR, and the abrogation of the 1972 trade agreement by the USSR at the start of 1975 have reduced the potential for transfer in this channel. However, even since 1975, direct US participation in Western technology transfer to the USSR has remained larger than it was in the 1960's.

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have enabled analysts to focus on Western deliveries of machinery and transport equipment.[14]

The rationale for treating machinery deliveries to the USSR as a proxy for total commercial transfers is as follows. First, while other producer goods may also embody new technologies with potential for increasing their user's productivity levels, the major productivity-enhancing potential of new technologies in embodied form is generally considered to lie in machinery and equipment. Second, although not all machinery embodies technologies new to its purchasers, anecdotal evidence and the "Methodological Guidelines" of the USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan) strongly suggest that Soviet planners do not allocate hard currency to machinery imports unless the relevant machine-building ministry attests that it cannot itself provide, within the time-frame established by the plan, machinery of the type and parameters required.[15] Finally, other important transfer channels, such as purchase of know-how and licenses and the receipt of training, are in Soviet practice mostly connected with major plant purchases, and the values of the technology acquired are included within the reported values of these package deals.

There are therefore good grounds for treating the time series set out in Table 1, especially column 3, as an indicator of the changing dimensions over time of commercial flows of technology from the West to the USSR. It must be remembered, though, that this time series is only an indicator of orders of magnitude. Pure license deals are excluded, as are purchases of nonmachinery items, such as large-diameter pipe and silicon chips, which may embody technologies with significant potential for raising productivity. Moreover, noncommercial channels such as literature screening remain avail-

14. These deliveries basically fall under Section 7 of the United Nations' Standard International Trade Classification (SITC 7), which is approximately equivalent in coverage to Section 1 of the trade classification of the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

15. Western business executives interviewed by the author frequently refer to a rule of this kind. It is fairly clearly stated in the USSR Gosplan volume, *Metodicheskiye ukazaniya k razrabotke gosudarstvennykh planov razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR* (Methodological Guidelines for Working Out State Plans for the Development of the USSR National Economy), Moscow, 1974, p. 595.

Firsthand acquisition of Western expertise: at the left, French engineers instruct a Soviet operator in use of controls on French-built equipment installed at a cold steel rolling line in Moscow; at the right, specialists from the Occidental Petroleum Corporation of the US, building engineer Albert Hickman (center) and fitting engineer Santo Antonio Saimino (right), advise Soviet Director A.V. Skorichenko on the construction of the chemical plant he is to run in Girgor'yev Liman near the Ukrainian port city of Odessa.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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able—and no doubt are used—as ancillary and alternative modes of transfer. Consequently, a fall in the flow of machinery deliveries, while probably indicative of a reduction in the *commercial* transmission of Western know-how to the USSR, might not necessarily entail a reduction in the *total* flow of technological information from West to East.

With these provisos, we can use Table 1 to put technology transfer to the USSR in perspective. In its commercial form, at least, technology transfer represents only a very small share of Soviet equipment investment (column 4). This proportion has grown somewhat since the mid-1950's, but the rise has been neither strong nor continuous. The percentages for the latter half of the period probably somewhat understate the share of Western machinery in total Soviet equipment investment, since they do not allow for unacknowledged inflation present in Soviet prices for USSR-produced machinery.[16] However, while correction for this phenomenon might raise the mid-1970's share to 6 percent or so, it would not alter the general picture.

As can be seen, fluctuations in the value of machinery purchases have been considerable. These appear to be the result mainly of the exigencies of the Soviet hard-currency balance of payments. Up to 1972, variation in the figures in column 2 could be quite well "explained" statistically by two other variables: hard-currency grain imports and total hard-currency exports.[17] In the subsequent "détente" period, Soviet hard-currency borrowing increased sharply, and the emergency grain imports of 1972-73 were not allowed to inhibit the growth of machinery imports. However, the Western recession of the mid-1970's slowed the growth of Soviet hard-currency export earnings, and another round of emergency grain imports was necessitated by the 1975 harvest failure. As a result, Soviet indebtedness grew sharply and began to act as a constraint on machinery imports.

The limits to Soviet indebtedness were not so much set by Western banks and governments as they were self-imposed by Soviet planners. To be sure, in 1976 and 1977 some doubts were raised in the Western press about Soviet credit-worthiness in the medium term, but Western governments (apart from the US) continued to extend official credit support for exports to the Soviet Union, and medium-term Eurocurrency loans continued to be obtainable by the USSR on good, though marginally hardened, terms. Thus, the sharp cutback in new Soviet orders for Western machinery that occurred in 1977—the first such reversal in the 1970's—most likely reflected the financial caution of Soviet policymakers, out of concern that USSR debt service in hard currency had reached what is believed to have been something on the order of 25-30 percent of hard-currency earnings for exports of merchandise other than arms.[18] One might hazard the guess that Soviet machinery orders would pick up once more if Soviet hard-currency export earnings again began to grow strongly.

Absorption Policies and Problems

It is one thing, of course, to purchase technology, whether in embodied form (as machinery) or in less tangible forms, and quite another thing to put it to work effectively. One interesting theoretical model which can be used to examine this question is that developed by economist Stanislaw Gomulka. He argues from the assumption that machinery imported from country A, when used in country B, tends to be used with the same level of labor productivity as in A. Thus, broadly speaking, international transfer of technology in embodied form is pictured as conveying A's labor productivity level to B through the medium of the imported machinery. Other things being equal, the direct impact of this transfer on B's output levels would be greater the larger the share of machinery from A in B's investment, and the larger the initial labor productivity gap between the two countries.[19] In addition, there may be some indirect impact on B's productivity levels from the production of new and productivity-enhancing producer goods on the imported machines and/or the successful diffusion to B's own domestic machinery production of the technologies embodied in the imported machines.

The question is to what extent effects of these kinds are actually achieved in the Soviet case. Of course, the answer to this question hinges on the specific aims that the Soviet planners seem to have been pursuing in importing Western technology, the means they have adopted for pursuing those

16. On this, see A.S. Becker, "The Price Level of Soviet Machinery in the 1960's," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1974, pp. 363-79.

17. See Hanson, loc. cit., p. 34.

18. On this and more general developments in Soviet trade, see fn. 6 above.

19. Gomulka and J.D. Sylwestrowicz, "Import-Led Growth: Theory and Estimation," in F.L. Altman et al., Eds., *On the Measurement of Factor Productivities: Theoretical Problems and Empirical Results*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1976, pp. 539-78.

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aims, and the ability of the economy to achieve the goals set for it.

Under Khrushchev, the import of Western machinery was extended from small-scale, often one-of-a-kind, purchases of individual machines to purchases of whole plants. These latter were concentrated particularly in the chemical industry, as part of the "chemicalization" drive that began in 1958. There were also a number of license purchases, including one well-known early example, the 1959 acquisition from Burmeister og Wain of a license for production of marine diesel engines. In general, the emphasis was on injecting Western technology into a few previously neglected branches of the Soviet economy—above all, the chemical industry, but also, at this stage, the Soviet merchant marine.

In more recent years, machinery and know-how imports have gone into a wide range of industries, including traditional high-priority branches (e.g., West German contracts for the Kursk steel complex). Emphasis on importing chemical technology has been maintained, while the import of ships and marine engines has declined as a share of the total. Two giant motor-industry projects, the passenger-car plant at Tol'yatti and the Kama Truck Works (KamAZ), entailed a very large inflow of Western machinery and know-how into the Soviet machine-building and metalworking sector in 1968–76; these also resulted in particularly prolonged and close contact and cooperation with the Western suppliers in activities ranging from joint design (e.g., with Pullman-Swindell for the KamAZ foundry complex) to training of Soviet operators.[20] Other areas of concentration in recent years include computers and (lately) machinery and know-how for the extraction and pipeline transportation of oil and gas.

From the point of view of officials in the Soviet central party-state apparatus who plan and manage these technology imports,. the process might be characterized as follows: The quantity of imports is severely limited, relative to the domestic investment program, by balance-of-payments constraints (even if one allows for credit, product buyback deals, etc.). Given the five-year and (where known) longer-term investment and output targets of the various branches of the economy, these limited imports must as far as possible be allocated between branches and projects in such a way as to maximize the total net contribution they make to reaching aggregate national output targets.

Specialists from the Japanese Kochiwa firm (in the white helmets) consult with specialists from the Soviet Sevmormontazh construction department on the installation of advanced equipment for wood-chip handling at the new Soviet Far Eastern port of Vostochnyy, near Nakhodka.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Both the information available for and the pressures bearing on this process of allocation are plentiful. For instance, branch research institutes have well-established procedures for following developments in Western technology in their industries, and senior branch officials must commonly put pressure on the central apparatus (the Secretariat of the party Central Committee, USSR Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade) for the acquisition of specific pieces of Western technology for specific projects. The problem is that the information available to the central decision-makers, while plentiful, is also imperfect, and branch pressures are an unreliable guide for set-

20. See Holliday, op. cit. On the KamAZ foundries in particular, see "Kama River," *Modern Casting* (Des Plaines, IL), March 1976, pp. 42-56.

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ting overall national priorities. At the same time, the central planners' choice should be eased by the very fact that only a relatively small number of projects can have Western machinery and know-how allocated to them. Areas with the largest technology and productivity lags behind the West should in general be readily identifiable. So the allocation problem might in a sense be expected to be simpler than it would be if the potential flows were larger.

What is sought is, normally, proven technology. This is because the costs of getting an unproven technology to work as designed in a location remote from that in which it was developed can be high.[21] In the Soviet case, the risks of adopting an unproven technology are compounded by a lack of close organizational links with the supplier and the alien Soviet institutional environment. Hence, the USSR's desire for "the latest" technology usually means, in practice, the latest *proven* technology.

Proven technology with the potential to increase Soviet productivity significantly may often be what in Western terms is called "state of the art" rather than "leading edge" technology. This is true, in part, because some "leading edge" technology, especially in electronics, is subject to Western strategic embargo and not readily accessible.[22] In other areas of rapid technological advance, Soviet (or East European) attainments are on a par with those of possible Western suppliers. What principally matters to the planners, it would seem, is the extent of any Soviet-Western productivity gap in a particular field, and the priority given to that field.

Purchases are often made not so much because the fundamental technical principles underlying the product or process in question are not well understood by Soviet specialists, but because the Western supplier has an established capability in detailed design work, in manufacturing to a given quality, and in contract and site management that the corresponding Soviet industry lacks. For example, the Soviets installed Western as well as domestically-produced multi-spindle automatic lathes at Tol'yatti, and they have allocated very large resources to having large Kellogg-process ammonia plants put up by Japanese and French contractors despite already having a knowledge of the Kellogg process.[23] In the first case, the Soviet machines appear to have been less well made and were installed at points in the plant where they had a lower rate of operation than the Western machines. As for the ammonia plants, the capabilities the Soviets apparently lacked were in detailed design, in the fabrication (for civilian purposes) of tanks and tubes capable of withstanding high pressures, and in general contracting and site management. Frequently, a Western main contractor for a Soviet project provides above all a capacity to coordinate supplies and installation work with an efficiency which the overburdened (and undermotivated?) Soviet planning apparatus cannot match.

One might expect the implementation of the transfer process to be rather well managed. Imports of Western machinery and know-how are going to a relatively few high-priority plants and new-plant projects. Western contractors provide skilled organizational help. The systemic hindrances to innovation that have been analyzed by Berliner[24]—in the arrangements for pricing, incentives, supply, and so on—will be present, but they may well be reduced by frequent, ad hoc intervention from on high. An extreme instance would be the giant KamAZ truck project, whose director had the status of a deputy minister of the motor industry, and which has received frequent visits from members of the Politburo.[25]

Despite these factors, available evidence indicates that the absorption process is apt to be slow and incomplete by Western standards (which is not necessarily incompatible with its being relatively successful compared with most "indigenous" Soviet innovation). Work in progress on a survey of West European exporters' experiences suggests

21. A quantitative study of this and certain other aspects of transfer, based on a sample of projects by US-based multinationals, has been made in D.J. Teece, *The Multinational Corporation and the Resource-cost of International Technology Transfer,* Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1976.

22. Any notion that the strategic embargo has somehow dwindled into insignificance, especially for West European exporters, can be readily corrected by studying, e.g., the 23 pages of small print setting out for the UK the Industrial List of items subject to export control. See *Trade and Industry* (London), Apr. 30, 1976, pp. 305-28. This list is in addition to those for munitions and for atomic energy. Instances of evasion of export controls are cited in R. Schneiderman, "High Technology Flows," *Electronics* (New York, NY), Jan. 8, 1976, pp. 68-74. Nancy Foy, in *The IBM World,* London, Eyre Methuen, 1974, quotes an IBM executive as estimating that about 40 IBM computers had been obtained by the USSR despite export controls intended to prevent this. But it is evident that the business of getting round the controls is difficult, costly, and time-consuming for the Soviet purchaser.

23. Philip Hanson, "The Impact of Western Technology: A Case Study of the Soviet Mineral Fertilizer Industry," in P. Marer and J.M. Montias, Eds., *East European Integration and East-West Trade,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, forthcoming (1979).

24. See Berliner, op. cit.

25. Holliday, op. cit.

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that Soviet-imported chemical plants, for example, usually take longer to construct, equip, and commission than would be the case in Western Europe; that output is seldom subsequently taken above the rate guaranteed by the supplier; and that manning levels can be (but are not always) relatively high.[26] There is also evidence that the technology installed at Tol'yatti has on the whole been neither diffused nor updated since the completion of the car complex, and that domestic diffusion of the technology of mineral-fertilizer production, while not negligible, has still been limited.[27]

How Large an Impact?

The bottom line for all of this is, of course, the size of the economic benefits the USSR has been deriving from its purchases of Western machinery and know-how. To determine this fully, one would have to assess not only the direct and indirect effects on output referred to above but also the resource costs both of the exports that pay for these imports and of the transfer process itself. In a very long-run, aggregate sense, the costs and benefits of the transfer process also include imponderables such as, on the one hand, the possible atrophy of domestic R and D capability in a particular field through reliance on imports, and, on the other, the possible learning of general management and organization skills from close acquaintance with successful Western firms.[28] However, the brief discussion here will be confined to direct and indirect net effects on output of the sort discussed earlier.

For reasons suggested above, it would not be surprising if these effects were shown to be relatively large. Some studies, indeed, suggest that they are. A branch case study of the net contribution to Soviet agricultural output in the mid-1970's of the technology embodied in mineral-fertilizer plant imports from the West since 1960 produced the remarkably high figure of a US$4 billion net increment to *annual* rates of output in return for cumulative plant purchases totaling only US$2 billion.[29] This was, it must be said, a tentative estimate conditional on a number of assumptions, and even if it was approximately correct, it may not be representative of the impact of other such imports. The study dealt with an especially promising injection of technology at the intersection of a backward chemical industry and a backward agriculture.

A series of exercises conducted by Donald W. Green and Herbert S. Levine with the SOVMOD macroeconometric model of the Soviet economy developed at the University of Pennsylvania have yielded aggregate figures for the Soviet industrial sector which are also remarkably high. They indicate that the net addition to output resulting from a unit increase in the stock of imported Western machinery in Soviet industry is 8-14 times the corresponding effect of a unit increase in the "indigenous" capital stock. Since the stock of Western machinery is such a small part of the total, this does not imply that Soviet industrial growth in recent years has been dominated by the contribution of Western technology, but it does imply that that contribution has been significant. Thus, in one exercise, it was calculated that variations of 10 percent either way in the projected total of Western machinery imports for 1973-80 would generate slight but perceptible changes in Soviet total industrial output in 1980, from an index of 126.6 (1975 equals 100) to 126.2 in the case of a reduction in such imports, and to 127.0 in the case of an increase.[30] Slight though these projected changes are, it must be remembered that they arise (in the model) from relatively small variations in a relatively small flow of imports.

At the same time, Green and Levine stress that these are experimental calculations, and that their interpretation is in any case a complex matter. Indeed, a number of questions can be raised about these calculations—e.g., the valuation of the imports, the time lags before the imports enter the capital stock, and the specification of the production functions from which their contribution to output is estimated. There is also a fundamental dif-

26. From a survey of machine-tool and chemical-plant exporters currently being undertaken by the author in cooperation with Dr. M.R. Hill and Dr. H. Vogel for the Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, CA.

27. E.B. Golland, "The Technological Base for High Labor Productivity," *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1976, pp. 75-87.

28. A possible example of this sort of spin-off is suggested by a recent statement that the only Soviet machine-building ministry with experience in acting as a general contractor for projects, in taking responsibility for installation and commissioning of equipment made by other ministries, is the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Industry Machine-building. V. Krasovskiy, "Capital Investment Policy in the Period of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1978, pp. 21-33. This ministry supplies an industry in which Western firms have played an especially large role as general contractors for projects, and have thus set a clear example of such a function. The coincidence is intriguing.

29. Hanson, "The Impact of Western Technology . . .," loc. cit. Values are in 1973 US prices.

30. D.W. Green and H.S. Levine, "Soviet Machinery Imports," *Survey* (London), Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 1977-78, pp. 112-26.

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

Technology transfer and exchange: the June 20, 1977, delivery of a 40-ton superconducting magnetic system from the Argonne National Laboratory of the US Energy Research and Development Administration to the Institute of High Temperatures of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The equipment is being used in a joint US-USSR project of research on magnetohydrodynamics.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ficulty in identifying the contribution of such imports net of (for example) the effects of preferential allocations to import-intensive projects of cooperating domestic inputs. These cooperating domestic inputs include such intangibles as the time and attention of central officials (which may have a high opportunity cost to the rest of the economy).

A recent, and as yet unpublished, paper by Martin L. Weitzman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology raises further questions by showing that the use of the stock of imported Western machinery as a separate explanatory variable in production-function analysis of recent Soviet industrial growth does not improve statistically the explanation of such growth.[31] In other words, despite the Green-Levine findings, one cannot definitively reject the hypothesis that the impact on output, at the margin, of this imported machinery does not in fact differ from that of "indigenous" machinery.

A final dimension of the impact of technology transfer on the Soviet economy should be mentioned here. To what extent have such transfers narrowed the technological gap (and, by inference, the productivity gap) between the USSR and the West? A disaggregated set of case-study assessments of Soviet technological performance suggests that there was no clear, general reduction in observed Soviet lags behind the West in a broad selection of key technologies between the mid-1950's and the early 1970's.[32] One might speculate that commercial transfer prevented some gaps from widening, and that further increases in trans-

31. M.L. Weitzman, "Technology Transfer to the USSR: An Econometric Analysis," an unpublished paper originating from MIT, Cambridge, MA, in August 1978.

32. Amann et al., op. cit., especially Chap. 2.

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fer activity might at best be narrowing some gaps. In general, then, international technology transfer has not been a vehicle for Soviet "overtaking," and in fields of rapid change it is not even sufficient for "catching up."

Conclusions

To sum up, both the logic of the whole exercise of technology importing and the microeconomic evidence suggest that Soviet purchases of Western technology make a significant, but not dominant, contribution to Soviet economic growth. Of crucial importance are several facts. First, these imports are a comparatively small input into a large economy. Second, the failure of the USSR to increase substantially its share of Western markets for manufactures seriously hinders the growth of Soviet machinery imports for balance-of-payments reasons. Finally, Soviet lead-times in utilizing and diffusing the imported technology seem to be relatively long.

If transfer performs less than wonders for the Soviet Union, it might be argued that the economic benefits of this process to the West are not even commensurate. Competition among Western governments to promote exports has kept credit terms for these deals softer than they would otherwise be. Competition among firms competing to sell the same, or similar, proven technologies tends to keep contract prices close to the Western firms' supply price, which is likely to be very far from adequately reflecting potential gains to the user from the technology acquired. The effects of this trade in boosting employment, moreover, can easily be exaggerated. Employment associated with machinery contracts for the USSR is a minute proportion of total employment in the Western countries comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (In 1976, machinery sales to the USSR by the 14 major OECD countries were only 1.7 percent of their machinery sales worldwide.[33] This would correspond to something on the order of a fifth of 1 percent of GNP for a medium-sized West European country such as France or West Germany).

In contemplating increased use of Western technology, of course, Soviet planners must deal not only with economic considerations but also with other aspects of East-West relations, factors which generally fall beyond the scope of the present discussion. An example is the role that foreign policy considerations play in fostering or impeding transfer. However, the absence of close coordination of transfer policies among the Western governments has resulted in very limited control by these governments over transfers to the USSR, except in the case of products covered by the West's embargo on specific strategic goods. Thus, the predominant constraints on Soviet utilization of technology transfer to spur growth would appear to lie in the realm of the Soviet economic and systemic factors outlined above.

33. For the data on these SITC 7 category sales, see OECD, *Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series B—January-December 1977*, Paris, 1978.

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The Italian CP: Stumbling on the Threshold?

By Stephen Hellman

When the 1976 general elections gave the Italian Communist Party (PCI) 34.4 percent of the vote, confirming the party's gains made a year earlier in local elections, it became clear that Italy's political arithmetic had been radically altered. With 38.7 percent of the vote, Christian Democracy (DC) remained the largest party in the country, but not by much. Furthermore, the DC had had to decimate some of its most faithful allies among the minor laical parties in order to match the party's showing in the previous general elections.[1] The PCI, in contrast, increased its support from the one election to the next by over 7 percent. When the Socialists (PSI), the country's third largest party with 9.6 percent of the vote, declared that they would refuse to participate in a coalition which excluded the Communists, the DC had to bow to the inevitable.

The Communists moved quickly and with maximum publicity to capitalize on their increased leverage in the political system, leverage denied to them as long as the DC had been in control of the balance of power. Things to which the PCI had long been entitled were now grudgingly granted, such as the presidency of one of the two chambers of parliament, a proportional number of committee chairmanships, and a prominent place in meetings of all parties "within the constitutional area." These developments bolstered the PCI's legitimacy and its oft-repeated claim that Italy could not resolve her major problems without Communist participation in the national government.[2] In the autumn of 1976, the PCI abstained on the confidence vote for Premier Giulio Andreotti's government. In March 1978, it gave Andreotti a positive vote of confidence. And later in the year, the PCI announcement of its opposition to the continuation in office of Giovanni Leone sealed the fate of the President of the Republic. Leone was forced to resign and was replaced by Sandro Pertini, a Socialist. All these events would have been unimaginable a scant three years earlier and were ample testimony to how far the PCI had come.

Over most of this three-year period, the PCI's fortunes seemed to be on the rise everywhere. Local elections in 1975 put well over half the Italian population under local governments which included representatives of the PCI. The sweep into office was particularly dramatic in the largest cities. New, young leaders were everywhere in evidence, and the party had apparently reversed a decline in mem-

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1. The most hard-hit of the DC's traditional minor party allies were the Liberals (PLI), who dropped from 3.9 to 1.3 percent of the vote, and the Social Democrats (PSDI), who fell from 5.1 to 3.4 percent. The Italian Republican Party (PRI) improved its standing slightly, with its share of the vote rising from 2.9 to 3.1 percent. Detailed results of the 1976 general elections can be found in *Rinascita* (Rome), June 25, 1976, p. 4.

2. Giacomo Sani has dealt with the period through most of 1976 in "The PCI on the Threshold," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1976, pp. 27-51. For further background on the 1976 elections and the crisis, see the collection of essays in Howard R. Penniman, Ed., *Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1977.

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Figure 1. PCI Membership and Recruitment, 1956-78



SOURCE: Adapted from official PCI statistics reported in Marzio Barbagli and Piergiorgio Corbetta, "Party and Movement: Characteristics and Renovation of the PCI," *Inchiesta* (Bari), January-February 1978, p. 11; and *l'Unità* (Rome), Oct. 14, 1978.

bership which had seemed irreversible just a few years earlier (see Figure 1).

It has thus come as a considerable shock to some, including many Communists, that the PCI has recently run into a number of serious difficulties. Major warning signals had already been visible in 1977, especially in terms of weakened Communist influence among Italy's students.[3] But the sequence of events which began at the very end of that year and carried over into 1978 left no doubt about the

3. At Rome University in February 1977, leftist students drove Luciano Lama, Communist head of the General Confederation of Italian Laborers, off the campus when he tried to play the role of peacemaker in student disputes. In March, the Communist stronghold of Bologna was badly disrupted by student rioting following the killing of an extraparliamentary leftist by police; the PCI was openly attacked by students on this occasion. The PCI devoted its entire Central Committee meeting of March 1977 to the Rome and Bologna incidents. The minutes have been published in PCI, *I communisti e la questione giovanile* (The Communists and the Youth Question), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977. In December, elections to fill the governing councils of public and private schools at all levels saw left-wing slates defeated by Catholics. Reactions to the surprising Catholic vote can be found in *l'Unità* Dec. 18, 1977.

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PCI's plight. A difficult governmental crisis was resolved in a fashion which stung and embarrassed the Communists. Then, on the very day the new government was sworn in, Aldo Moro was kidnapped and his bodyguard massacred. Two months later, a week after Moro's body was found, important partial local elections dealt the Communists a sharp blow, while the PSI and DC advanced. And just a month after that, in June, the results of twin referenda on laws dealing with the public financing of political parties and the regulation of public order gave the Communists cause for even greater concern.

Do these problems represent something of a cyclical pause in what has been, after all, a very unpredictable political process, or are we instead witnessing a more serious and perhaps long-term downturn in PCI fortunes? Current events are breaking at too rapid a pace, and space is far too limited, to answer these questions in definitive fashion. But a balanced assessment of recent developments can make the PCI's dilemma and the present phase of the Italian crisis more intelligible.

Ambiguous Crisis and Its Antecedents

Nothing illustrates the PCI's current dilemma more clearly than the governmental crisis of January-March 1978. It ended with a formal request for a Communist vote of confidence in the government, but the DC's victory in this particular skirmish was total. The crisis was reluctantly opened by the PCI in the wake of a massive strike and demonstration in Rome by the militant Metalworkers' Union in December. Having done everything in their power to discourage the demonstration, the Communists could ignore neither its resounding success nor its explicitly political content.[4] Responding to the request for more decisive governmental action to deal with the country's economic crisis and for passage of numerous reforms, the PCI demanded full participation for itself in the Italian government. The influence of the strike on PCI actions is clear from the fact that just a month earlier, the party had rejected demands that it pressure the DC to form an emergency cabinet which would include Communists.[5]

Striking metalworkers march past Rome's Coliseum on December 2, 1977. More than 100,000 strikers gathered in the Italian capital to demand more jobs and a change in government economic policies.

—UPI.

It soon became apparent that the DC had no intention of giving in to the PCI's demand. The Communists, unwilling to force new elections, fell back to a much more flexible position, one which called for firmer signs of good faith by the DC. It was understood that the PCI would actively support a cabinet which included highly qualified independent or technical ministers. Andreotti promised to comply with Communist wishes in this regard, but then turned around on March 15, 1978, and named a new cabinet composed *entirely* of Christian Democrats.[6]

The outraged and mortified Communist leadership now found itself in a no-win situation. A vote against the new cabinet would force new elections while casting the PCI in the role of the intransigent (and power-hungry) villain. An abstention would

4. See the PCI daily, *l'Unità* from mid-November to Dec. 6, 1977, for continuous emphasis by the Communists on the inadvisability of a large demonstration. Communist pressure on the union in this period was intense enough to generate a lively debate within the labor movement. Many non-Communist unionists argued that the unions were losing their independence from party control and interference.

5. Demands were made by the Socialists, but especially, in this period, by Ugo La Malfa, head of the Republican Party. See his interview in *La Repubblica* (Rome), Nov. 6-7, 1977, p. 1.

6. Early editions of *l'Unita*, Mar. 15, 1978, featured a front-page interview with Alessandro Natta, head of the PCI's parliamentary delegation, in which DC goodwill was praised, as was the granting of PCI requests concerning the composition of the cabinet. This edition was quickly withdrawn from circulation.

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raise the question of why the Communists had precipitated a drawn-out crisis, only to revert to acceptance of precisely the role they had played in the previous government. And a "yes" vote, under the circumstances, would mean that the Communists were publicly admitting having been outmaneuvered. Ironically, the kidnapping of DC chief Aldo Moro by the *Brigate rosse* (Red Brigades) provided the PCI with an escape hatch of sorts, for the emergency situation resulted in a quick vote of confidence which avoided the bruising parliamentary debate which had been expected. The crisis thus ended as it had begun, with a general impasse. But it had tarnished the PCI's image and credibility and poignantly underscored the profound constraints under which the party must operate in light of the present balance of power in Italy.

The crisis also demonstrated that the DC remains quite capable of setting the broad agenda of Italian politics to its own liking, despite its reduced maneuvering room. Its capacity for outflanking and springing unpleasant surprises on its parliamentary collaborators is likewise apparently undiminished.

The Socialists, whose own self-interest remains their paramount concern, are suspicious of the PCI's strategy of "historic compromise," which they fear will crush them between Italy's two largest parties. As a result, they balk at anything perceived as working to the Communists' advantage. At one point during the crisis, when the DC indicated that it was considering holding new elections, the PCI responded that before elections were called the Left should have a chance to form a government. This tactical move by the PCI might have been expected to gratify the Socialists, for it sounded as if the party acknowledged the feasibility of the "Left Alternative" which the PSI held out as an alternative to the "historic compromise." But the Socialists, much to the PCI's displeasure, instantly rejected the idea, declaring that any proposal for a Left coalition was "premature."

The tail end of the crisis served, too, to show, as have many terrorist episodes over the past few years, the special vulnerability of the PCI to public reactions against radical extremist groups like the *Brigate rosse*. The party's consistent hard line against terrorism, and even the fact that its own members have on occasion been attacked, cannot totally cancel the impact in the public mind of the fact that "red" or "left" terrorists speak in the name of Communist revolution. For a very long time the Communists were reticent to admit that "left" terrorism existed in Italy. Such an admission, they felt, would lend weight to efforts by conservatives to equate leftism with extremism, and this could only hurt the PCI's image. Long after the evidence was overwhelming, this preoccupation kept the PCI from recognizing that denunciations of foreign intelligence agencies or fascists in disguise were not an adequate response to the danger posed by the Red Brigades. More recent analyses have corrected earlier omissions while emphasizing, albeit sometimes in exaggerated fashion, that violence and terrorism have nothing to do with the workers' movement.[7] But the PCI's *actions* with regard to terrorism have never left room for equivocation. Communist firmness during the Moro affair contributed, perhaps decisively, to the triumph of those who refused any recognition of or negotiation with the Red Brigades.

The governmental crisis of 1978, in sum, ended in a standoff. With hindsight, one can see that in the short run such a situation could be very damaging to the Communists. The enthusiasm which had accompanied the PCI's impressive electoral gains would hardly be sustainable in a situation seemingly guaranteed not to produce profound reforms. Worse yet, for the long run, the party's strategy of "historic compromise" committed it to continued cooperation with the DC.[8] Intent on vindicating its strategy and demonstrating how much progress was being made despite the difficulties of this phase of collaboration, the PCI leadership tended, in the view of many, to overstate its achievements. This also contributed to disillusionment later on.

The post-1976 period, to be sure, witnessed significant accomplishments. Parliament, functioning with a decisive Communist contribution to its effectiveness, tackled important and long-delayed legislation. The potentially explosive modernization of rent control legislation, delayed 32 years, was carried out. Important powers were devolved to local governmental institutions. The secret services were coordinated and democratized. And even so divisive and emotion-laden an issue as the

7. Perhaps the most one-sided of these interpretations to be given an official stamp of approval can be found in Paolo Bufalini's address to the April 1978 meeting of the Central Committee of the PCI. This is reprinted in *l'Unita*, Apr. 18, 1978. A more balanced and reflective interpretation is Adalberto Minucci, *Terrorismo e crisi italiana* (Terrorism and the Italian Crisis), interview by Jochen Kreimer, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1978, esp. pp. 9-48.

8. A detailed analysis of the policy of "*compromesso storico*" would take us beyond the scope of this article. A concise summary is found in Sani, loc. cit., pp. 39-43. For more detail, see Stephen Hellman, "The Longest Campaign: Communist Party Strategy and the Elections of 1976," in Penniman, op. cit., esp. pp. 160-70.

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PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer solemnly applauds the proceedings at the 1978 National Festival of l'Unità, *which brought some 400,000 people to Genoa in September 1978.*

—Camera Press.

legalization of abortion was resolved with a very progressive law—one which the DC obviously opposed, but did not challenge with the same crusading tactics it had employed against the divorce law in the 1974 referendum. These reforms were compromise products that generated a lot of criticism, yet they were also achievements which would have been impossible prior to 1976.

Nevertheless, the Communists have found it difficult to reap much immediate political benefit from these accomplishments. Some measures, touted as successes by the PCI, have proven to be too vague and devoid of real content. A 1977 Governmental Program, a law on industrial reconversion, and a law to employ more youth, for example, all promised far more than they have delivered. The Communists themselves have recognized that precious little has been achieved to turn the economy of the country around. Yet this theme had been a major plank in their 1976 platform. And even the important reforms cited above have met with enormous obstacles in their practical implementation. Finally, a great number of crucial issues, particularly those related to economic reforms, remain to be legislated. The Communists' problem is that while their record is respectable, it falls far short of earlier expectations.

Of equal or perhaps greater importance is the way in which this record has been achieved. The PCI has done nothing to suggest a change of *style* in Italian politics. For a party which has always stressed that it is not like the others, and whose credibility depends in large measure on the freshness of its image, it can be most damaging to be identified as part of a process in which politics proceed as usual. Locked into a difficult situation because of the political balance of power in Italy and forced into even greater difficulty by its own strategic assumptions, the PCI certainly became aware very early of the erosion of its image. But the party's caution at the time of the metalworkers' strike indicates also how sensitive it was to constraints which it perceived on its activity. The PCI's behavior at the time suggested not blind optimism or misjudgments; rather, it indicated a paralyzing uncertainty of ideas and initiatives.

This uncertainty was best illustrated by the way the Communists handled one of the more publicized events of the post-1976 period, the drafting of a "Proposal for a Medium-Term Project." With the party's newly-won support in 1975 and 1976 based on an image of legitimacy, honesty, and efficiency, the Communists recognized that a consolidation of this support would be necessary once they moved out of the opposition. This required, within the framework of the party's broader goals, a statement of priorities and concrete objectives for the following several years. The statement would have an important *internal* function in the PCI as well. It would reassure restive leaders and militants that the new phase opened in 1976 did not signify that the PCI was going to become so totally engrossed in the day-to-day management of its newly-won position as to lose sight of its medium- and long-term objectives.

Party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer was especially sensitive to the dangers implicit in the party's new situation. He knew that his proposal for an austerity program would hardly inspire the party rank-and-file unless it could be demonstrated that today's sacrifices were clearly linked to future transformations of Italian society. After all, the PCI had

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Table 1. Voter Share of Italy's Five Largest Parties in Recent Elections in 261 Selected Communes[a]

(in percent)

Party[b]	Last pre-1978 local elections[c]	1976 general elections	May 1978 local elections
DC	37.5	38.9	42.5
PCI	25.8	35.6	26.5
PSI	13.5	9.2	13.3
PSDI	6.2	3.3	4.8
MSI-DN	6.8	7.1	5.0

[a] For comparability, the percentage of the vote in all cases is figured for those 261 communes that had more than 5,000 inhabitants at the time of the May 1978 elections. Elections at this level are conducted according to proportional lists, and hence the results provide a precise picture of the votes obtained by each party.

[b] DC—Christian Democracy; PCI—Italian Communist Party; PSI—Italian Socialist Party; PSDI—Italian Social Democratic Party; MSI-DN—Italian Socialist Movement-National Democracy.

[c] These elections were held on various dates, ranging from 1972 to 1977.

SOURCE: *L'Unità* (Rome), May 17, 1978.

already met stiff working-class resistance to Premier Andreotti's austerity measures. The PCI proposals of "austerity" would have to be presented convincingly if they were to have any chance of being accepted.[9]

The "Proposal for a Medium-Term Project" thus seemed an idea whose time had come, and there was a lot of speculation through the summer of 1977 as to what it would contain. However, the document which finally appeared satisfied almost no one.[10] Consequently, after a few fitful attempts to generate serious discussion of its merits outside as well as inside the PCI, it was largely ignored.[11]

The proposal suffered because it reflected but did not reconcile contradictory pressures regarding two fundamental issues. Within the party leadership, which is divided over—among other things—the wisdom of *any* kind of "project," most economic experts and some other influential leaders are exceedingly cautious in their assessments of what can actually be achieved by the PCI under present circumstances. Sometimes referred to as the "realists," they are fearful of the party's overextending itself in any way. Others are explicitly identified as *progettualisti*—"supporters of a project"—and want both a clear statement of goals and more decisive PCI action to achieve them. It is not surprising that a document to which both groups contributed—and which was also influenced by others with less easily categorized positions—would leave something to be desired. The second issue on which contradictory views were expressed concerned the audience to which the Proposal was directed. If aimed primarily at other political parties, the Proposal would have to spell out specific PCI objectives as an indication that the Communists were making something of an opening bid in a projected negotiating process. But if it were primarily designed for internal party consumption, it would have to dwell on broader objectives. The Proposal ultimately adopted neither approach, but tried to combine the two. It ended up too vague for one purpose, and too specific for the other.

Electoral Shocks After Moro's Death

Just a week after Aldo Moro's body was found near PCI headquarters in downtown Rome, one tenth of the Italian electorate voted in local elections. The results confirmed that the Communists had problems. The party managed to improve its showing slightly over the last local elections in the same places, but its share of the vote fell 9 percent below the 35.6 percent it had received there in the 1976 general elections (see Table 1). It was as if the great advances of the mid-1970's had never occurred: proportionately, one out of every four votes cast two years earlier for the PCI had disappeared. The drop was particularly heavy in the South, where the gains had been greatest and where the Communists in 1976 had for the first time achieved parity with their national average. In contrast, the DC and the PSI made important advances over 1976, and some minor laical parties also recovered somewhat from the drubbing they had suffered that year.

The Communists had been prepared for a possibly minor setback, but the dimensions of their losses came as a profound shock which demoralized the party and saw its critics announce the demise of

9. See Enrico Berlinguer, *Austerità occasione per trasformare l'Italia* (Austerity: The Chance to Transform Italy), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977, pp. 9-31. These are Berlinguer's conclusions presented at a PCI-sponsored conference on the role of intellectuals in the transformation of Italy, held at the Eliseo Theater, Rome, Jan. 14-15, 1977.

10. PCI, *Proposta di progetto a medio termine* (Proposal for a Medium-Term Project), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977. It might be added that the volume came off the presses at a most inopportune time, the very end of July. It thus coincided with the "deadest" period of the year in Italy, when a good deal of the population—and all politicians—are on vacation. This publication date probably resulted from difficulties in getting agreement on the final version of the document.

11. The PCI sponsored a debate in the pages of *Rinascita*, its theoretical weekly, from July to October 1977. See Numbers 29, 31, 33, 36, and 39 of the weekly for the various commentaries.

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

Giulio Carlo Argan, the Communist Mayor of Rome.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

the historic compromise strategy. Moving to head off cataclysmic interpretations of what had happened, the party leadership stressed the unique circumstances in which these elections had been held. Above all, there was the Moro tragedy. Beyond this, the leadership pointed out, the PCI always fares less well in local contests, where parochial considerations often outweigh national issues. Finally, the South had been disproportionately represented in these elections; the absence of returns from the large urban centers of the North necessarily exaggerated DC percentage gains and PCI losses. These were valid qualifications, especially since they were offered as such and not as excuses.[12] But the PCI had never seen its support drop so sharply, and when the entire country went to the polls a month later to vote on the twin referenda, the results were discouraging for the PCI both in the South *and* in the country's big cities.

Before the referenda were held, the top PCI leadership launched a searing denunciation of the recent shortcomings of party activists. Following the local elections, regional and provincial party secretaries were called to Rome to meet with Berlinguer. There, in a tone which would come to typify PCI commentary for the rest of 1978, the Secretary-General denounced the excessive concessions which the party had made to the DC in the interest of broad unity. He pointed out that Moro's martyrdom had resulted in the DC's being exempted from criticism of its often vacillating attitude toward the Red Brigades. This, under the circumstances, was acceptable, he said. Less acceptable was the *general* exemption from Communist criticism which the DC had recently enjoyed:

This is the point at which our critical reflection must begin, for the absence of a polemic directed at the overall line of the DC, including its responsibilities for the way the country has been run, is much less justified. We have been very generous these past two months, generous perhaps to the limits of ingenuousness—for our generosity and trust has not been paid back in kind, either by other parties or, especially, by the DC.[13]

Berlinguer focused a good deal of attention on Communist behavior at the local level, denouncing the tendency to seek agreements with the DC "at any cost." He reminded the leaders of the local party organizations that alliances at their level had to be viewed "in terms notably different from those that arise at the national level." He also criticized a growing tendency of the party leadership at *all* levels to spend too much time in formal institutional settings, rubbing shoulders with other political leaders. Instead, Communists should be devoting more attention to the "direction of struggles, to work among the masses, and to cultural and ideological battles." In short, while the PCI had announced that it would be a party of government and of struggle in the post-1976 period,[14] it had in reality emphasized

12. See especially the resolution of the PCI Executive (*Direzione*), "On the Electoral Results," *l'Unita*, May 20, 1978. A more detailed discussion is Celso Ghini, "Analysis of the First Vote After March Sixteenth," *Rinascita*, May 19, 1978, pp. 3-4. March 16 was the date Moro was kidnapped.

13. *L'Unità*, May 26, 1978.

14. The theme "party of government and of struggle" was made official in 1976 at the December Central Committee meeting. For the PCI's awareness of potential pitfalls and preparations for this new phase, see the address at this meeting by the head of the party's Organization Section, now published in book form as Gianni Cervetti, *Partito di governo e di lotta* (Party of Government and of Struggle), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977.

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the former role almost exclusively, to the detriment of the latter. This had undermined its combativeness and threatened its very identity as a mass party working for the radical transformation of society.

Berlinguer's comments, made with characteristic bluntness, were only a more detailed version of what many critics of the PCI had been saying since 1976. Similar views had in fact become common within the PCI itself in the period leading up to the local elections, and now that they had been translated into official party policy, expectations of a change in PCI behavior and pronouncements rose. The party had recognized its identity crisis; it was now a question of acting to resolve it.

It immediately became clear that in the difficult straits in which the party found itself in mid-1978, abstract desires would not be translated into actions very easily. The entire thrust of Berlinguer's criticism was directed against the PCI's failure to establish greater distance between itself and the other parties supporting the government, that is, to express its independence and separate identity. As soon as he had aired his views, though, the campaign on the referenda, which once again aligned the PCI with the DC and the government, got under way. Contrary to expectations, the Communists did not wage a particularly "autonomous" campaign, and when the votes were tallied, the PCI found itself linked with a mediocre showing by the winning side—and with a continuing identity problem.

What accounted for the inability of the Communists to alter their behavior even when the pitfalls of their course had just been dramatically underscored? The way in which the campaign on the referenda developed suggests the interplay of four key factors.

First, there was the party's earlier momentum. Having done little to dissociate itself from the government for nearly two years, the PCI could not become "more autonomous" in the twinkling of an eye. However penetrating and scathing the recent self-criticism might have been, recent practice had not equipped the Communists for a brusque tactical turnabout. The short notice which Berlinguer gave his party reinforced the PCI's inclination to fall back on familiar tactics and slogans during the campaign.

Second, the referenda themselves were unfortunate test cases for the party's purposes. The PCI has always taken a dim view of the popular referendum, which by its very nature eludes institutional control. Indeed, since referenda in Italy can only abrogate laws, not impose legislation, they can be considered antiparliamentary exercises. Berlinguer's postelectoral criticism of an overly institutional interpretation of the "historic compromise" was in no way equivalent to PCI advocacy of referenda. On the contrary, Berlinguer explicitly reiterated the party's opposition to them and reaffirmed the validity of the long-range strategy of government-wide PCI rapprochement with the DC.[15]

Third, for a variety of reasons the Communists were committed to the governmental position in support of the two laws which would have been abrogated had the referenda been approved. Yet this commitment obviously undermined the goal of reinforcing a more independent Communist Party identity.

The law allowing the public financing of political parties was very unpopular, but had been passed with PCI support in the wake of the financial scandals surrounding various parties in the 1970's. Although the PCI had not been involved in the scandals, its position in support of the law during the referendum associated it in the public mind with the parties that had been. This did little to promote a more autonomous image. Even within the party, public financing is exceptionally unpopular with many militants, who resent the way it has undermined PCI distinctiveness. Prior to the law's passage, the PCI had been financially hard-pressed, but at least it could proudly present itself as the only self-sufficient party in the country, financed entirely by grass-roots support.[16]

As for the law regulating public order, popularly known as the *Legge Reale* ("Reale Law"),[17] the PCI had originally opposed it in parliament, and the party's later support of it certainly did not help the party appear more independent—especially in the eyes of significant sectors of the Italian Left. Although the Communists offered many reasons for the reversal, it is likely that the major consideration was to avoid letting Center-Right forces monopolize a law-and-order issue in the face of rising terrorism and criminality in the country. However farsighted, this tactic left the PCI as the only left-wing party which campaigned openly to retain the law. The PSI was so divided over the *Legge Reale* (for which, incidentally, it had voted in parliament in 1975)

15. See *l'Unita,* May 26, 1978.

16. The PCI's 1977 budget totaled 40 billion lire (US$47 million). Public financing accounted for roughly one third of the party's credits and income—12.45 billion lire (US$14.6 million). *L'Unitå,* Jan. 27, 1978.

17. Named for Oronzo Reale, the Minister of the Interior who presented the bill.

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Table 2. Results of the June 1978 Twin Referenda, By Geographical Area
(in percent)

Area	To abolish public funding of parties			To abolish the "Reale Law"		
	Valid completed ballots		*Blank or void*	Valid completed ballots		*Blank or void*
	"Yes"	"No"	*ballots*	"Yes"	"No"	*ballots*
North	39.9	60.1	*5.8*	20.2	79.8	*5.6*
Center	40.8	59.2	*5.3*	20.8	79.2	*5.1*
South	51.6	48.4	*8.0*	29.7	70.3	*7.8*
Islands	54.8	45.2	*7.9*	32.3	67.7	*7.9*
All Italy	43.7	56.3	*6.3*	23.3	76.7	*6.2*

SOURCE: Data adapted by author from *Rinascita* (Rome), June 16, 1978, pp. 4-5.

that it counseled its supporters to vote according to conscience.

Finally, the contentious nature of both laws made the other governmental parties leery of committing themselves too fully one way or the other in the campaign. The impact of the PCI's active support of the government position was thus magnified by default, setting the Communists up for their second no-win situation in six months. Only an overwhelming number of "no" votes would have allowed the PCI to emerge with its prestige undamaged.

When the dust of the often ugly campaign settled, the strength of the abolitionist, or "yes," vote was striking, especially on the public financing of political parties. Nearly 44 percent of the country had voted to abolish the law, and an absolute majority had done so in the South (see Table 2). Moreover, the "yes" vote carried the four largest cities in Italy, three of which had Communist mayors.[18] The Communists drew some consolation from the very strong "no" vote in the "Red Belt" of Central Italy, but the overall results made clear that the malaise signaled in the local elections in May was neither temporary nor geographically circumscribed.

A Problematic Strategy

The problems encountered by the PCI during the first half of 1978 could be shrugged off as a mere run of bad luck only by the most naive or blind—and the Italian Communists are neither. But it is one thing to be aware of a problematic situation and of the constraints that it imposes, and quite another thing to act effectively to alter prevailing conditions. Furthermore, when a pattern becomes apparent in a succession of crises, one is required to probe more deeply. The Communists' political difficulties and their identity crisis may reflect more than an inability to adjust to a new political phase in Italy. They may be rooted in the party's overall strategy. Only an examination of the PCI's strategy against the broader backdrop of the evolution of Italy's ongoing crisis can indicate whether they are.

As with any crisis which is simultaneously social, economic, and political, the Italian situation over the past decade has been one of anything but linear development. Italy's crisis broke out at the end of the 1960's, with labor's "hot autumn" of 1969 only the most dramatic of a series of events which disrupted Italian society and seemingly threatened every aspect of the established order. By 1972, however, a general reaction against the turbulence of the preceding phase and a Center-Right counter-offensive saw the country's more moderate and conservative forces attempt to recoup their losses at minimal expense. If the logic implicit in the first period was to sweep aside the old system of power dominated by the DC, the converse logic of the second became to drive the PCI, the unions, and Italy's other emergent sociopolitical strata back to their more marginal roles of the 1960's. Neither design was successful. The first would at minimum have required a revolutionary crisis. This did not develop, and even if it had, the Left lacked sufficient leverage, unity, and will to channel it in a fruitful direction. The DC and the bulk of the Right, for their part, were neither prepared nor equipped to push the logic of "restoration" to its ultimate form, the status quo ante.

What these two phases demonstrated was that although the Italian system was far from healthy, the democratic rules of the game were deeply entrenched. They also indicated to each side that its opposite number was more powerful and more re-

18. The four cities with more than a million inhabitants are Rome, Milan, Turin, and Naples. At the time of the referenda, the PCI was the largest party in all four cities, with only Milan not under a left-wing government headed by the Communists.

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Leaders of Italy's Christian Democracy (DC): at the left, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti; at the right, DC Secretary-General Benigno Zaccagnini.

—Brian Alpert/Keystone, and Keystone.

silient than expected. Neither side reverted to passivity, however; nor was either unaffected by what had happened. The first to draw a political lesson—and to reap the consequent benefits—was the PCI. Sobered by the DC's resiliency and the widespread public backlash against prospects of too radical change, the Communist Party criticized itself, moderated its posture, and elaborated the strategy of reapprochement with the DC known as the *compromesso storico*.

This more responsible and moderate stance certainly contributed to the striking advances made by the Communists in the third phase of the crisis, which was marked by the steady erosion of DC hegemony and the steady rise of the Left. Beginning with the 1974 divorce law referendum and ending with the 1976 general elections, the Left, led by the PCI, reaped the benefits of the widespread dissatisfaction which had become manifest in the late 1960's. But this was by no means an automatic process. The PCI changed, while the DC, wracked by scandal, could not or would not follow suit.

The most recent phase of Italy's crisis can best be described as an impasse or standoff, characterized by the necessary but mutually suspect collaboration of the major parties in the Italian system, including, most prominently, the DC and the PCI. For its part, the DC accepts the situation because it has no choice. At the same time, it is attempting to maximize the PCI's visible responsibility for governmental behavior while keeping real Communist influence at a minimum. A successful holding action of this sort might well deliver what a more aggressive approach could not, namely, the erosion of PCI credibility and support. Because of its long-term strategy of "historic compromise," the PCI's task is much more difficult. The party must demonstrate its ability to effect promised changes, maintain its distinct identity, and persuade the DC that long-term collaboration is the only realistic solution to Italy's deep-seated problems.

To date, indications are that the DC has been much more successful than the PCI in achieving its basic objectives. This reflects in part the much less ambitious goals which the Christian Democrats have set for themselves in this phase of the crisis and in Italian politics in general. But it also reflects the DC's ability under party Secretary-General Benigno Zaccagnini to project a fresher, cleaner, and more dignified image than previously. These adaptations to changing circumstances by the DC, along with what many see as a resurgence in the country generally of more traditional values in a difficult period—a resurgence by no means restricted to Italy in the late 1970's—have worked very much to the DC's advantage, as has the PCI's in-

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ability during the same period to propose anything resembling a specific and viable alternative for Italian society.

The most obvious and perhaps most important question arising out of this state of affairs is whether the strategy of "historic compromise" elaborated by the PCI in 1972-73 will have much of a future after 1978. The term will certainly be in use for a long time, but what will remain of its content? However much it contributed to earlier successes, it has revealed its shortcomings in the present phase of Italy's crisis.

These shortcomings go far beyond Berlinguer's criticisms of Communist behavior, which boil down to the assertion that the line is correct, but that it has been applied incorrectly, in too conciliatory a fashion. This argument is, ultimately, not very persuasive, for a good measure of conciliation would appear to be required if the PCI's long-term goal of collaboration and cooperation with the DC is to be realized. The fundamental problem is that the DC does not share the PCI's long-term goal and that to convince the DC to change its mind about the "historic compromise" the Communists have only two courses open to them, both of which may be pursued simultaneously, but neither of which is likely to be effective. The first is to try to *persuade* the DC leadership that it is in everyone's interest that long-term cooperation take place. But unless this is an invitation for the most prominent personalities of the DC to commit political suicide, it assumes that DC supporters would accept the idea. That they do not, and that the DC's bases of support are more conservative now than they were prior to the 1976 elections,[19] are unpleasant realities which the PCI conveniently avoids facing up to. The second possible course is to *force* the DC toward a more cooperative stance. But the DC, as already indicated, is quite able to resist PCI pressures; indeed, it appears to have increased its electoral strength precisely by ceding as little as possible to the Communists.

Berlinguer's singling out of local-level concessions to the DC for particular criticism is also not very persuasive. Since 1976, the *national* party leadership has been intensively involved in the promotion of "broad alliances" at the local—especially regional—level, and *l'Unità* has publicized any and all such arrangements as great successes. The point which needs to be stressed here, however, is not the apparent hypocrisy of the national leadership.[20] It is, rather, that alliance-building at the local level is totally consonant with the party's strategic goals. The DC's local power bases are an integral part and one of the basic pillars of the Christian Democratic system of power. If the DC cannot be forced to change at the local level, it is unlikely that "change" in any meaningful sense can be brought about at the national level. It is this fact which drove the PCI to press for as many local-level alliances with the DC as possible after 1976.

There is, of course, some leeway for more or less conciliation or aggressiveness in Communist behavior toward the DC. But fundamentally the PCI's strategy requires a good deal of conciliation, and this has simply not paid off. One cannot waltz without a partner. Thus, the most recent stage of Italy's crisis may indicate that the "historic compromise" was an effective *tactic* for a given phase of the crisis, but is not a plausible *strategy* for a way out of the crisis.

From its formulation, the strategy of "historic compromise" was distinguished and made controversial by its insistence that profound change in Italy would only be possible under conditions of broad national unity. The continued presence of the DC as a major political force was recognized as essential given Italian conditions. But it was also recognized that the potential alternation in power of majority and opposition that is characteristic of other Western democracies would prove as fatal in Italy as it had been in Chile in 1973.[21] Therefore, the "historic compromise" was to be more than a simple, temporary governmental formula; it was viewed as offering a strategic vision of how the transformation of Italy would take place.[22]

The compromise idea as initially proposed specifically embraced some formulas for cooperation and explicitly excluded others. But Berlinguer's most recent pronouncements suggest the original vision has undergone significant modifications.

19. As noted earlier, in the 1976 elections the DC remained stationary at 38.7 percent of the vote only by "cannibalizing" its smaller allies. The Center-Right thus lost just over 4 percent. The DC lost votes to its left but gained an equal number from its right. Its electoral base thus shifted rightward.

20. Hypocrisy may well exist, but this will only be proved if local party leaders are punished in the future while national leaders remain untouched for promoting local-level concessions. Until this happens, it remains plausible that Berlinguer made his remarks in a self-critical spirit.

21. For documentation and citations regarding this issue, see Hellman, "The Longest Campaign," loc. cit., pp. 165-70.

22. Berlinguer elaborates this point in many places. See, for example, his address to the 14th Congress of 1975, in PCI, *XIV Congresso del PCI: Atti e resoluzione* (14th Congress of the PCI: Acts and Resolutions), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1975, pp. 49-50.

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The strategy is now defended as valid no matter what the makeup of the governing coalition in power. And Berlinguer has even conceded that it can permit the "possible alternation" of governments without risking a destructive polarization of society.[23] In effect, the PCI Secretary-General is reinterpreting the "historic compromise" to mean that, in power or in opposition, his party will not pursue policies which threaten Italian democracy by splitting the society into two radically opposed camps. But this reduces the meaning of the "historic compromise" to the level of a broad consensus, while the creation of a sociopolitical bloc of all major forces in order to transform society appears to have gone by the boards. Thus, Berlinguer is preaching only a remnant of the original strategy, and may even be preparing the party for a possible enforced trip back into opposition. The outright abandonment of the historic compromise is unlikely, but serious alterations may well be under way.

The PCI's Crowded Agenda

Despite the Communists' recent problems, it is a sign of Berlinguer's prestige—and of his party's basic dilemma—that no one challenges his continued leadership. If current trends indicate anything about the future, the father of the "historic compromise" appears slated to be the guardian of at least a partial revision of the strategy. This may raise a number of problems for the party, but it is not as incongruous a situation as it seems on the surface. It is, for instance, very much in keeping with the PCI's obsession about presenting everything as a manifestation of continuity. This is in part a style of leadership which has been confirmed over time, but it has also proven to be an excellent way to minimize organizational disruption and demoralization. The corps of leaders which surrounds the Secretary-General has been notable in recent years for a uniformity of style and of outlook. Such uniformity—unusual for the PCI— demonstrated how fully the top leadership believed the party to be won over to the "historic compromise." Some minor shake-ups at the upper reaches of the leadership are now expected even prior to the upcoming congress. This return to normalcy for the PCI will be yet another sign that the "historic compromise" did not usher in a radical new era for the party.

Indeed, the extent to which the party organization and leadership at all levels has been stamped by the triumphant period of the "historic compromise" may prove to be one of the most serious problems confronting the PCI in the immediate future. The upcoming 15th National Congress of the PCI, scheduled for the spring of 1979, will no doubt see the main debate centered on problems of national strategy. This Congress promises to be of exceptional interest, however, because so many other related issues—organizational, ideological, and political—have come to the fore during the most recent period.[24]

Organizational issues. Italian Communists like to argue that purely organizational problems do not exist, that they are only structural manifestations of political problems. The large dose of truth in this observation is evident from the way in which the party has consistently discussed its own organization since 1976. Even the perennial organizational problems of a mass party—and PCI strategy in the entire postwar period has presupposed an activist mass party—have taken on a new measure of urgency as the PCI's gains have increased the tasks it must perform. The membership statistics in Table 3 underscore one aspect of the dilemma. From a low point of just under 1.5 million at the end of the

Table 3. PCI Membership Trends, 1968-78

Year	Membership	Recruits	Nonrenewals
1968	1,495,662	98,067	132,810
1969	1,495,756	101,206	101,112
1970	1,498,367	105,867	103,256
1971	1,510,502	112,627	100,492
1972	1,573,956	151,118	88,384
1973	1,611,073	137,198	99,301
1974	1,643,716	132,774	100,131
1975	1,715,195	155,854	84,375
1976	1,797,597	170,966	88,564
1977	1,797,075	129,351	129,873
1978	1,767,000	101,000	NA

NA—Not available.

[a]Totals do not include members enrolled in PCI foreign federations. There were approximately 18,000 such members in 1977.

SOURCE: Official PCI statistics reported in Marzio Barbagli and Piergiorgio Corbetta, "Party and Movement: Characteristics and Renovation of the PCI," *Inchiesta* (Bari), January-February 1978, p. 11, and *l'Unità* (Rome), Oct. 14, 1978.

23. Berlinguer used this phrase in his speech to provincial and regional leaders, *l'Unita,* May 26, 1978; and in his address to the July Central Committee meeting of the PCI, *l'Unità,* July 25, 1978.

24. A revealing sign that the party leadership expects (and wants) a wide-ranging debate at the upcoming congress is that the official document for discussion will be a set of theses. PCI congresses in 1972 and 1975 abandoned the practice of presenting theses for discussion in favor of a precongress speech by Berlinguer. The reintroduction of theses is a tacit recognition that disagreement exists and that it can be more easily expressed in impersonal form.

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1960's, PCI membership rose to nearly 1.8 million in 1977. But membership did not keep pace with PCI advances at the polls. In 1968, there was one party member for every 5.7 Communist voters; by 1976, this ratio had fallen to one for every 7 voters. The decline was especially significant when one considers that the immense electoral gains and vastly expanded governing responsibilities and related tasks of the party during this period might have been expected to attract vastly increased numbers of recruits into the PCI. This is certainly what the leadership, which had sought to increase mass recruitment into the party for many years, had hoped for. Yet party growth stagnated in 1977, and showed a slight decline in 1978.

The new pressures on the party created by its victories, combined with its reasonably abrupt changes of fortune, have generated many other organizational problems as well. One which has been particularly publicized is the increasingly disproportionate representation of people of middle-class and intellectual origins among new party cadres and leaders. From the grass roots up, the difference between the leadership and the mass membership in this respect is growing. This has generated an extensive debate within the party. Most commentators allow that there are many explanations for the trend, and that not all of its effects are negative. Simultaneously, however, almost all participants in the debate express concern about the trend's long-run implications. They fear a dilution of the party's class identity at an especially sensitive time and increased communication problems between leaders and rank-and-file. There is also a preoccupation voiced that leaders who are not products of mass struggle and mobilization would be less inclined to look toward these practices as essential political assets. Recent tendencies toward institutional compromise and mediation would thus be reinforced. All of the structural tendencies leading in this direction have been inflated anyway by the very rapid rate at which new leaders have been created and coopted to fill the many new positions of power into which the party has moved since 1975.[25] Inexperienced local leaders have been more the rule than the exception for the PCI, and this has promoted considerable cadre training activity in the spirit of the "historic compromise." While

25. This particular debate was stimulated by Giovanni Berlinguer, the brother of the Secretary-General and himself a top leader of the PCI, in "Why Less Worker and Peasant Cadres?," *Rinascita*, June 6, 1977, pp. 7-8. Articles followed for the rest of 1977, and letters on these issues have continued to be published throughout 1978. The issues cited in the text cover only a small part of the discussion.

Scenes from the massive turnout of hundreds of thousands of PCI faithful at the September 1977 National Festival of l'Unità *in Modene, where party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer delivered a major policy speech.*

—Marcelli/SYGMA.

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the party claims to be attempting by means of this training to overcome what it calls "the lack of a historical memory" of its cadres,[26] the leadership must be very aware that those accustomed only to the victories of the mid-1970's are going to be much more susceptible to demoralization and paralysis in the new and difficult phase which has now begun.

Ideological issues. An identity crisis for any Communist party, even one as nondoctrinaire as the Italian, necessarily raises ideological questions. It is not surprising that recent discussion has focused heavily on two issues long cited as of fundamental importance by the more astute observers of the PCI—the party's "Leninism" and its relationship to the Soviet Union.[27] These are by no means the only issues to figure prominently in recent discussions, but they are crucial ones.

Official party pronouncements on these and other ideological matters vary considerably according to circumstances. Genuine uncertainty, the character of the audience, and the requirements of the political moment all have their impact, and variations in the manner in which things are said sometimes lead to the impression that there is more fluctuation in the party's position than is truly the case. In the debate over Marxism-Leninism, for example, the attentive observer could note that when the issue was raised internally, emphasis fell on the preservation of PCI traditions. When raised with people outside the party organization, the Communists' nondogmatic and laical nature was underscored. In a period like the autumn of 1977, when PCI overtures to the DC and the Catholic world were at their peak, so was the deemphasis of Lenin's contribution to PCI thinking. Since 1978, however, as the PCI's attitude toward the DC has hardened, quite a different tone has prevailed.[28]

This balancing off of conflicting pressures by means of flexible positioning is a long-standing practice in the PCI. In recent years other Communist parties—most notably the French and Spanish—have made quite clamorous pronouncements as they eliminated terms like "proletarian dictatorship" and "Marxism-Leninism" from their official lexicons. Italian Communists, in contrast, simply point out that their own party stopped using these terms a long time ago, without fanfare. Subtle change in the PCI will quite probably continue, although the recent stiffening of the party's posture may slow the evolutionary process. "Marxism-Leninism," because it is anachronistic and implies a dogma, will almost certainly be replaced by a more innocuous formulation at the upcoming congress. "Democratic centralism," on the other hand, may undergo some marginal modification but remains too practically efficacious to be seriously challenged.

The same sort of balancing act is apparent in the PCI's treatment of the USSR, and in the special relationship which links the PCI to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). PCI acceptance of the underlying assumptions of Italian foreign policy and criticism of the USSR have developed notably over the years.[29] But pressures on the party, in the form of demands for further clarifications of its position, have been and will continue to be high. What critics on both the left and the right of the PCI want to see is an open break between the party and the CPSU; however, this is in all likelihood a vain hope. Open denunciations of the USSR by the Spanish Communists led by Santiago Carrillo have sometimes put the PCI in embarrassing situations, though never embarrassing enough to cause them to undertake similar initiatives. The Italian party has carefully evolved a critical, but not openly hostile, stance toward the Soviet Union, one which commands broad consensus within the party and adequately serves the PCI's many outside needs.

To support its present position, the PCI leadership can point out that the party has taken the proper stand on issues and occasions which have really counted. In October 1977, the PCI joined the other parties which support the Italian government in voting for a unanimous foreign policy document. Less than a month later, Berlinguer, speaking on

26. The Party-School Section of the PCI held national conferences in both 1976 and 1977. Only three other such conferences took place in the entire postwar period. The most recent conference focused on the problems involved in creating cadres capable of handling the tasks which have arisen since the PCI's electoral victories. Sezione Scuola di partito del PCI, *Formazione dei quadri e sviluppo del partito* (The Formation of Cadres and the Development of the Party), Rome, Salemi, 1978.

27. See Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1968.

28. A telling comparison of the different tones of pronouncements to different audiences is obtained by contrasting Berlinguer's closing speech to the National Festival of *l'Unità* in September 1977 (see *l'Unita*, Sept. 19, 1977) with his much-publicized letter to the Bishop of Ivrea just one month later. This letter is now reprinted in Antonio Tatò, *Comunisti e mondo cattolico oggi* (Communists and the Catholic World Today), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977, pp. 27-38. For a sampling of the party's more recent tough tone and content, see Berlinguer's concluding remarks to the 1978 National Festival of *l'Unità*, reported in *l'Unità*, Sept. 18, 1978.

29. For a superb discussion of the PCI position and the motives underlying its evolution, consult Robert D. Putnam, "Italian Foreign Policy: The Emergent Consensus," in Penniman, op. cit., pp. 287-326.

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Soviet television during the 60th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution, said that the PCI considers democracy and socialism to be inseparable and universal values. And by early 1978, the PCI had even become openly critical for the first time of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy in Africa.[30] Meanwhile, repeated and harsh criticism of Soviet repression of dissenters has continued.

Of course, critics point to other indicators. When Carrillo was snubbed during the 60th anniversary celebration in Moscow, for instance, the PCI's coverage of what had happened was highly evasive. And while the PCI spoke out against the repression of dissent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it systematically kept its distance from several conferences on dissent which were held in Italy. But perhaps what most enrages critics of the PCI is the party's refusal to draw the conclusions implicit in its own analyses of the USSR. If democracy and socialism are truly *universal* (and not just Western) values, and if the PCI openly states that democracy exists in very small doses, if at all, in the USSR, what does this imply about the existence or authenticity of socialism in that country?

Such criticism may be well-grounded. But it is precisely the PCI's refusal to draw conclusions which permits it to keep its feet in two camps. Explicit denial of the Soviet model's applicability to Italy and the party's acceptance of NATO and the Common Market situate the PCI squarely in Europe. This is an absolute necessity of the party's domestic political strategy. On the other hand, its continued special relationship with the USSR helps reinforce the party's distinct identity. In addition, party leaders believe—perhaps naively—that this special relationship will bolster Italy's international position when the Communists eventually acquire a full share of power.

Communist-Socialist relations. Finally, relations with the Socialist Party are likely to require significantly greater attention than heretofore. The Socialist Party has been using the new political situation in Italy to seek a way out of its own perennial dilemma—to find a way to reinforce its own identity while avoiding subordination to either of Italy's two largest parties. Because of Communist successes and the enunciation of the "historic compromise" strategy, Socialist pressure—and attacks—on the PCI have become more aggressive and more frequent since 1976. Particularly since the end of 1977, tension and distrust between the two parties have mounted to very high levels. The Communists, who would of course like to interpret "Left unity" in their own fashion, do seem to have a point when they question the merit of recent PSI actions. If the long-term goal of the Socialists truly is to offer Italy a "Left Alternative," do they think they promote the unity of the Left by devoting most of their energy to attacking the PCI?

Part of the Socialists' motivation can probably be found in what can only be described as gleeful revenge. Resentful of their own poor showing in 1976



Enrico Berlinguer, PCI Secretary-General, addresses a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, on November 2, 1977, during Moscow's observance of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

30. The Senate foreign policy resolution and speeches in support of it by leading Communists are reprinted in Ufficio stampa del Gruppo dei senatori comunisti, *I comunisti e la politica estera* (The Communists and Foreign Policy), offprint, n.d. (1977), pp. 4-16. Berlinguer's appearance on Soviet television is reported in *l'Unita*, Nov. 5, 1977. On Africa, see Romano Ledda, "Eritrea Is Not the Ogaden," *l'Unità*, Apr. 18, 1978. This article "corrected" the earlier much more mainstream and orthodox line set out by Giancarlo Pajetta, "We Choose the Front Which Represents Negotiations and Peace," *Rinascita*, Feb. 17, 1978, pp. 7-8.

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and doubly resentful of what they have considered—often with good reason—Communist disregard for the PSI as the PCI has ardently sought broad alliances with the DC since 1975, the Socialists are now paying the Communists back.

But beyond this, the Socialists have a more ambitious design. In their projected future Left majority in Italy, the Socialists certainly envision a Communist-Socialist balance of power more favorable to themselves than the 3.6-to-1 ratio which emerged in the 1976 elections. The Italian Socialists have their eyes on the French situation, where a nearly moribund Socialist Party arrived at parity with the Communists in less than a decade. The PSI is realistic enough to recognize that parity would seem to be out of the question in Italy, but the party is ambitious enough to pursue its own interests unashamedly.[31] What all this means is that the two major parties of the Italian Left are currently divided strategically and tactically—and by several decades of accumulated mistrust and animosity.

As they have moved with unprecedented unity to rejuvenate their image, the Socialists have managed on a surprising number of occasions to force the PCI to debate issues the Communist leadership clearly would have preferred to deal with by different means, if at all. Many (if not most) of the protagonists in recent ideological debates in Italy concerning pluralism, the relationship between socialism and democracy, dissent, the nature of the USSR, and other critical issues have been noted PSI intellectuals or party leaders. The Socialists have also moved into areas which they feel the Communists have forsaken because of their preoccupation with coming to terms with, and hence not alienating, the Church. Civil liberties, ecology, and women's rights are among the most recent issue areas where the PSI has tried to raise the banner of the Left abandoned, in the Socialists' view, by the Communists.

Socialist initiatives at times have appeared unabashedly opportunistic, as when the PSI came out in favor of negotiations with the Red Brigades during Aldo Moro's kidnapping or when it attempted to limit the Communists' maneuvering room in the political crisis discussed at the beginning of this article. But the Socialists have enjoyed some brilliant successes. In July 1978, for instance, they managed to get a member of their own party, Sandro Pertini, elected President of the Republic after the resignation of Giovanni Leone. This triumph illustrated how effectively and aggressively the PSI could use its pivotal placement between the two giants of Italian politics. Tenacity of this sort and the Socialists' ideological attacks on the Communists promise a strained and rocky future in relations between the PCI and PSI.

This relationship is aggravated still further by local conflicts. Particularly where PCI gains in 1975 made Left majorities theoretically possible, the two parties have frequently been at loggerheads. The PCI has bitterly resented Socialist criticism of its decision to make overtures to the DC in a number of places, for the PSI had done precisely the same thing in similar circumstances during the 1960's and early 1970's. Moreover, constant tension exists in numerous local Left coalitions because of Socialist demands for influence and a share of power far beyond what the PSI percentage of the vote would seem to merit. Hostile feelings exist and are constantly exacerbated between the two parties all the way down to the grass roots.

Conclusions

Nothing that has been discussed above will make

Socialist Sandro Pertini, left, newly elected President of Italy, is applauded by Communist Pietro Ingrao, President of Italy's Chamber of Deputies, on July 8, 1978.

—Wide World.

31. The public record reveals very little of what the PCI thinks of the French situation. Although the anger of the top PCI leadership with the French Communists' behavior during the electoral campaign in France at the start of 1978 was widely reported in the Italian press, *l'Unità's* coverage of the ruinous arguments between French Socialists and Communists—arguments which certainly contributed strongly to the Left's defeat when victory was believed possible—has been strikingly "diplomatic" and noncommittal.

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At the left, Italian Communist labor leader Luciano Lama addresses students at Rome University on February 17, 1977, urging them to end a week-long occupation of the campus and return to classes. At the right, extreme leftist students, whose violent attack disrupted the meeting and drove Lama from the university's campus.

—Wide World.

the Communists' immediate future an easy one. But whether one sees the new phase of the Italian crisis which we have been discussing as the start of a fluid period of uncertainty or as the beginning of a more stable period of reduced leverage for the Left, several things should be kept in mind.

Communist momentum in Italy appears to have slackened, but the strength of the PCI has by no means been seriously deflated. Were new general elections to plunge the PCI to the level of support it had in the partial local elections of 1978—a most unlikely occurrence—this would certainly represent a defeat for the Communists. But even then the general balance of political power in Italy would return to roughly what it was at the beginning of the present decade. Only unprecedented Socialist gains and a complete breakdown of PCI-PSI relations would make a stable majority excluding the Communists even mathematically possible.[32] But this would mean another round of Center-Left rule, and that formula has so badly burned the PSI and so favored the PCI that it is difficult to imagine that it could remain truly stable. The political situation in the early 1970's, it is important to recall, was characterized by constant crisis and paralysis because it was impossible to form a stable coalition in parliament or a government willing to tackle Italy's many serious problems.

Another factor must give pause to anyone who might want to try to exploit the PCI's present vulnerability with new national elections. Few Christian Democrats enjoy the present proximity of the Communists, but most have been realistic enough to see that it leaves the DC's power structures intact while providing the government an opportunity to deal with potentially explosive national problems. Reforms, and even unpopular economic measures, which generated polarization and paralysis when the PCI was in opposition to the government have recently been enacted with Communist support. Each issue that can be resolved now lightens the load that future governments, whatever their make-up, will have to bear. The present situation also serves DC interests politically because, in the short run, it sets the PCI in opposition to the positions of likely constituents it would otherwise be rallying against the DC. Some of the most important reforms

32. "Centrist," or Center-Right, coalitions do not seem plausible formulas for the foreseeable future. They would require a shift in voting patterns extreme even by Italy's recent standards. Furthermore, they would guarantee a maximum of instability, since they would place both the Socialists and the Communists in the opposition.

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pending in parliament, such as those concerning pensions, the school system, and the universities, would be difficult, if not impossible, to push through with the PCI on the other side of the barricades. While the PCI cannot fully control the unions and the students, it can at least minimize their potential for disruption.

The irony of the current situation has not eluded the Communists. They know that their presence at the threshold of power has eroded their credibility as a party of efficiency and change. Even their greatest successess—such as their sweep into power at the local government level in 1975—seem to acquire a bitter edge as time passes. The Communists inherited the worst problems from their predecessors, but in the local elections of 1980 they will bear the onus of the incumbent in a majority of important cities and regions. In response to the danger implicit in this situation, the party has hardened its posture on all fronts throughout 1978. Yet the numerous constraints which act on the PCI have limited the result to date to a shift more in tone and style than in substance. The party's tougher stance will no doubt help Berlinguer keep debate at the upcoming 15th National Congress within manageable bounds on many issues. But it cannot resolve, and it may even exacerbate, the basic dilemmas of the party's domestic strategy. The time-worn slogans and symbols which worked in the recent past may well leave many supporters indifferent or unconvinced in the near future. This is what the PCI found repeatedly when it tried to orient new voters with old tactics in the 1978 electoral contests described at the outset. Increasingly, the new Communist electorate may have to be persuaded by results.

If this is true, then the only course by which the PCI might maintain the allegiance both of a more ideological membership and of a more pragmatic electorate would be not simply to adopt a tougher posture but to assume one which can "deliver the goods," i.e., one that will achieve concrete reforms. Although rational decision-making models are often inapplicable to the Italian scene, the implications here are that a continuation of the present impasse could well put the greatest pressure for some dramatic action on the PCI rather than on the DC or the Socialists. Events such as continued DC refusal to make meaningful concessions on important reforms could force the Communists to see their choice in stark terms: erosion or the maintenance of integrity and dignity. To opt for the latter would precipitate a serious crisis and almost certainly national elections as well. Elections are something the PCI would very much like to avoid, but not at any price. The Communists' short-term fortunes, as well as their long-term strategy, almost certainly rest on their ability to extricate themselves from the present impasse. In calmer times, all of Italy's parties might have been willing to await the results of the elections to the European Parliament slated for 1979 and the Italian local elections slated for 1980 before making major decisions. But with the situation as it currently stands, and with pressures building, 1980 seems a very long way off.

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Books

The Middle East in Soviet Strategy

By George Lenczowski

HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE. *La Politique Soviétique au Moyen-Orient, 1955-1975* (Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East, 1955-1975). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975.

R. D. McLAURIN. *The Middle East in Soviet Policy.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1975.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977.

GALIA GOLAN. *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

A. YODFAT and M. ABIR. *In the Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf.* London, Frank Cass & Co., 1977.

ABRAHAM S. BECKER et al. *The Economics and Politics of the Middle East.* New York, NY, American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1975.

SOVIET POLICIES in the Middle East have drawn increasing attention from Western scholars, diplomats, and policymakers ever since World War II. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the revolutionary changes occurring in the area beginning with the 1950's intensified Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern politics, and the October war of 1973 brought the USSR and the US close to a confrontation. The six books reviewed here, while varying in length, detail, and emphasis, all try to describe, clarify, and analyze Soviet policies in this area noted for its strategic importance and endemic political ferment.

Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's lucid and well organized book is probably the most comprehensive in its analysis of the underlying principles and main thrusts of Soviet policy. It reviews historical trends in Russian policy, the ideological foundations of Soviet policy since the revolution, and the USSR's actual policies and actions in the Middle East.

R. D. McLaurin's study of Soviet policy in the region was written under contract for the Office of the US Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). In contrast to Carrère d'Encausse's historical treatment, this volume is par excellence topical in organization: the author discusses in order Soviet objectives in the Middle East; constraints (domestic and international) on Soviet policy there; and the political, economic, military, and cultural dimensions of Soviet activities. The book is written clearly, with a certain penchant for economy in words. To some extent it reflects the typical preoccupation of its official sponsors with issues, problems, and possible solutions: each neatly delineated section inclines the reader to ask almost instinctively, "What's the bottom line?"

Alvin Rubinstein's volume focuses on the special relationship that developed between the USSR and Egypt after 1967. It probes the somewhat mystifying matter of influence: who gained influence over whom, and if influence was gained, what was its extent, and what were its manifestations? To answer these questions, Professor Rubinstein subjects the turbulent decade after the June war of 1967 to careful scrutiny, thus providing the reader with a very well documented and most detailed analysis of Soviet and Egyptian behavior during that period. The vicissitudes of the abruptly changing Soviet-Egyptian relationship—from the height of massive arms deliveries and the friendship treaty of 1971 to the 1972 expulsion of Soviet experts and Anwar Sadat's turn toward Washington—are described and analyzed in a vivid manner.

Rubinstein also devotes attention to the methodological prob-

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lems inherent in this kind of research and directs some caustic remarks at such quantitative techniques as studying UN voting statistics and the frequency of mutual visits. In his study, "strict quantitative content analysis was not applied to the joint communiqués and [individual] editorials [of the USSR and Egypt] because preliminary research revealed that this technique did not yield any additional substantive insights into the influence relationship itself" (p. xix). Instead, Rubinstein deliberately used "thematic content analysis," or—in plain English—applied common sense and logic rather than largely irrelevant mathematical formulas.

Galia Golan's book has an even narrower frame of reference than the Rubinstein volume, focusing on the October war of 1973 (the Yom Kippur or the Ramadan war, depending on the reader's preference). The author, an Israeli scholar at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has produced a work commendable in terms both of its exceptionally detailed and thorough documentation and of its detachment—remarkable for one identified with one of the parties to the war and standing so close to the scene of the action. Only occasionally can the reader detect the author's national identity, and hence preferences. She refers, for example, to the Palestinian fedayeen as "terrorists." (True enough, the fedayeen have often perpetrated acts of individual and group terror, but their Israeli adversaries have also carried out acts of terror and counterterror. Both sides claim special patriotic motivation for their deeds.) It is likewise to the author's credit that despite the mass of detail she provides, she does not lose sight of broader, more fundamental questions relating to Soviet objectives and priorities.

A. Yodfat and M. Abir's short study concentrates on an issue that has emerged more recently in the region's politics—the security of the Persian Gulf. The title of the work itself harks back to the Nazi-Soviet agreement of 1940, in which Molotov defined "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf . . .as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union."[1] The authors argue that a power vacuum arose in the Gulf area as a result of the British withdrawal in 1971 and that the USSR, directly or by proxy (especially through Iraq), has been trying to fill it. Casting a glance at the expanded periphery of the southeastern Arabian peninsula, the authors find Marxist South Yemen—a poor but militant state—playing the role of the Middle Eastern "Cuba." They also point to the big powers' rivalry in the Indian Ocean as an extension of Persian Gulf concerns and suggest its linkage with the situation in the Horn of Africa, where (at the time they wrote their study) the Soviet Union possessed a seemingly strong foothold (bolstered by a bilateral treaty) in Somalia.

In the final volume examined here, *The Economics and Politics of the Middle East,* only the section by Abraham S. Becker, "The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970-1973," is directly relevant to our focus. (The other authors—Bent Hansen and Malcolm H. Kerr—deal respectively with economic and broader political issues in the area.) Becker's crisply formulated analysis

1. *Nazi-Soviet Relations. 1939-41: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* Washington, DC, Department of State, 1948, p. 257.

Reviewers in this Issue

GEORGE LENCZOWSKI—Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley (Berkeley, CA); Chairman of the Committee for the Middle East, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA); author of numerous works, including *Russia and the West in Iran, 1919-1948,* 1968, and *Soviet Advances in the Middle East, 1972;* and editor of *Political Elites in the Middle East, 1975,* and *Iran Under the Pahlavis,* 1978.

YOUNG C. KIM—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University (Washington, DC); author of numerous works on international politics and East Asia, including *Japanese-Soviet Relations,* 1975, and *The Future of the Korean Peninsula, 1977.*

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S. FREDERICK STARR—Secretary, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution (Washington, DC); his many published works include, most recently, *Melnikov: Solo Architect in a Mass Society,* 1978, and a forthcoming study of Hans von Herwarth and Hitler's Embassy in Stalin's Moscow.

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concentrates on major issues and trends rather than "drowning" the reader in a mass of detail. This contribution is especially valuable for its treatment of the crucial period 1970-73, i.e., broadly from the year of transition in Egyptian leadership (from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Sadat) to the year of the October war.

FOR ALL THEIR differences, these books present a number of common themes. First, on the question of the USSR's motivation and objectives, the authors generally tend to attach more importance to state interest as perceived by Soviet leaders than to ideology. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse is perhaps most articulate in discussing the relative contributions to Soviet policy of tradition, ideology, and state interest. She sees Soviet policies as a function of all three factors. In particular, she shows the evolution of Communist doctrine and strategy—both from an ideological standpoint and in terms of Soviet state interests—from the rigidly bipolar concerns of the Stalin-Zhdanov era to Khrushchevian and post-Krushchevian formulations stressing the importance of the Third World.

Virtually all the authors agree that the main Soviet objective in the Middle East is to gain a strategic advantage over the United States in the region. Rubinstein is quite explicit on the matter. Galia Golan sees the Soviet Union as intent on establishing its political presence in the Middle East and on legitimizing that presence once established. Thus, the USSR desires to deal with those existing governments that are willing or anxious to cooperate with Moscow—which in turn means, Golan argues, that the ideologically motivated goal of establishing Communist regimes in the area is only a remote, long-range objective. McLaurin defines the Soviet objective somewhat more broadly—as denial to the West of the economic and geographic resources of the area. However, McLaurin, and similarly Yodfat and Abir, claim that due to an expected shortfall in domestic Soviet oil supplies in the 1980's, the USSR is also motivated by the positive wish to secure control over some Middle Eastern oil for its own needs.

These books also provide insight into the means by which Moscow pursues its objectives. The Soviet Union is viewed as seeking to increase its political and military presence by promoting controlled tension in the area. It supports radical-revolutionary (but not necessarily Communist) regimes. It selectively sponsors, or maintains liaison with, movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Popular Front for Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). It supplies arms, military experts, and economic assistance to, and establishes "cultural" links with, other countries in the region. It may establish a presence, as Carrère d'Encausse observes, with or without formal treaty arrangements. The USSR has concluded treaties of friendship at one time or another with Egypt, Iraq and Somalia. (Of course, these treaties proved of short duration in the cases of Egypt and Somalia.) With other countries—Syria, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, and South Yemen—the Soviets have pursued and substantially achieved their objectives without the benefit of a formal treaty.

Does this mean instability in the area serves Soviet objectives better than does stability? Golan and McLaurin advance the thesis that as long as stability is achieved on Western terms, the Soviet Union will favor destabilization of region, but that if stability could be attained under Soviet sponsorship (total or partial) and if, above all, the USSR were to appear as a guarantor of such an order, then its policy would tilt toward the support of stability (Golan, p. 19; McLaurin, p. 27).

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT is recognized by all the authors not only as the central issue in the international politics of the Middle East but also as the principal factor facilitating Soviet advances in the area. Beyond this unanimity, however, it is possible to discern slightly differing nuances in analyses of this linkage. On the one hand, authors of Israeli nationality (Golan, Yodfat, and Abir) and certain others (Rubinstein and Becker) tend to stop short of acknowledging that it is the alienation of the Arabs from the United States due to the latter's pro-Israeli stance that has provided the main opportunity for Soviet penetration. For example, Becker asserts that, in contrast to the NATO countries, the Arab world displayed no strong predisposition to resist Soviet penetration. While partly true (at least insofar as the radical regimes were concerned), such a statement misses the causal link between Arab receptivity to Soviet offers of support and the frustration of Arab endeavors to secure arms, economic aid, and an evenhanded approach from Washington. Carrère d'Encausse, by contrast, definitely points to Arab alienation from the West as the main factor facilitating the establishment and maintenance of a Soviet presence in the area. Moreover, McLaurin reminds us

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that the USSR itself was not always that welcome in Arab circles. Through its vote for partition of Palestine in 1947 and its sale of arms to Israel in 1948 (during the war of independence), the USSR established a working relationship with the newly founded Israeli state, to which the Soviet Union was the first to extend de jure recognition. At the time, then, there was nothing inherently pro-Soviet or anti-American in Arab attitudes. The postwar process of decolonization in the Middle East combined with growing US identification with Israel to bring about a change in Arab attitudes toward the West, a change which Moscow was quick to turn to its own advantage.

An important part in this process was played by the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, to which our authors pay much, if not the bulk, of their attention. Both wars provided an opportunity for close interaction between Moscow and the revolutionary "frontline" Arab states. However, from the authors' accounts it is not too easy to conclude the degree to which the Soviet Union actually contributed to the onset of these wars—whether through incitement, connivance, collusion, or provocation by means of purposeful misinformation. Short of opening the secret Soviet archives, the world will probably have to settle for a variety of differing hypotheses supported by mere scraps of evidence.

With regard to the benefits and costs to the Soviet Union of the June 1967 war, the evaluations of the authors vary greatly. Thus, Becker describes the June war as a defeat for Soviet policy, while Carrère d'Encausse calls it a victory. Here again, as in some other instances, the individual author's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict may perhaps provide some clue to the standards of assessment applied. There is some force of persuasion to the equation: Israel defeats Moscow's Arab client states; hence, Moscow suffers a defeat. On the other hand, even Becker follows up his initial "defeat of the Soviets" thesis by a statement that immediately subsequent to the war the Soviets established their massive presence in the Arab world. The question, therefore, may be asked: what, in political terms, was more important—the actual military defeat of the Soviet-supplied Arab armies (undoubtedly damaging to the Soviet reputation in the area) or the aftermath of the war, during which intensified Arab frustration opened wide the gates to a renewed Soviet influx?

As for the 1973 hostilities, an important consequence from the Soviet perspective was the Arab oil embargo, which was directed against the United States, Portugal (still under the rule of Marcello Caetano, successor to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar), the Netherlands, South Africa, and Rhodesia. While the authors tend to acknowledge that the embargo had an impact on the US, and in particular on its policy toward the Middle East, they are less than unanimous in evaluating the contribution of the embargo to immediate or long-term Soviet interests. On the one hand, Yodfat and Abir say that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1973-74 rendered a great service to Soviet interests. On the other hand, Galia Golan seems to minimize the oil weapon—maintaining that its effect is limited in time because, in some 10 years, oil will decrease in importance as a source of energy. To this reviewer, Ms. Golan's view appears overly optimistic. Since 1973, despite the discoveries in Alaska and the North Sea, imports of Middle Eastern oil to the West and Japan have grown, and in the United States alone dependence on imported oil increased from 33 percent of total demand in 1973-74 to some 45 percent in 1977.[2]

SOVIET POLICY in the Middle East must not, of course, be examined in a vacuum. At least some of the authors of the present volumes address themselves to the question of the significance of the region in overall Soviet global interests. McLaurin claims that while the area's resources are important to the West, they are not so important to the USSR, and hence that the Middle East at present is not vital to the Soviet Union. However, he warns that having once established a presence in the area, the Soviet bureaucracy is loath to see itself dislodged and will thus tend to evaluate the area as "vital." Galia Golan expresses a similar idea, but phrases it differently: the Middle East, she claims, is not a priority area for the Soviets but plays a "crucial subsidiary role" and has the potential for being a "hotbed" out of which superpower conflict might arise. Interestingly, Becker confronts this same question, although in an oblique way. He points out that the Soviets succeeded in persuading American President Richard M. Nixon to acknowledge publicly that the Middle East is of vital concern for *both* the US and the Soviet Union.

The whole discussion about the importance of the Middle East in Soviet global calculations is in turn repeatedly linked by these authors to the problem of détente.

2. Exxon Co., USA, *Energy Outlook, 1978-1990*, Houston, TX, May 1978, p. 16.

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Two ideas seem to emerge from these discussions. The first is that détente permitted the containment of the 1973 war and the avoidance of superpower confrontation. The second is that détente has always had its limitations, as suggested by Soviet public statements that did not abjure the continuity of either ideological warfare or Soviet support for national liberation movements in the era of détente.

This reviewer would look at matters somewhat differently and suggest that such restraint as the Soviet Union showed in both 1967 and 1973 was not due to the rather artificial concept of détente but to sober Soviet evaluation of (1) the balance of world forces, (2) the USSR's own limitations, and (3) the risks inherent in any adventurous military action—or more simply, to an unwillingness to be drawn into a global war at a time and place not of Moscow's choice.

ON BALANCE, it seems probable that the Soviet Union will continue to pay considerable attention to the Middle East, and that the region will therefore continue to loom as an area of possible superpower confrontation. The reviewed volumes are thus to be valued for their contribution to our understanding of past Soviet concepts, policies, and behavior and the basis they provide for assessing future Soviet policy in this strategic area of the world.

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Pyongyang, Moscow, and Peking

By Young C. Kim

WAYNE S. KIYOSAKI. *North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945-1975*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

CHIN O. CHUNG. *Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975*. University, AL, University of Alabama Press, 1978.

GEORGE GINSBURGS and ROY U.T. KIM. *Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1945-1975*. Moorestown, NJ, Symposia Press, 1977.

ROBERT R. SIMMONS. *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War*. New York, NY, Free Press, 1975.

WILLIAM J. BARNDS, Ed. *The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs*. New York, NY, New York University Press, 1976.

THE EXISTENCE of Sino-Soviet conflict has produced ambivalent attitudes in North Korea. On the one hand, the Pyongyang leadership recognizes that this conflict provides North Korea with a measure of flexibility and a freedom of maneuver. On the other hand, it sees the lack of bloc unity as a reason to fear manipulation by both the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well as a constraint on North Korea's efforts to unify the Korean peninsula under its aegis. Indeed, whenever North Korea has found itself closer to one side than to the other, it has suffered consequences.

In light of the last consideration, Pyongyang since 1970 has been pursuing a policy of equidistance toward its big Communist neighbors, scrupulously avoiding comments critical of either. To be sure, the impression persists that North Korea's relations with China are warmer than its relations with the Soviet Union, for North Korea clearly feels closer to the PRC emotionally and ideologically. Pyongyang, for example, notes with much appreciation China's unswerving and ardent support of its policies and especially Peking's explicit praise of and deference to President Kim Il-song. At the same time, North Korea's sense of solidarity with China is tempered by a painful awareness of its own heavy dependence on the USSR for economic aid, the supply of sophisticated weapons, and diplomatic support.

The books under review touch in various ways on North Korea's tortuous path to independence and self-reliance and the complications and problems that such a course has entailed. Wayne Kiyosaki's emphasis is, in his words, on "the role of the great powers in shaping North Korea's foreign policy," and his interpretive essay sheds much light on Pyongyang's handling of pressure from Moscow and Peking. Chin O. Chung provides an informative narrative of aspects of North Korea's relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union and of its reactions to selected issues in dispute between the two Communist neighbors. While his volume is essentially a chronological account of events, the interpretations sprinkled throughout represent a useful distillation and synthesis of the existing literature on the subject. The Ginsburgs-Kim book is a chronicle of the highlights of North Korea's diplomatic activities in general.

Robert Simmons' volume explores the strains and discord among the Communist allies during the Korean war. In the course of this exploration, he develops the argument that factional political struggle in North Korea constituted an important element of the background of the war. Although some of his conclusions are admittedly speculative, his interpretations are thought-provoking.

While the book edited by William J. Barnds covers a broad range of topics, three essays in it bear directly or indirectly upon our concerns here. Donald Zagoria and Young Kun Kim look perceptively at North Korea's

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relations with the major powers. Robert Scalapino presents a lucid and incisive analysis of North-South Korean relations and the unification policies of the two sides. Gregory Henderson makes a plea for a unified independent Korea. While he views a unified Korea with a four-power guarantee of its neutrality and independence as an ultimate objective, he favors a gradualist solution, bestowing his blessing on intermediate measures, including those of the type South Korea has been advocating. Unfortunately, it is not clear how he proposes to move the two sides in Korea—with the respective vested interest of ruling groups that are sustained by profoundly divergent ideological, political, economic, and social systems—to agree to intermediate measures, let alone to travel the path to a unified Korea. No matter how intermediate, measures of any significance would necessarily have crucial implications for the distribution of power within each society as well as between the two societies.

AS THESE BOOKS attest, the interaction among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the USSR, and China has become quite complex. It may be useful, therefore, to explore the dynamics of this interaction—especially insofar as it affects the current situation on the Korean peninsula.

The major foreign policy goals of North Korea are completion of the revolution in all of Korea and promotion of socialist construction in Korea as a means of furthering the development of world revolution. (That these also look very much like *domestic* policy goals should not be surprising, for Pyongyang entertains no distinction between domestic and foreign policy objectives—the latter being viewed as instruments for implementing the former.) North Korean foreign policy places highest priority on the dual task of realizing national reunification and completing the revolution on the Korean peninsula.

The twin aspects of this task, it is important to understand, are closely intertwined. A South Korean revolution and national reunification are prerequisites for the completion of an all-Korean revolution. To put things another way, revolution in the South and national reunification have the common purpose of advancing all-Korean revolution. As the North Koreans see things, revolution in the South and reunification both necessitate the withdrawal of United States troops from Korea. A South Korean revolution involves not only a class struggle for a people's democratic government but also national liberation from the United States. By the same token, the struggle for national reunification must take place throughout Korea under the aegis of the DPRK.

The North Korean view is that the fulfillment of its objectives requires: (1) strengthening of the revolutionary power base in North Korea, (2) bolstering of revolutionary power in South Korea, and (3) securing increased international support. In order to enhance its national power through socialist construction, North Korea seeks to safeguard and strengthen military, political, and economic ties with other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. It also believes that the development of economic ties with the Western nations would contribute to the attainment of this goal. To enhance the revolutionary potential in South Korea, Pyongyang argues that "contradictions" between revolutionary forces and antirevolutionary elements must be intensified. More specific, the political consciousness of the masses in South Korea must be awakened in order to advance struggle under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party, and a united front of workers, peasants, and other progressive patriotic forces such as youth, students, and intellectuals must be formed. To increase its solidarity with international forces, North Korea believes it must (1) deepen its ties with socialist countries and Third World countries; (2) establish diplomatic relations with the countries with which South Korea maintains relations and, if possible, cut off South Korea's ties with these nations; (3) forestall South Korea's effort to develop links with socialist countries; (4) seek membership and participation in all types of international organizations; and (5) capture the allegiance of overseas Korean residents and mobilize them for its cause.

AS FOR THE USSR, Moscow believes that it is in the Soviet national interest to prevent the establishment of hegemonic influence in East Asia by other powers. This general conception underlies, and fundamentally shapes, Soviet policy toward Korea.

At a more concrete level, Soviet policy toward Korea seems to reflect the following premises:

(1) No development in or around Korea should be allowed to bring about a major deterioration in Soviet-US relations which might adversely affect Soviet interests elsewhere. In particular, a severe confrontation carrying the risk of military action should be avoided.

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While a US presence in South Korea is not desirable in either the medium or long run, this presence is not detrimental to Soviet interests in the short run. In a sense, moreover, the American military presence provides leverage vis-a-vis North Korea.

(2) The course of Japan's domestic or foreign policies should not be affected in a way injurious to Soviet interests. In Moscow's eyes, it would be prudent not to encourage or provide a pretext for Japan to increase her military capabilities sharply, and especially to develop nuclear weapons. Nor should Japan be stimulated to move toward closer alignment with China or to undertake more intimate defense cooperation with the US. Finally, Japan's economic cooperation with the Soviet Union should not be jeopardized.

(3) No development regarding Korea should lend support to China's anti-Soviet programs, domestic or foreign. More specific, Chinese influence in Korea should not be enhanced. Above all, Peking should not be allowed to establish predominant influence over North Korea. From the Soviet standpoint, it is crucial that the government in North Korea remain friendly to the Soviet Union, for in the event of a military conflict with the PRC, North Korea would be of strategic importance. Soviet naval activities could be hampered by any hostile power that controlled Korea.

A number of Western analysts, including several contributors to the volumes under review here, claim to see some indications that the Soviet Union may be contemplating application of the German formula to the Korean peninsula. The evidence cited includes private comments of Soviet scholars and Soviet grants of entry visas for South Korean nationals to participate in international conferences held in the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet Union may consider the North Korean formula for unification unrealistic and while Soviet analysts may accept the division of Korea as a fact and expect the division to continue for an indefinite period, it is important to point out that the Soviet government has never advocated a German formula. Nor has it made any serious diplomatic effort to promote the formula in regard to Korea. Moscow remains unresponsive, for example, to a call for direct talks with South Korean governmental representatives. Thus, the Soviet Union appears unlikely to support application of the German formula unless present circumstances concerning Korea alter radically. The most critical factor would probably be North Korea's consent or acquiescence to such a course.

Whatever one's judgment about the alleged Soviet inclination to adopt the German formula, it is not difficult to discern the existence of powerful constraints on Soviet flexibility. One is North Korea's persistent admonitions. The Soviet government does not want to antagonize Pyongyang by taking actions which might undermine North Korea's position on a matter the latter considers vital.

Another constraint is the PRC, which would undoubtedly seek to exploit the situation to the USSR's disadvantage by accusing it of "betrayal." Moscow is highly sensitive to North Korea's ties with the Chinese and feels inhibited from taking actions that might result in increased intimacy between these two countries.

A final constraint is Soviet perceptions of US intentions toward Korea: notably, the degree of US support for South Korea and America's evolving relations with North Korea. Here the troop withdrawal issue weighs heavily. The initial announcement in the spring of 1977 of President Jimmy Carter's decision to pull out American ground forces apparently came as a surprise to Soviet analysts.[1] Despite Carter's campaign promises, they seem to have believed that the international ramifications involved would prevent any new administration from significantly reducing US forces, at least without a quid pro quo. Moreover, they found it incomprehensible that the US would unilaterally give up the powerful leverage it enjoys with respect to both Koreas and to other powers because of its military presence. For these reasons, they have remained skeptical that the Carter Administration would actually implement the force withdrawal plan as initially announced, and they have argued that if the US does so, it would not carry out withdrawal in such a manner as to jeopardize South Korea's security or to bring about a disequilibrium in the balance of power in the region. At the same time, what Moscow sees as instability and uncertainty in US policy toward South Korea during the past several years has contributed to Soviet caution in considering the German formula. Paradoxically, the following proposition generally appears to hold: the greater the perceived degree and steadiness of American support for South Korea, the easier it would be for the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of improving relations with South Korea. (Only a perception that US abandonment of South Korea was imminent might provide the Soviet Union with

1. This judgment is based on private conversations with Soviet specialists.

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more incentive to enter into negotiations with South Korea and to establish its presence in South Korea.)

The Soviet government's caution or "inflexibility," however, is not merely the product of these various constraints. It derives at least as much, and probably more, from the fact that Moscow perceives no clear advantages that would accrue from behaving otherwise and that would offset the possible disadvantages entailed.

Under what circumstances might the Soviet position change? The following developments would appear conducive to a change:

(1) Significant improvement in the relations between the two Koreas. This might involve the conclusion of a nonaggression or renunciation-of-force agreement, or simultaneous entry of two Koreas into the United Nations.

(2) North Korea's estrangement from the Soviet Union and a subsequent strengthening of the North Korea-China entente.

(3) Significant movement in the relations between the US and North Korea. However, such movement would have to be of the sort that would not lead the Soviet Union to believe that the US was significantly diminishing its support for, or attempting to isolate, South Korea.

(4) Fundamental rupture of the relations between the US and South Korea, with a corresponding significant loss of US influence in South Korea.

None of these circumstances is likely to arise in the near future. In the short run, therefore, the Soviet government will probably continue to back North Korea's unification policies. Whatever Soviet analysts may say in private conversations, the Soviet's government's public stance effectively sets the limits of permissible Soviet actions.

However, while Moscow is unshakably determined to ensure the survival of North Korea as an independent socialist country, the Soviet Union also has a major stake in preventing a war in Korea. Consequently, the Soviet Union is likely, in the short term at least, to seek a relaxation of tension and, above all, tranquility on the Korean peninsula.

It should be stressed, nonetheless, that this Soviet position is not immutable. The assumption that the Soviet Union will be both willing and able to restrain North Korea, which this reviewer takes to be an important part of the Carter Administration's rationale for its troop withdrawal decision, may not remain valid over the long haul.

ACCORDING TO many Western specialists, China's policy toward Korea has several components. China tends to regard North Korea as part of its rightful sphere of influence and to attach considerable strategic importance to it. Furthermore, China recognizes that its claim to identification with the Third World is strengthened by firm support from North Korea, an Asian state. But as Peking sees things, the first priority of Chinese foreign policy is to contain Soviet influence in Asia, and for this purpose China must exploit the existence of parallel interests with the US and Japan. By developing a friendly relationship with the powerful US, China can obtain a counterweight to Soviet expansionism as well as facilitate the deepening of its ties with Japan and other Western countries and ensure US cooperation in the matter of Taiwan. To the Chinese leadership, then, a war in Korea is highly undesirable. Not only would it result in greater North Korean dependence on the Soviet Union and a consequent increase in Soviet influence, but it would also bring about a confrontation between China on one hand and the US and Japan on the other, with numerous adverse effects for China in the political, economic, and strategic spheres. For example, it might provide a powerful inducement for Japan to rearm. Thus, a US military presence in South Korea may not be without some merit from the Chinese standpoint, for it keeps South Korea from initiating military action against North Korea, thereby providing China with greater political leverage vis-à-vis North Korea than Peking might otherwise enjoy. China's dilemma, as Zagoria puts it, is to what extent she can oppose a US military presence without undermining America's credibility as a countervailing power in Asia.

These interpretations are plausible and persuasive. Indeed, some visitors to the PRC during recent years have come away with impressions that tend to reinforce them. Nevertheless, such views and judgments remain largely speculative in nature. What is unmistakably clear is that China has consistently expressed vocal public endorsement of North Korean policies, including a call for complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea. For the Chinese, support of North Korea's unification policy is a matter of principle. After all, China, which still seeks to win control of Taiwan, can hardly rebuke North Korea for the latter's insistence on one unified Korea. Moreover, racial, cultural, and ideological affinity, whether real or imagined, enhances the solidarity the PRC feels with North Korea in its struggle for South Korea's liberation.

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To sum up, North Korea regards its relations with its two Communist neighbors as of crucial importance to the realization of its national objectives of strengthening its own revolutionary power base and harnessing international revolutionary power to its cause. Given the nature of Soviet and Chinese interests, however, it would be foolish for Pyongyang to take for granted a compatibility of Soviet and Chinese policies with North Korea's objectives. North Korea may expect, and is presumably aware, that the road ahead will continue to be tortuous.

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The Cuban-Soviet Link

By Cole Blasier

BLANCA TORRES RAMIREZ. *Las relaciones cubano-soviéticas, 1959-1968* (Cuban-Soviet Relations, 1959-1968). Mexico City, El Colégio de México, 1971.

JACQUES LÉVESQUE. *L'URSS et la révolution cubaine* (The USSR and the Cuban Revolution). Paris, Presses de la Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976. English-language edition, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives, 1959-1977*. Trans. by Deanna Drendel Leboeuf. New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY. *Russia in the Caribbean.* Washington, DC, 1973. Part One: Panelist Findings, Recommendations and Comments. Part Two: Special Report by James D. Theberge.

LYNN DARRELL BENDER. *The Politics of Hostility—Castro's Revolution and United States Policy*. San German, Puerto Rico, Inter-American University Press, 1975.

THE STORY of Fidel Castro in Cuba has become a modern fairy tale, exciting curiosity and imagination the world over. Although Castro was once described as a 20th-century Robin Hood, Cuba's economy has such great limitations that he now seems better cast as Cinderella. The United States emerged as a kind of wicked Stepmother in this tale, while the Soviet Union assumed the unaccustomed role of Prince Charming. In 1960, Castro joined the USSR in what became a solid union, although the pair did not "live happily ever after."

Proud and strong-willed from the beginning, Castro strayed from Soviet orthodoxy in both his domestic and foreign policies. Tensions between the two partners reached a peak in 1968 in the wake of the collapse of the national liberation movements that Castro had fostered in Bolivia and elsewhere. The USSR held back Castro's oil allowance as a protest against his disorderly housekeeping and his obsession with Cuba's producing 10 million tons of sugar a year by 1970.

In these quarrels, the Soviet Union was meticulously discreet in public about its Cuban partner. However, Castro, in fits of temper or pique, occasionally let slip clues about tiffs with the USSR. Only recently have both partners maintained a consistent decorum.

For many years, Castro was forced to remain cooped up at home. While this situation stemmed mainly from the punitive sanctions of the United States, Castro may have welcomed the privacy that the isolation afforded him, for it gave him time to establish his authority in his own ménage. Moreover, he may have been afraid to expose his troubled household to the temptations of the wider world. Castro's isolation also suited his Soviet partner well, for it precluded tests of the union against richer and more powerful rivals.

Now, however, this marriage has successfully weathered the initial stages of courtship, adjustment, and consolidation. Both partners have achieved their major objectives in the relationship and feel secure with one another. One result is that Castro has been emerging more and more from his Caribbean domicile. This is not to say that the parties are headed toward divorce. Quite the contrary. Now that the relationship is on a firmer footing, Cuba and the USSR appear to have much to gain from a more open marriage.

SOVIET-CUBAN relations are the main theme of three of the books reviewed in this essay and of several chapters of the fourth, Bender's *The Politics of Hostility.* These four books were written by scholars in international relations with different national perspectives. Blanca Torres from the Colégio de México and Jacques Lévesque from the University of Montreal come from countries that, like Cuba, have enjoyed the advantages and suffered the dis-

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advantages of being a close neighbor of the United States. James D. Theberge, formerly a staff member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University and the author of Part Two of *Russia in the Caribbean,* later ambassador to Nicaragua in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, emphasizes "security" perspectives so often associated with US government policies. Lynn Darrell Bender writes from the Inter-American University in San German, Puerto Rico.

All the volumes are serious and richly documented contributions to understanding Soviet interests in Cuba, especially how these relate to continued rapprochement between the United States and Cuba in the wake of each country's establishment of an "interest section" in the capital of the other in September 1977. Key issues include (1) the extent of Cuban dependence on or independence of the Soviet Union, (2) the military-strategic significance of the Soviet presence in Cuba, and (3) the Soviet position on US-Cuban rapprochement. The analyses of the authors are distinguished more by agreement than disagreement.

Not surprisingly, all concur that Cuba has been extremely dependent in an economic and military sense on the USSR. None, however, maintains that Soviet support for the economy and the armed forces has made Cuba politically or ideologically subservient. In fact, Blanca Torres' main theme is that Castro was able, in spite of Cuba's economic and military dependence, to maintain fairly great political and ideological independence in the 1959-68 period (p. 127). To support her position, Torres points to Cuba's approaches to countries of the Third World, its attempts to become the leader of revolutionary movements in Latin America, and its efforts to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Torres characterizes the Soviet relationship with Cuba as difficult and costly—considerations which help to explain why the USSR has not moved aggressively to establish similar relationships with other Latin American revolutionary movements. Furthermore, she contends that the Soviet Union has had national interests—i.e., raising domestic living standards and reducing tensions with the United States—which have conflicted with heavy Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy and US-Soviet rivalry over Cuba. Indeed, Torres goes further. She claims that the Cuban case indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to grant greater political freedom and independence to those socialist countries which are not vital to its security and that Soviet leaders have never been able to control Communist movements—such as the Yugoslav, Chinese, and Cuban—which achieved power essentially on their own.

Jacques Lévesque reaches similar conclusions. He argues that "the errors committed by Cuba in her economic development strategy and Soviet flexibility in accepting them in spite of disagreements have had positive results. Through her own errors, Cuba has established her own experience. . . .her present orientation is a result of this experience and not of a model imposed from abroad" (p. 208).

Although in the 1960's the conflicts between Cuba and the USSR were so well known that those who described Castro as a Soviet puppet were not convincing, in the 1970's, when Cuban and Soviet policies began to coincide in many different respects, the extent of Cuban autonomy became less clear. Lévesque interprets the changes in Cuban policy in the 1970's toward conformity with the Soviet line as consonant with Cuban economic and security needs, i.e., as the result more of a convergence of interests than of Soviet pressure.

By contrast, the two American authors, Bender and Theberge, put more stress on Soviet influence in Cuba as opposed to the exercise of Cuban autonomy. Bender, for example, writes that although "the extent to which Cuba's policies are today dictated by the Soviet Union cannot be conclusively established. . . Castro could well end up falling into the trap *he has so far successfully eluded* [reviewer's emphasis]—that of almost total dependence upon the Soviet Union and the loss of the cherished Cuban independence" (pp. 55-56). At the same time, Bender does not suggest that Castro has *yet* fallen into that trap. Theberge maintains that by the early 1970's Soviet efforts to gain control over Castro's revolutionary adventures and foreign policy had been largely successful. Indeed, Theberge argues, "Castro was compelled to bow to the Russian pressures and to sign a secret agreement binding himself to support the Soviet line," although Theberge provides no further details (p. 54). Elsewhere, Theberge describes Cuba as tending to be transformed "into an increasingly reliable instrument of Soviet policy in the Western hemisphere" (p. 123). Nevertheless, even Theberge indicates that "Cuba's Fidelista party" is "one of the few Communist parties in Latin America that follows a line independent of Moscow and Peking" (p. 36).

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In my opinion, there is no denying that Soviet influence in Cuba is great, but a convergence of interests accounts better for Cuban behavior than does Soviet pressure. This convergence of interests has applied particularly to Cuba's relations with other Latin American governments. Castro has terminated his support for many guerrilla movements in the area and moved toward friendly relations with incumbent governments which take an "anti-imperialist" stance, such as the military government that seized power in Peru in 1968. While such moves have tended to parallel Soviet policies, they have essentially reflected Cuban interests rather than Soviet pressures. Cuban support for guerrilla movements had failed everywhere—most notably, in the venture that resulted in Ché Guevara's death in Bolivia in 1967. Consequently, rapprochement with "anti-imperialist" governments was more promising than support for guerrilla warfare.

Cuba's efforts to resume relations with incumbent governments in the Americas, including ultimately that of the United States, also have seemed to accord with Cuba's economic interests. The outcome of Castro's economic experiments in the 1960's, which caused the USSR such concern, tended to prove the USSR right—namely, that tested approaches such as those embodied in the Soviet model should receive a fair trial and that Cuba should try to emerge from her isolation in the hemisphere and reestablish economic and political ties with her neighbors.

Convergence of interests even appears to offer a better explanation of Cuban policies in Africa since 1975 than does Soviet pressure. After the mid-1960's, when Cuba was at the forefront of the world revolutionary movement as the host of the Tricontinental Conference, Cuba established its own ties with African leaders—most particularly, those in the Portuguese colonies. And Cuba, even more than the USSR, has been committed to national liberation movements around the world. That is why the frequently heard description of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethopia as mercenaries or Soviet "proxies" exaggerates Soviet power and underrates Cuba's own initiative and commitment in Africa.

ON THE SECOND ISSUE, the significance of the current Soviet military presence in Cuba, only three of the volumes under review are pertinent, for Torres does not cover the post-1969 period, when visits to Cuba by Soviet submarines, surface ships, and aircraft became more frequent. Lévesque devotes relatively little attention to Soviet military relations with Cuba. Generally speaking, he doubts that the Soviet Union's main international objective is the establishment of "world military hegemony." In any case, he believes that in Latin America the USSR—and presumably the same would hold true for Cuba—seeks primarily to bring about changes in regimes in the region rather than to gain "direct military advantage" (p. 213). Although Bender devotes more space to Soviet military initiatives in the Caribbean than Lévesque does, he doubts that "even a sustained Soviet naval presence in this area will. . . change the overall strategic balance" (p. 61). Not unexpectedly, it is Theberge who gives greatest emphasis to military strategic matters, but it is also he who is most explicit that the Soviet military presence in the Caribbean poses greater political and psychological than military-strategic "threats." He maintains, for example, that:

The presence of Soviet strategic or conventional forces in the Caribbean would not alter the military balance or confer important military advantages on the Soviet Union in the event of general war. . . . It could have strongly unfavorable political and psychological repercussions on the US position in the Hemisphere and help to erode US prestige and credibility elsewhere in the world. (p. 135)

All three analysts, of course, were writing before the recent Soviet shipment of MIG-23's to Cuba. However, the information that has emerged to date about the precise characteristics of the airplanes supplied does not suggest that this development would have altered their basic judgments.

With regard to the third issue, the Soviet position on US-Cuban rapprochement, the same three authors present similar views, but with different emphases. What may be most significant is that none of them indicates overt Soviet opposition to such rapprochement. Lévesque is most reserved on the issue, noting simply that the Soviet Union, like Cuba, wants the latter to be able to trade with its natural trading partners for several products and that such a situation would provide important economic benefits for both countries (p. 207). Bender believes that there is little the USSR could do to prevent Castro from taking the initiative in seeking to improve relations with the United States. In a positive sense, he maintains that there are strong indications that the Soviet Union would welcome the end of Cuba's

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political and economic isolation and any consequent lessening of the economic burden that supporting the Castro government entails (p. 78). Theberge goes even further and asserts that "the Soviet Union is exerting its influence on Cuba to break out of its diplomatic and economic isolation and to arrive at an accommodation with the United States" (p. 125). He attributes this effort to Moscow's desire to reduce the economic burden that Cuba poses and to foster peaceful coexistence, but he does not actually show how and when Moscow may have pressed these views on Cuba.

TO SUM UP there is much agreement among the authors on several fundamental points. First, Cuba appears to have considerable freedom of decision with respect to its domestic and foreign policies despite its grave dependence on the Soviet economy and on Soviet military hardware. Just how much is probably impossible to measure quantitatively. Certainly, Cuba makes compromises with the USSR regularly. Yet it should be kept in mind that the capacity of Soviet sanctions to secure Cuban compliance has limits. Economic pressure is the main instrument at Moscow's disposal, and too much pressure of this sort could prove self-defeating. In other words, it could put in jeopardy what the USSR has invested to make Cuba a viable Marxist-Leninist society. That Moscow is unlikely to do. Thus, a Cuban decision to be recalcitrant confronts Soviet leaders with what may be an unsolvable dilemma. As the US has learned, client states often can call the tune.

Second, none of the authors considers the Soviet military presence in Cuba as strategically significant in the sense that it alters the global balance. Although all would attribute some political significance to that presence, they differ on how much. This reviewer believes that as long as Moscow does not violate the main lines of the agreement it reached with Washington during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the political significance of Soviet military visits will be limited.

Third, none of the authors points to Soviet opposition to a US-Cuban rapprochement, and most believe the USSR probably favors it. Surely the Soviet Union would find it politically awkward to oppose such a rapprochement openly. Moreover, it seems probable that the Soviet Union has more to gain in the near future by going along. Since Castro is firmly established in Cuba and the Cuban-Soviet tie is strong, Cuba's rapprochement with the United States would not pose important political or strategic disadvantages for the USSR, and it could prove beneficial economically insofar as it would enable the Cuban economy to become more viable and hence less dependent on Soviet aid. But this speculation deserves more extended discussion than is possible here.

These three conclusions bear upon Cuba's growing openness to the non-Communist world and most particularly to the nations of the Western hemisphere. Currently, the main obstacle to Cuba's complete emergence from isolation, which entails resumption of economic and diplomatic relations with the United States, is Cuban military operations in Africa. Yet it is unlikely that the Cubans perceive themselves as Soviet surrogates in Africa. Indeed, there is not much in the record to show that Cuba is simply a pawn or puppet of the USSR there. Since Cuba's operations in Africa are not under total Soviet control, Cuban forces probably will remain in Africa *only* as long as Havana believes their stay serves important Cuban interests.

Furthermore, Cuban interests in the Western hemisphere appear to lie in the direction of some reconciliation with non-Communist governments. To begin with, Havana's hostility to such governments in the past did not produce tangible revolutionary results. Second, cooperation rather than confrontation would enhance Cuba's long-term security, particularly in the absence of any formal Soviet guarantee of Cuba's independence. (Cuba, it should be stressed, is not a member of the Warsaw Pact). Third, reconciliation would vastly improve the chances of making the Cuban economy viable and eliminating its dependence on Soviet subsidies to cover its huge balance-of-payments deficits. Cuba's neighbors—and most particularly the United States, the Caribbean country's natural economic partner—provide some of the best opportunities for acquiring the markets, technology, and credit that the country needs to eventually stand on its own feet.

Thus, Cuban rapprochement with the United States now seems largely a matter of will. Cuba is not likely to find a secure place within the Western Hemisphere community until the serious problems raised by its military operations in Africa are resolved. And given the nature of Cuba's system and political objectives, its relations with other governments in the area will probably continue to be uneasy. Nevertheless, movement by Havana toward reconciliation with the United States holds out advantages as well as disadvantages for both the Cuban and Soviet governments.

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Anti-Zionism in the USSR

By William Korey

TSEZAR SOLODAR. *Dikaya polyn'* (Wild Wormwood). Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1977.

VLADIMIR BEGUN. *Vtorzheniye bez oruzhiya* (Invasion Without Arms). Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1977.

V.I. KISELEV et al., Eds. *Mezhdunarodnyy sionizm: istoriya i politika* (International Zionism: History and Politics). Moscow, Nauka, 1977.

A NEW HIGH in the Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda campaign which began a decade ago was reached in 1977 with the publication in Moscow of three major monographs presenting Zionism as both the embodiment of evil and a profound threat to civilization. The size of the editions of the first two books and the prestige of the publisher of the third provide convincing evidence of the scope and high priority of the propaganda effort. Moreover, the contents of the books indicate that the campaign itself was founded upon overt anti-Semitic bigotry.

The major theme of *Dikaya polyn',* which was printed in an extraordinary 200,000 copies, is that Zionism cannot be distinguished from mankind's worst enemy, Nazism. Falsely interpreting the Judaic concept of the "Chosen People" as a reflection of a racially-based aspiration for world domination, the book's author, Tsezar Solodar, recalls, for example, that as a youngster of 12 years of age, he had heard Zionist leaders in Vinnitsa make the following remarks:

The Jewish nation has been chosen by God; we are first among all peoples. And everyone who belongs to our world nation, which is now dispersed throughout the entire world, must be ready to raise his sword under the white and blue banner....(pp. 22-23)

He goes on to say that he heard an exact "echo" of these statements in 1941 when he attended the interrogation of four captured German SS men. Strained as his analogy is, Solodar was judged by his publisher, the house of the State Committee for Publishing of the Russian Federation (RSFSR), to have scored an important point in the struggle "against international Zionism, one of the main detachments of anti-Communist forces."[1]

Like Solodar, Vladimir Begun, in *Vtorzheniye bez oruzhiya,* defines the Zionist objective as one of establishing mastery over the world.[2] Begun has long had the reputation of a prolific peddler of anti-Jewish themes in Byelorussian journals, and in an earlier work, *Polzuchaya kontrrevolutsiya* (The Creeping Counterrevolution), he actually tried to justify the pogroms against Jews in the Tsarist era as a legitimate expression of the class struggle.[3] But while Begun's earlier book had been published in Minsk in a relatively small edition of 25,000 copies, his new effort, clearly designed to reach a far larger audience, was published in 150,000 copies in Moscow.

Begun's hyperbole masks his inability to demonstrate the validity of unsubstantiated attacks. Even as "Jewish bankers" have striven to take "control of national governments," he writes in a passage typical of what the book has to offer, so have Zionists aspired to take "into their hands the most powerful propaganda apparatus—the mass information media"; "indeed," he concludes, a "considerable part" of the mass media in capitalist countries already is "under Zionist control." Elsewhere he argues:

1. The comment is noted on the flyleaf of the book. Laudatory reviews of the Solodar work appeared in *Ogonëk* (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1977; *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Apr. 6, 1977; *Sovetskaya kultura* (Moscow), June 7, 1977; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), July 2, 1977.

2. See esp. pp. 7, 22, 37, 40, 44, 48, 64, 103, 110, 112. For a recent enthusiastic review of the book, see V. Shepelev, "The Poisonous Virus of Zionism," *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 24, 1978.

3. Vladimir Begun, *Polzuchaya kontrrevolyutsiya,* Minsk, Byelarus, 1974. See particularly pp. 48-60, 81-82.

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"The ideological sources of Zionist gangsterism originate in the scrolls of the Torah," which is "a textbook unsurpassed for blood-thirstiness, hypocrisy, betrayal, perfidy and moral dissoluteness...." Here he is close to equating Zionism with Judaism—and anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism.

The third volume, *Mezhdunarodnyy sionizm,* makes this theme explicit.[4] The book was published in a relatively small edition of 26,000 copies, but it carried far greater weight than either of the other two under consideration here. Until its appearance, the anti-Zionist campaign lacked authoritative Marxist-Leninist ideological underpinning. Lenin's *Collected Works* contain only some 15 references to Zionism, and with one exception—a brief critique of a few lines—all the references are fleeting.[5] But since *Mezhdunarodnyy sionizm* was published by the prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences and its contributors were drawn from the members of various institutions of the Academy, it provided a powerful ideological endorsement to the campaign which went a long way toward filling this void. TASS trumpeted the landmark achievement in a special release and commentary on July 22, 1977, calling attention to the book's purpose as "the exposure of the ideology of Zionism, of its theory and practice."

The key theme of the volume, elaborated in the focal essay written by V.I. Kiselev,[6] is that the "Jewish bourgeoisie," using Zionism as a cover, aspires to world domination through increased control over the international banking system. Though couched in Leninist terms, Kiselev's argument nevertheless recalls the basic theme of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* the notorious anti-Semitic forgery of the early 20th century.[7] Kiselev points to several banking firms in addition to the Rothschilds', the bugbear of the *Protocols,* as "large financial-industrial Jewish monopolies whose sphere of interests spreads over many countries of Europe, America, Asia, and Africa," and adds that the "influence of the finance bourgeoisie of Jewish origin" extends to "many spheres of material production." Especially "noticeable," alleges Kiselev, is the role of American Jewish finance capital in the "military-industrial complex."

Evidently not content with his initial exaggeration of the power of Jewish finance, Kiselev surfaces a second traditional anti-Semitic theme to distort the truth still further. Postulating the notion of clannishness among Jews, he contends that "among the Jewish bourgeoisie, the use of all sorts of extra-market...kinship relations...through 'one's own'... has always been practiced in a particularly far-reaching manner." Thus, the Lazard-Frères and Lehman Brothers investment groups are said to have "firm ties" with one another. As with the Rothschild family interconnection, these ties symbolize increased influence by means of an "international amalgamation of Jewish finance capital."

A distortion of the "Chosen People" concept also makes its way into the Kiselev volume. Asserting that Judaism considers the "goy"—defined as the "non-Jew"—an enemy against whom "violence" is required, one contributor, using a specious interpretation of Jewish Messianism, hypothesizes that belief in the Messiah is inculcated in Jews so that they will aspire to "mastery over all mankind." The author thus transforms the Chosen People idea into a religious and ideological rationale for world domination.

At first glance, it is very surprising that the Academy of Sciences of the USSR would lend its imprimatur to such blatant distortion in a field with so much potential for political repercussions. It becomes less so, however, when one realizes that the Kiselev volume was published nearly ten years after the Kremlin first launched its anti-Zionist drive in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of June 1967. The volume was produced only after years of carefully orchestrated and increasingly malicious anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda in the official Soviet media had prepared the way for general acceptance of the appearance under the Academy's authoritative auspices of a "scientific," Marxist-Leninist statement of "facts" with which everyone had already been completely familiarized.

LET US LOOK briefly at how the anti-Zionist—and increasingly anti-Semitic—propaganda campaign of the Kremlin developed prior to 1977.

During the first week of August 1967, the principal provincial journals of the USSR carried an

4. For reviews of this book, see *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya* (Moscow), March-April 1978; and *Aziya i Afrika sevodnya* (Moscow), June 1978.

5. The exception is in Lenin's polemic against the Bund written in 1903 and entitled "On the Position of the Bund in the Party." See Shmuel Ettinger's analysis in *Insight: Soviet Jews* (London), May 1976, p. 1.

6. Kiselev's essay is entitled "Zionism in the System of Imperialism,"

7. *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,* trans. by Victor Marsden, Los Angeles, CA, Christian Nationalist Crusade, n.d. The basic study of the *Protocols* is Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1966.

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article entitled "What Is Zionism?" which initiated the propaganda campaign. Its opening paragraph struck the dominant themes to be developed: "A wide network of Zionist organizations, with a common center, a common program, and funds exceeding by far the funds of the Mafia...is active behind the scenes in the international arena." The global "Zionist Corporation" is composed of "smart dealers in politics and finance, religion and trade," whose "well-camouflaged aim" is the "enrichment by any means" of the "international Zionist network." With an "unlimited budget," Zionism exercises control over more than a thousand newspapers and magazines in "very many countries of the world."[8]

With the entire propaganda apparatus of the USSR harnessed to the campaign, Zionism was to be equated with every conceivable evil—racism, imperialism, capitalist exploitation, colonialism, militarism, crime, murder, espionage, terrorism, prostitution, and even Hitlerism. In fact, what is striking about the Kremlin's perception of Zionism, as reflected in Soviet propaganda, is the enormity of the power and evil with which the Zionist network is endowed. As in the *Protocols*, the power is cosmic. No ideology, no "enemy," has received as much attention or been subjected to as much abuse in the Soviet media over the last decade as Zionism.[9]

That anti-Semitism has been at the core of the propaganda campaign is evident from the stereotypic Jewish images projected onto Zionism. Indeed, the distinction between Jew and Zionist became almost completely blurred as the campaign progressed and central elements of Jewish tradition were portrayed as the root of the Zionist evil. The anti-Semitic character of the campaign has been especially clear in the formulations of a number of key Soviet ideological specialists, among whom Yevgeniy Yevseyev, Trofim Kichko, Yuriy Ivanov, and Valeriy Yemel'yanov deserve special mention in our discussion.

The most prolific of the "specialists" on Zionism from the start of the campaign has been Yevseyev. His articles have appeared frequently in major Soviet publications. In an October 1967 essay in *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, for example, he characterized Zionism in almost surrealistic terms as an "invisible but huge and mighty empire of financiers and industrialists" that, with overwhelming economic and political power at its disposal, is able to exert "effective moral and psychological influence upon the sentiments and minds of people... in many countries."[10] Yevseyev's position at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences demonstrates the official nature of his polemics.

Trofim Kichko attracted worldwide attention in 1963-64, even before the official anti-Zionist campaign began, for an anti-Semitic book entitled *Judaism Without Embellishment*. The book evoked sharp criticism from Western Communist parties. His 1968 volume on *Judaism and Zionism*, published in an edition of 60,000 copies, became a primary source work for the campaign itself. Kichko described Judaism as a doctrine teaching "thievery, betrayal, and perfidy" as well as "poisonous hatred for all peoples." Its ultimate objective, he wrote, was to fulfill God's promise that "the whole world belongs to the Jews."[11]

As if to underscore the official character of the campaign, its third key contributor, Yuriy Ivanov, was a Central Committee functionary. In 1969 he wrote what was until recently the standard official work, *Beware: Zionism!* Published in 75,000 copies, the 173-page book was hailed by *Pravda* on March 9, 1969, as being of "undoubted importance" for revealing, once again, "the true and evil image of Zionism." With "one of the largest amalgamations of capital" available to

8. The quotations are drawn from *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), Aug. 5, 1967, one of the provincial organs in which the article appeared.

9. For example, a letter published in *Vechernyaya Moskva* (Moscow), June 28, 1977, called Zionism "the greatest evil on earth." A poem published in *Zvyazda* (Minsk), Dec. 7, 1976, was entitled "Zionism Is the Plague of the Earth." At a "scholars' conference on Zionism" held at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in February 1976, the chairman of the conference and Director of the Institute, B. Gafurov, explicitly declared Zionism to be a greater "enemy" than even Maoism. Maoism, he said, "works more crudely than Zionism," and while Maoism has but one locus, Zionism "fights us everywhere." See the Jewish *samizdat* publication, *Yevrei v SSSR* (Moscow), No. 14, January 1977.

10. *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Oct. 4, 1967. Yevseyev is the author of the standard work, *Fascism under the Blue Star*. The book was hailed by *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 3, 1972, as disclosing "the true face of Zionism" and the "chauvinist racist dogma of the 'Chosen People.'" Yevseyev has written over 40 major articles attacking Zionism since 1967, and is the ideological leader of the right-wing forces in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The conference of the Institute held in February 1976 and referred to in note 9 revealed this fact. The proceedings of the closed conference are summarized in *Yevrei v SSSR*, No. 14, January 1977. They are appropriately entitled "The Protocols of the Anti-Zionist Sages."

11. Trofim K. Kichko, *Yudaizm i sionizm* (Judaism and Zionism), Kiev, Znaniye, 1968. Key quotations from the work, translated into English, were published in *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs* (London), No. 3, January 1969, pp. 45-46.

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it, the international "Concern" of world Jewry, wrote Ivanov, maintains an extensive "international intelligence center" and a "well-organized service for misinformation and propaganda."[12]

By the end of the 1960's, then, writers with as varied backgrounds and institutional bases as Yevseyev, Kichko, and Ivanov had produced powerful, if factually unfounded, anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic tracts. The next major step in the Soviet campaign was not long in coming. On February 18, 1971, *Pravda* carried a lengthy and definitive article by Vladimir Bolshakov labeling Zionism "an enemy of the Soviet people."[13] The appearance of this phrase, ominously reminiscent of the language of the Great Purges of the late 1930's, in the authoritative daily newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was sufficent to indicate that the campaign had entered a new phase.

The theme of Zionism as an enemy of the Soviet people was picked up by the last of the contributors to the pre-1977 propaganda effort to which we will make specific reference here, Valeriy Yemel'yanov. Yemel'yanov, who holds a Candidate of Economic Sciences degree and who until 1976 taught at the Maurice Thorez Institute for Foreign Languages in Moscow, has also lectured for the Znaniye society, a nationwide network of associations for public education and indoctrination in the USSR. On February 19, 1974, he gave a lecture for the society at the Scientific Research Institute for the Rubber Industry, a summary of which later became available in *samizdat*. Zionism, Yemel' yanov told his audience, "represents the most powerful interstate monopoly, which controls up to 80 percent of the economy of the capitalist countries" and 90 to 95 percent of the mass media. The Zionists have declared their intention of achieving "world mastery toward the year 2000." This will lead to a giant struggle, "but victory will be for us" even though the victory will have to be paid for with "20 million lives."[14] After Bolshakov's *Pravda* article using language calculated to link Zionism with Stalin's worst excesses, it now seemed that Yemel'yanov, by using the 20 million casualty figure so often given as an estimate of Soviet losses in World War II, was intent on equating Zionism with Hitlerism.

The propagandists discussed thus far were by no means alone in creating a climate of anti-Jewish hostility. Dozens of other writers developed similar arguments as the campaign became increasingly widespread. Yet it was apparent that the Kremlin was far from satisfied with the results. We now know that in the fall of 1974, in a momentous new development in the campaign, the Central Committee of the CPSU officially adopted a seven-point "Plan of Measures to Strengthen Anti-Zionist Propaganda and Improve Patriotic and National Education of the Workers and Youth." The plan was sent for implementation to every district committee of the party. It called for "intensification of the struggle against the anti-Soviet activity of Zionism" and specifically asked for the selection of a special group of lecturers from the Znaniye society "to give lectures on Zionist themes."[15] The spread of anti-Zionism thus officially became a CPSU goal.

When, toward the end of December 1976, a long and authoritative article appeared in *Izvestiya* warning that Zionism was unique among the "enemies" of the Soviet Union and that as early as the beginning of the 20th century Zionism had declared socialism its "mortal enemy,"[16] the stage seemed set for an intensification of the Soviet anti-Zionist media effort.

A PRIMARY GOAL of the stepped up campaign in 1977 was to maximize the size of the audience. In addition to the usual, voluminous output of the press and to anti-Zionist books which appeared, as discussed earlier, in greatly increased numbers of copies, television was used for the first time to strike a major blow in the campaign.

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12. Yuriy Ivanov, *Ostorozhno: sionizm! ocherki po ideologii, organizatsii i praktike sionizma* (Beware: Zionism! Essays on the Ideology, Organization, and Practice of Zionism), Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, pp. 4-7. See also pp. 71-108, 143, 65. A second edition of the work appeared in 1970 with additional material dealing with the Rothschild family.

13. Bolshakov is one of the leading Soviet ideological specialists on Zionism. His booklet *Sionizm na sluzhbe antikommunizma* (Zionism in the Service of Anticommunism), Moscow, 1972, esp. pp. 46-89, is a principal source of the *Protocols* theme that Jews are economically dominant in the West. Besides this work, Bolshakov has written 18 major articles attacking Zionism since 1967.

14. A detailed summary of the lecture as initially distributed in *samizdat* was reprinted in an Israeli Russian-language newspaper, *Nasha strana* (Tel Aviv), May 28, 1976. The Znaniye group to which Yemel'yanov is assigned is attached to a regional party committee in Moscow. The opinions expressed in his lectures were repeated in an interview in the Palestine Liberation Organization organ, *Falastin al thawra* (Beirut), Mar. 21, 1976.

15. The text circulated in *samizdat* and appeared in *Yevrei v SSSR*, No. 8, April 1976. It is referred to in *Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy* (Moscow), No. 37, pp. 77-78. See also *Radio Liberty Bulletin* (Munich), PC 272/76, May 24, 1976.

16. *Izvestiya*, (Moscow), Dec. 24, 1976.

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On January 22, 1977, Soviet television carried on prime time—at 7 p.m., when viewing was heaviest—a newly-produced, hour-long documentary entitled "Traders of Souls."[17] It juxtaposed visual images of Jews and Israelis with the clear design of evoking suspicion and hatred of Jews. It personified World Zionism as an ugly and grossly corpulent individual passing out five-pound sterling notes to anti-Soviet demonstrators in London. It showed an American Jewish tourist at Moscow airport confessing, during an interview, that he had attempted to smuggle anti-Soviet material into the USSR and ostensibly admitting that he had acted on the instructions of Zionist organizations which may have maintained "clandestine ties with the CIA...." The Jew is characterized in the film as money-changer and "trader of souls," who not only buys demonstrators in London, but funds Soviet Jewish activists with international money orders. The activists themselves are presented as subversive elements, as "soldiers of Zionism within the Soviet Union...." "Traders of Souls" served as the basis of extensive and enthusiastic commentary in newspapers and journals for several weeks after it was first broadcast. Because of "popular demand," the authorities decided upon a re-showing of the documentary on March 11, 1977.

In addition to broadening the audience of the campaign, the directors of the propaganda drive now acted to intensify its effect as well, by focusing increasingly upon themes that stirred the deepest fears of the Soviet public—espionage, war, and Hitlerism. The weekly magazine *Ogonëk,* with a circulation of some two million, was a primary vehicle for these themes. Picking up the espionage idea first, the journal on January 29, 1977, charged that "Zionist agents" had succeeded in the "direct penetration of foreign secret services" with the aim of exercising "influence" over the intelligence operations of a "whole number of states," including the United States and England.[18] The title of the article, "The Espionage Octopus of Zionism," was self-explanatory.

The author of the *Ogonëk* article was Lev Korneyev, who had recently moved into the front ranks of the professional anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic agitators. One by one he would cover all the supposed evils of Zionism. On February 2, he applied his vitriolic pen to the new charge that Zionism was responsible for dumping arms onto the world market in order to foil détente and foster racism.[19] He returned to the theme of militarism on February 16, when he declared that in the USA, the military-industrial monopolies are "to a considerable degree controlled by or belong to the big pro-Zionist bourgeoisie" and "many" of the oil companies which are included in the 100 largest suppliers of the Pentagon are "directly controlled by pro-Zionist capital."[20] The next month, Korneyev elaborated upon the Zionism-equals-war thesis in a long article in an important Soviet military journal.[21]

The Hitlerism theme, emphasized in Solodar's *Dikaya polyn',* was further developed by Korneyev later in 1977 in a two-part series for *Ogonëk.*[22] He had "discovered" during his research, wrote Korneyev, that Zionism had been a hidden ally of Nazism in the struggle against the Soviet Union. According to Korneyev, Zionist leader Chaim Weizman had become an associate of Benito Mussolini in order "to exploit the expansion of international Zionism in the Eastern Mediterranean." The relationship with Hitler was held to have been even more intimate. Through such collaboration, Korneyev charged, Zionism had sought to "ensure the realization of its predatory plans in the Near East" and " 'Zionize' and rob the Jews of Germany."

According to Korneyev, Nazi-Zionist economic collaboration was particularly pronounced:

A whole number of banks and monopolies of the capitalist states (first and foremost of the USA) known as permanent donors to the fund of international Zionism or indirectly connected with Zionism and part of the system of pro-Zionist capital, extended assistance and collaboration to the Nazis both before they came to

17. The documentary film, entitled *Skupshchiki dush* in Russian, has been described in detail in *samizdat.* A summary appears in *Soviet Jewry and the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: Report,* New York, mimeographed, May 1977, p. 4.

An equally anti-Semitic and provocatory film, "The Hidden and the Overt," has been showing to limited audiences, including Red Army groups. In Leningrad it was screened at a public cinema. First news of the film appeared in August 1975. See *ibid.,* p. 48. A general description of the film was published in the Soviet journal, *Kino* (Moscow), August 1975.

18. Lev Korneyev, "The Espionage Octopus of Zionism," *Ogonëk,* No. 5, Jan. 19, 1977.

19. *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* (Moscow), Feb. 2, 1977.

20. *Moskovskaya pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 16, 1977.

21. *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), No. 6, March 1977. In this article, Korneyev also charged that Zionism was allied to "the world of organized crime."

22. Lev Korneyev, "The Sinister Secrets of Zionism," *Ogonëk,* No. 34, Aug. 20, 1977, and No. 35, Aug. 27, 1977.

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power in Germany and in the period when the Hitlerites were preparing for world war.

Listed among the supposedly Zionist-connected financial-industrial groups were the Rockefeller, Morgan, Kuhn-Loeb, and Dupont firms and International Telephone and Telegraph and Standard Oil of New Jersey.[23]

From here Korneyev moved to link Zionism with the major military-industrial and banking complexes of the United States today. In November 1977, he charged that "out of 165 of the largest 'death concerns' in the West, 158 are controlled or directly owned by the pro-Zionist bourgeoisie of Jewish origin."[24] And in July 1978, in *Ogonëk,* he flatly contended that Lockheed Aircraft, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, and many other US defense contractors are dominated by banking firms which are either owned by Jews or at least support "international Zionism and the ruling circles of Israel." He even declared that such multinational corporate giants as General Motors, Ford, General Electric, International Business Machines, Mobil Oil, and Chrysler Corporation are indirectly tied to Zionism through complex capital relationships which "integrate" Jewish capital with "non-Jewish capitalist enterprises."[25]

THE EFFECT of the decade-long anti-Zionist propaganda campaign upon public attitudes in the USSR would be difficult to measure. Yet there can be little doubt that, as reported by Soviet Jewish activists in *samizdat* literature and in their appeals to the West, the level of popular anti-Semitism has been significantly raised. Verbal abuse of Jews was particularly marked after the television documentary "Traders of Souls" in early 1977 and following the much-publicized trials of dissidents such as Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy in 1978.[26]

The impact of other official policies is easier to grasp. Running parallel with the anti-Zionist media campaign, and apparently coordinated with it, was a discriminatory process intended to sharply restrict the number of Jews entering higher educational institutions.[27] Between the 1968-69 and 1976-77 academic years, the number of Jewish students enrolled in Soviet universities declined for the first time, plunging from 111,900 to 66,900—a drop of more than 40 percent. A similar percentage decline occurred at the postgraduate level. Between 1970 and 1975, the number of Jewish postgraduate students fell from 4,945 to 2,841.[28] The long-term consequence of such changes will be an absolute decline in the number of Jews entering the professions.

Even in the short term, professional opportunities for Jews have been circumscribed by the erection of discriminatory employment barriers in certain fields. Nobel laureate Andrey Sakharov in 1968 noted the presence of such barriers at the Soviet Academy of Sciences.[29] And in 1970, Roy Medvedev pointed to a secret party circular which called for restriction of the employment of Jews in responsible posts in particularly sensitive scientific institutions.[30] Since the late 1960's, the pattern of anti-Jewish employment discrimination, according to various *samizdat* publications, has worsened.[31] The new obstacles merely add to and reinforce a complex of barriers excluding Jews from employment in a host of political-security fields.[32]

Medvedev, in a perceptive analysis of the Soviet Jewish question written over eight years

23. Korneyev, as a Candidate of History and staff member of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, strives to project an image of authority in his "research" findings. In fact, the findings are replete with elementary errors.

24. See Lev Korneyev, "The Poisoned Weapon of Zionism," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Nov. 16, 1977.

25. Lev Korneyev, "The Most Zionist Business," *Ogonëk,* No. 28, July 8, 1978, pp. 22-23. By 1978 Korneyev had become more prolific a contributor on Zionist themes than even Yevseyev.

26. Characteristic was the cry of bystanders as Aleksandr Ginzburg was driven from the courtroom in Kaluga where he was tried: "Hitler didn't kill enough of you Jews!" The episode is reported in *Newsweek* (New York, NY), July 24, 1978, p. 27. For a discussion of the impact of the Soviet TV documentary, see *Insight: Soviet Jews,* November 1977, pp. 7-8.

27. For the most recent data, see *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 let* (National Economy of the USSR for 60 Years), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 588. For earlier data and an analysis of them, see Michael Chechinski, "Soviet Jews and Higher Education," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), No. 2, 1973, pp. 12, 14.

28. *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR: Statisticheskiy sbornik,* (National Education, Science and Culture in the USSR: A Statistical Handbook), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 278, and 1977, p. 313.

29. Andrey D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,* New York, NY, W.W. Norton, 1970, pp. 65-66.

30. Roy M. Medvedev, *Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt i yevreyskiy vopros v SSSR* (The Near East Conflict and the Jewish Question in the USSR), Moscow, *samizdat,* May 1970. The same information was reported in the document, *Yevreyskiy vopros v SSSR: tezisy* (The Jewish Question in the USSR: Theses), which appeared in 1970. This document, it was later revealed, was written by Mikhail Zand, now at Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

31. See Lionel Kochan, Ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917,* 3rd. ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 379-81.

32. See William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia,* New York, NY, Viking Press, 1973, pp. 49-63. For some recent developments, see Everett M. Jacobs, "Further Considerations on Jewish Representation in Local Soviets and in the CPSU," *Soviet Jewish Affairs,* No. 1, 1978, pp. 26-34.

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ago, emphasized that Soviet anti-Semitism was "the chief factor and main reason" for the emergence of "Zionist tendencies in the USSR." He warned that the desire for emigration among Jews could be reduced only if anti-Semitism were systematically combated. Ironically, the Kremlin has chosen the opposite course and, as a result of its virulent campaign against Zionism, has increased the aspiration for exodus.[33] Whether the Soviet leadership wants the Jews to leave; or has chosen to make domestic and international capital out of the difficult situation it has created for them, without resolving their plight one way or the other; or has simply miscalculated the effects of anti-Zionism in the USSR is a question for which no definitive answer can be given at the present time.

33. For data on emigration and on the number of applications for exit visas, see Kochan, op. cit., p. 369. The National Conference on Soviet Jewry in New York City regularly issues data on emigration figures. Its most recent report (August 1978) indicates that the emigration rate and the number of applications for exit visas have significantly increased in the last two years.

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Art and Society in Revolutionary Russia

By S. Frederick Starr

IGOR GOLOMSHTOK and ALEXANDER GLEZER, Eds. *Soviet Art in Exile.* New York, NY, Random House, 1977.

NORTON DODGE and ALISON HILTON, Eds. *New Art From the Soviet Union: The Known and the Unknown.* Washington, DC, Acropolis Books, 1977.

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *Artists in Revolution: Portraits of the Russian Avant-Garde, 1905-1925.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1977.

HANS-DIETRICH SANDER. *Marxistische Ideologie und allgemeine Kunsttheorie* (Marxist Ideology and the General Theory of Art), 2nd ed. Tübingen, Kyklos-Verlag/J.C.B. Mohr, 1975.

ELIZABETH VALKENIER. *Russian Realist Art—The State and Society—The Peredvizhniki and Their Tradition.* Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis Publishers, 1977.

FROM THE OUTSET, Western study of Russia and the Soviet Union concentrated on the culture of the printed word. Hence attention was focused on the intelligentsia but not the peasant majority, on graphomaniac revolutionaries out of power rather than on memo-writing bureaucrats, and on *belles lettres* rather than the visual arts and music. The distinctive aspects of print culture in Russia were rarely noted; the nonprint *Nachlass* of Russian society and culture was all but ignored.

Recently, however, this situation has been changing. Bureaucrats are in scholarly fashion; the peasantry is being probed and measured with the scientific techniques of the *Annales* school;[1] and the visual arts are becoming the object of increasing attention. The opening of each new area of investigation permits the posing of fresh questions, which must in turn give rise to appropriate research techniques. Among these frontier fields, the creative arts present a particularly difficult challenge if their study is intended to provide insight regarding broader social issues and not merely to elucidate the course of their internal evolution. Because of this, it may be well to pause and set down some of the issues to which studies of the visual arts might usefully be addressed.

Individual works of art embody symbols and images which reflect the cultural parameters of their author and of their author's world. Often the symbols and images of a given artist, school, or era relate to one another in such a way as to form a system—or language—of artistic expression that is equally coherent whether it is conceived consciously or is merely the unconscious product of individual or collective creativity. After identifying such images and systems, one can often trace their geneology and show how prototypes were modified or transformed under the influence of specific external factors—political, religious, economic, or whatever. Such analysis in turn may lead to inquiries into the social dimensions of works and schools of art.

This kind of study can identify the relevant social coordinates for the artist, the patron, and for both the intended and the actual audience. One might determine, for example, whether the art in question was produced by or for an elite, or whether it was bound up instead with broader elements in the society. Whichever, the case, the important task is to identify the specific aesthetic and symbolic traits that link the work of art with its audience.

1. The *Annales* school of French historiography, represented by, among others, Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel, and Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, holds that through the use of the diverse evidence of social, economic, and cultural history one can reconstruct the distinctive *mentality* of a social group or era.

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Finally, in speaking of a given body of art, one might usefully consider it in a cross-cultural perspective, to ascertain which of its features are common to many societies and which are most nearly distinctive and unique to the setting in which it originated.

It was not to be expected that any one monograph would speak to all of these questions, but it was reasonable at least to hope that no monograph would wholly ignore them either. Thus, such pioneering works as René Fülöp-Miller's *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism*[2] and Professor Donald Drew Egbert's *Social Radicalism and the Arts: Russia,* which regrettably was still in manuscript at the author's death,[3] were both excellent on the intentions of artist and patron but far weaker in their treatment of the art itself and the manner in which it did or did not embody the author's intentions and communicate them to the audience. By contrast, works such as Camilla Gray's *The Great Experiment*[4] and Valentine Marcadé's *Le Renouveau de l'Art Pictural Russe* (The Renewal of Russian Painting)[5] offer well chosen samples of the art being discussed, but elucidate them through references to social and political developments that verge on caricature. Hence, such pioneering efforts left the study of Russian art by students of Russian society as a whole lagging far behind comparable studies on France, Germany, or the United States.

THE PRIMARY STIMULI to the recent blossoming of the study of Russian art in the West were, first, the emergence in the late 1950's of a band of unofficial, or "dissident," artists in Moscow and, second, the rediscovery—both by these Soviet artists and by Western scholars—of the experimental art of the years immediately before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. Three of the books under review treat these topics. *Soviet Art in Exile* and *New Art from the Soviet Union* deal exclusively with the art of the last decade and a half, while *Artists in Revolution* focuses on the early 20th-century avant-garde.

The two volumes on the contemporary scene, it must be stressed, are both exhibition catalogues that have been expanded to include interpretative essays, artistic and political manifestos, and other documents. In each case, a dedicated and knowledgeable collector—Alexander Glezer and Norton Dodge respectively—has enlisted the assistance of professional students of art history for selection and interpretation. The results are thoroughly informative, in part because of the high quality of the various essays included in the volumes, and in part because every effort has been taken to make the selection of paintings presented as broadly representative as possible, even when this has meant including works that might not survive the scrutiny of a rigorous jury of museum directors.

Soviet Art in Exile concentrates on Moscow in the 1960-75 period, that is, the half dozen years or so on either side of the high point of the post-Stalinist "thaw." If one is to judge by the works included, the period produced no masters whose works are likely to endure, but it did permit a remarkable number of talented artists to express their highly personal visions. The very diversity of their visual languages and imagery bears special emphasis. There could be no better evidence of the extent to which a sterile uniformity was imposed on Russian artistic expression for a generation under Stalin than the scale of the effort required to reabsorb all the suppressed modes of expression during the "thaw." Paradoxically, the absence of a developed artistic milieu in which this process could take place may have helped it along. With few patrons initially, no schools fully open to experimentation, few opportunities to exhibit, and no organized system of dialogue with even the educated public, artists were left relatively free to follow their various paths without critics trying constantly to demonstrate their adherence to a given "school" or patrons pushing them to convert themselves into manufacturers of identifiable products. To be sure, a sophisticated infrastructure of studios, critical review, and market was rapidly coming into being; but the very abnormalcy of the first post-Stalinist decade may have protected the delicate process of assimilation at a critical moment. Such a process rarely gives rise to masterpieces, but it is quite capable of producing something more than what Bernard Berenson once called "the originality of incompetence." It is, in fact, a necessary step in the development of a new visual culture that is responsive to its own internal dynamic rather than to external political or economic dictates.

2. René Fülöp-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia,* trans. by F.S. Flint and D.F. Tait, New York, NY, A.A. Knopf, 1928.

3. Donald Drew Egbert, "Social Radicalism and the Arts: Russia," unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 1968.

4. Camilla Gray, *The Great Experiment: Russian Art, 1863-1922,* New York, NY, Abrams, 1962.

5. Valentine Marcadé, *Le Renouveau de l'Art Pictural Russe, 1863-1914,* Lausanne, L'Age d'homme, 1972.

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The result of this process is that few countries can match the USSR today for the sheer multiplicity of visual languages under examination by their artists. This is particularly evident when one expands the frame of reference to include Soviet art centers other than Moscow, as the editors of *New Art From the Soviet Union* have done. In this volume the geographic dimension reigns supreme. Excellent essays devoted to Moscow, Leningrad, and Estonia present an East European art world that is less integrated from center to center than it has been for centuries. Had the editors included the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in their coverage, this fragmentation would have appeared with even greater starkness.

If there is one criticism that must be leveled against both the Dodge/Hilton and the Golomshtok/Glezer volumes, it is that they give too little sense of the broader cultural ideals implicit in the discrete tendencies they identify, and pay too little attention to directions of change. Igor Golomshtok's excellent discussion of "fantastic realism" and Janet Kennedy's fascinating essay on the Leningrad surrealists in the Dodge/Hilton volume go farthest toward providing such analysis. Surely, forms of surrealism such as those discussed in these two essays came closest to being the central aesthetic language of the last generation. And is there any wonder? Like mannerism, surrealism is perfectly suited to express the distortions of reality that result when one set of values or institutions arises suddenly within another but does not entirely supplant it because the old set is sustained by forces that are beyond the ability of the new to affect. Struggle over the heritage of the past is the basic condition of independent art in the USSR. This explains why several authors in these two collections hesitate to call the experimenters of the 1960's an avant-garde.

No such reticence affects discussion of the innovators of the 1910's and 1920's who, through their art, sought to be "culture makers" in the fullest sense of the word. In *Artists in Revolution,* Robert Williams shows that such figures as Mayakovskiy, Malevich, Meyerhold, and Tatlin succeeded to a degree, but by doing so they brought down upon themselves the inevitable wrath of those who held that the power to shape society belongs first to the politician. Rather than to analyze their art per se, Williams's chief concern is to determine what impelled these promethian artists. Both facets of his double answer are of immense interest.

First, through a careful examination of the background of the artists as a group, Williams shows that the cultural upheaval of the early 20th century in Russia was nourished by a social transformation within the community of artists which brought to the art schools of Moscow and Petersburg a band of young provincials eager to storm the cultural heights of Russia and, beyond that, of Europe as a whole. Taken in isolation, this is as common an occurrence in the world of art as it is in any other profession in a rapidly modernizing society. But Williams adds a second, psychological dimension, namely, that the artists in question were, at their point of maximum creativity, "more youthful in spirit than in age" and that they experienced an individual and collective crisis arising from their confrontation with their own mortality. Their common solution to this crisis was, Williams argues, to engage in an orgy of creativity, so as to achieve through art an immortality that their physical beings denied them.

There is much to recommend this approach to cultural investigation, for it brings together social, psychological, and metaphysical elements that scholars generally treat in isolation from one another, if at all. By asking the right questions, Williams opens up bold new prospects to those seeking the roots of 20th-century Russia's spiritual, artistic, and even political culture. What we need now are meticulous studies penetrating still deeper into the lives of individual artists and seeking out the precise links—at both the individual and the collective levels—between their personal development and their specific role as artists and culture makers.

THIS DIMENSION is almost entirely lacking in Hans-Dietrich Sander's *Marxistische Ideologie und allgemeine Kunsttheorie.* The book is a thorough, if traditional, exploration of the theory of Marxist aesthetics in the 20th century. By taking a broadly European perspective and by considering writers of the post-World War II generation as well as the Marxist patristics, Sander reminds us just how serious has been the Marxist concern with aesthetics. He also inadvertently demonstrates how tenuous the links have been between the theory and practice of the "Marxist" visual arts in the USSR, most obviously in the post-Stalin "thaw" period, but in the high Stalin era as well. While far more has happened in recent Soviet criticism than Sander has bothered to indicate in this new edition of a volume which originally appeared in 1970, the author's basic point

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remains valid: a primary reason why Soviet experimental artists have moved outside the orbit of Marxist aesthetic concerns is that they have not found within that body of theory sufficient stimuli to the actual production of art, no matter what value Marxist aesthetics may have in analyzing the final product. The preoccupation of Marxist aesthetics with literature rather than with painting may play a role in this state of affairs, but the underlying causes surely run deeper and would merit serious examination on their own account.

Elizabeth Valkenier's fine book on *Russian Realist Art* provides an ideal jumping-off point for such a reassessment of Soviet aesthetics and, in particular, of Socialist Realism. Up to now, the fact that the early 20th-century abstractionists—who have received so much attention—were but a small minority in a sea of representational painters has been overlooked in Western studies. Yet neglect of the realist mainstream in the last Tsarist period and even during the 1920's has made the renaissance and transformation of realism in the 1930's the more difficult to account for. Valkenier explains not only the peculiar blend of altruism and opportunism that impelled Russia's 19th-century realists, but also the extent to which the realists' early social concerns were overwhelmed by their rabid nationalism. No less than the artists' identification with the downtrodden, this nationalism was the very essence of 19th-century realism in Russia and constitutes one of the bonds connecting the *Peredvizhniki* with Stalin's court painters. It is no wonder, then, that the realist tradition was so staunchly opposed by the avant-gardists of the 1910's and 1920's—and also by most post-Stalin experimenters right up until today. A second characteristic common to the "old realism" and to the Socialist Realism of the 1930's was their literary rather than purely visual quality. This trait, too, contrasts sharply both with the revolutionary avant-garde described by Williams and with much of the current activity covered in the Dodge/Hilton and Golomshtok/Glezer volumes.

VARIOUS COMMENTATORS on Russian art in the past century have been drawn to the conclusion that there exist in Russian visual culture two basic strands, one representational and the other abstract, the former frequently existing in alliance with government interests and the latter tending to be more nearly autonomous. None of the five volumes discussed here supports such a conclusion. On the contrary, whether taken as a group or singly, they all suggest that none of the analytic categories generally invoked to explain Russian visual culture—"realist," "avant-garde," "dissident," "official," and so on—get very close to the heart of the matter. Most, if not all, such categories derive either from the relationship of the artist to some external authority or from some campaign being waged for or against the artist by his critics. Even when appropriate to their subject, their use as labels implies a more fixed, less dynamic situation than in fact exists today in the visual arts of the USSR. Soviet painting in the 1970's may not rival prose literature or the cinema in either the intensity or quality of its output. But the current experimenters are more bold and more sophisticated than the young realists of a century ago, and they enjoy wider backing among the cultural elite than did the early 20th-century avant-gardists. This being so, the activities of Soviet artists provide rich material for all scholars and analysts interested in Soviet affairs generally.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

POLITICS IN CHINA

TO THE EDITORS: In "Politics of Modernization in the PRC" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1978), Mr. Kenneth Lieberthal concluded that there is rivalry between Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and his senior vice premier Mr. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and that the latter is or may be positioning to oust the former.

In November 1977, this correspondent put to certain Chinese officials the possibility of the older generation of leaders not accepting the leadership of Hua Kuo-feng, and that it would be a natural human behavior with a generation gap.

It was pointed out to this correspondent that there was generational unity (oneness in Trinity) in the Chinese leadership group, and there would be no rivalry. This is intended to mean that there is and will be collective leadership in China after Mao.

With respect to many speculations on the leadership crises in China after Mao, it was pointed out to this correspondent that the speculators often disregarded the fact that there was collective leadership in China, that Hua's appointment as the first Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of the country was supported by all the factions—the radicals, the technocrats, and the camp between them—and that the radicals were got rid of by the concerted efforts of the latter two factions.

It was pointed out to this correspondent also that Teng and his old comrades would not want the leadership position. Any attempt by Teng to wrest the leadership position now vested in Hua will lead to crises, and subsequent leadership crises after his death. The appointment of a younger man (Hua) to lead the country until the year 2000 is to avoid leadership crises following the death of people like any of the present three Chinese vice premiers.

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's recent trip abroad may be considered as indicating his confidence of his own position and his confidence that while he was away no one at home was conspiring to ease him out.

The differences listed by Mr. Lieberthal are matters of style, not basic policies.

It is unlikely that Teng in the last decade of his life when he is given a free hand to do his work will jeopardize his beloved country by attempting to wrest the nominal leadership position, and put his modernization plans to a stop by risking a repeat performance of the "Gang of Four" or another decade of 1966-76. The only inference of Teng's present eminence is that Hua needs a man like him and his support, and his reinstatement is intended to bridge the gap between the new technocrats and the old technocrats like Teng.

CHENG TIM PIN
Singapore

MR. LIEBERTHAL REPLIES: My article used evidence of Hua-Teng tension to highlight two dimensions of elite politics in China as of last spring: personal divisions between these two leaders, and a broader cleavage that divides—roughly—the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution from the victims. Subsequent evidence has confirmed the latter part of my analysis. Wu Teh has been purged; Ch'en Hsi-lien and Wang Tung-hsing are under severe attack at the time of this writing; the Cultural Revolution beneficiaries who held first-secretary positions in Tientsin, Peking, Honan, Liaoning, Sinkiang, Heilungkiang, Hupeh, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region have all been purged during 1978 and have been replaced by men who had been targets during the Cultural Revolution; and so on. More broadly, the Chinese media are now openly discussing the reluctance of many who rose during 1966-76 to accept the new set of programs which has been introduced and the tensions this reluctance is generating. In short, the "collective leadership" that Cheng Tim Pin sees is rapidly consuming some of its own—and every one of them belongs to the "younger generation" that reaped rewards from the Cultural Revolution. Teng Hsiao-p'ing may want unity, but he obviously insists that this unity be based on his own set of priorities and is sweeping aside those who disagree.

The personal relationship between Hua and Teng is more complex, and I find myself in partial agreement with Cheng Tim Pin on this issue. The evidence cited in my article suggested severe tension between these two leaders during the winter-spring of 1977-78, and I believe that evidence accurately reflected the situation at the time. The tension visibly continued until at least the conclusion of the All-Army Political Work Conference in early June. Since then, however, Hua has not used a public platform to disagree with Teng. Several Hua quotes have been published that call on everyone to "further emancipate our minds," "be bolder," etc.—all of which give the impression of supporting the radically new programs being pushed through by Teng. Hua has,

CORRECTION

The photo of Georges Marchais' May 1978 press conference on page 10 of the July-August 1978 issue of *Problems of Communism* was serviced by AGIP/Pictorial Parade, not AGIP/SYGMA.

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moreover, either consented to—or failed to stop—the purges of the very leaders whom he so clearly tried to protect during the winter-spring of 1977-78.

One can read this evidence in various ways. My own feeling is that Hua is trying to position himself so as to be able to take credit if the controversial modernization program brings early rewards, while at the same time allowing himself leeway to head the movement to curtail the modernization program if the effort proves too costly and divisive. Hua is, therefore, protecting Cultural Revolution beneficiaries up to the point where Teng can make an effective case that these men are dragging their feet so badly that they are jeopardizing the modernization effort itself. Then Hua perforce sacrifices them.

Teng certainly sees the value of maintaining a façade of unity with Hua, and I would guess that he wants to keep Hua as head of the party (so long as Hua does not resolutely oppose key points of the modernization effort). This situation does not reflect a true "collective leadership" as that term is commonly used, and it certainly does not preclude the possibility of further substantial purges among the leaders in the center and in the provinces. Teng and his colleagues are aging, however, and the real challenge facing them is to ensure that Hua will continue with the controversial modernization program at full speed after their departure from Peking's political stage. Teng's strategy is now geared to this effort—with the de-Maoization issue remaining as central to this endeavor as when I wrote my article last spring.

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